The individual mind and the external world' : an aspect of romanticism in selected writings of wordsworth and coleridge by Bernard, Norman David
'THE INDIVIDUAL MIND AND THE EXTERNAL WORLD':
AN ASPECT OF ROMANTICISM IN
SELECTED WRITINGS OF WORDSWORTH AND COLERIDGE
NORMAN DAVID BERNARD
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Arts University 
of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg for the Degree of Master
oBPTEMBER 1987
DECLARATION
I declare that this dissertation is my own, unaided work. 
It is being submitted for the degree of Master of Arts in 
the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has 
not been submitted before for any degree or examination in 
any other University.
NORMAN DAVID BERNARD 
1 SEPTEMBER 1987
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to my supervisor 
Professor &.G. Woodward for the help he has given me during 
the writing of this dissertation. In addition to improving 
the dissertation stylistically and on many points of detail, 
he made a suggestion concerning the work's structure and 
content the importance of which the relevant footnote in 
Chapter 3 does not nearly convey.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1 p. 1 -
Section A p. 1 "
Section B p. 9 - 19
Section C p. 20 - 20
Chapter 2 p. 30 76
Section A p. 30 " 41
Section 3 P- 42 - 52
Section C p. 53 - 67
Section D p. 68 - 76
Chapter p. 77 - 197
Section A p. 77 - 109
Section B p. 110 - 150
Section C p. .51 - 197
Epilogue: p. 198 - 215
Appendix* The Dejection Ode p. 216 - 224
Footnotes p. 225 " 256
Footnotes to SuKvttary: P- 225
Footnotes to Chapter Is p. 226 232
Footnotes to Chapter 2: p. 233 " 240
Footnotes to Chapter 3: p. 241 - 253
Footnotes to Epilogue: p. 254 - 255
Footnotes to Appendix: p. 256
Bibliography: p. 257 - 276
JHT ^
TEXTUAL SOTS
Unless otherwise stated all references to Wordsworth1 a 
poetry and the 1805 Prelude are taken from The Oxford 
Authors Edition, edited by S. Gill. References to the 1850 
Prelude come from the Norton Critical Edition of The 
Prelude, edited by J . Wordsworth, K.H. Abrams and S. Gill. 
The relevant details concerning these editions are to be 
found in Section 0 of the Bibliography.
SUMMARY
Hopkins‘ characterization of imagination as the "widow of an 
insight lost" hints suggestively at a problem which 
Schiller * famous Letters on the Aesthetic education of Man 
had already shown long before to be central to European 
Romanticism. Imagination and consciousness appear only at 
the cost of destroying an unproblematic unity of self and 
world. As Wordsworth's Preface to the Excursion suggests, 
many Romantic poets and thinkers hoped, paradoxically, to 
regain through consciousness itself a richer, more 
comprehensive unity of being than the innocent unreflective 
unity of self and world that had been lost. A demonstration 
of the kind envisaged in The Excursion that mind and world 
were essentially "fitted" to each other could regain, 
immanently within experience itself, the positives of 
religious experj ence in purely secular terms I
Section B of Chapter 1 suggests that dichotomies of self and 
world had come to be sharply experienced as a result of the 
"Cartesian Split". Descartes’ attempts to ground our 
knowledge of the world by reconstructing it with logical 
inferences from a certitude, the cogito, given to us in 
experience indubitably, left the mind at best precariously 
and contingently connected with the world. The 
self-defining subject is now central to European thought.
Descartes' procedures reflected the methods of a newly 
emergent and highly successful physics which tended to 
favour an atomistic and mechanistic conception of 
experience. These two trends were connected at a deep 
level, for to the extent that subject and object, mind and 
matter were thought of as ontoiogicaily distinct, objects 
were regarded as things to be manipulated and 
controlled.^ These dualisms were intolerable to Romantic 
writers and thinkers. To t ft s. at, on the contrary, what seemed 
to be given in experience was an intuition of the life of 
things. Schelllng, believing that the world '-as an organism 
to be understood in terms of the direction of its evolution, 
came to articulate a metaphysics conceiving of man as the 
spiritual essence of the world rendered conscious.3- In so 
doing he became the first notable thinker to try and 
systematically ground beliefs that roan's relationship to the 
world was a "fellowship of essence". Section C of Chapter 1 
ends with a brief look at seme verse in The Prelude, and 
suggests that Schelling’s philosophy and Wordsworth's poetry 
exemplify what Hirsch calls a common "structure of 
experience".4
The examination ot Coleridge's work starting in Chapter 2, 
Section A, shows how these concerns came to play a role in 
English Romanticism. Coleridge's assertions in the 
Biographia Literaria that "Truth is the correlative ot
Being,.. intelligence and being are reciprocally each 
other's substrate",3 and his recasting of the Kantian 
notion of "Reason" to make it refer to something like a 
direct intuition of spiritual truths,^ indicate how he too 
tried to articulate a conception of the world as embodied 
spirit. The characterisation of Truth and Being cited above 
indicates that the "ideas", the spiritual intuitions to 
which "Reason" gave access strangely resembled potencies and 
agencies. The identy of subject and objects is the ultimate 
principle of not merely our knowledge, but of being itself. 
I attempt to show in Chapter 2 Section B that this attempt 
to ground the conceptual in the non-cognitive led to 
Coleridge assigning art in general, and poetry in 
particular/ enormous importance. The poem, like the faculty 
of Imagination itself, synthesises and unifies by concretely 
embodying our intuitions into the "life of things" in 
images.  ^ The symbol, revealingly defined as a 
"trans]ucence" of the "ideal in the real" and of the 
"eternal through and in the temporal", is claimed to be part 
of the reality it simultaneously represents. Section C of 
Chapter 2 accordingly examines Frost at Midnight and the 
Eolian Harp to show how the attempt to express the notions 
mentioned above influenced the structure and language of 
Coleridge's poems.
Coleridge's poems often begin by depicting a state of 
alienated isolation which is gradually overcome by memories 
and reflections culminating in an insight into the "One 
Life" celebrated in tho Eolian Harp. The use of implied 
auditors to counter the solipsism implicit in the opening of 
a poem like Frost at Midnight 8 and generalize the 
significance nf the poem's culminating insight is also 
fairly frequent. The culminating insight into the "One 
Life" is given actually in an epiphany which simultaneously 
certifies the revelation in question. The precariously 
self-validating nature of the epiphany gives rise to 
difficulties examined in Chapter 2 Section D . The attempt 
of "natural piety" - to use Wordsworth's term - to dissolve 
any sharp distinctions between mind and world in a 
perception of a supposedly common essence is in danger of 
relapsing into solipsism. This is shown by one of 
Coleridge's notebook entries and by some passages in The
Prelude such as -V 247-67, where jects are "crossed" with 
the perceiver's "image11. The ^vatry of Wordsworth and 
Coleridge accordingly embodies an inconclusive 
subject/object dialectic. The f.scariousness of the 
epiphanic moment car aloo result in an attempt, seen in the 
contradictory cloce of the Rolian Harp, to ground our
insight into the "one Life" more aecurely in a "theology" of 
sorts. This tendency ia seen in The Prelude in the
Simplon-Pass passage where objects, "soulless images" in
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themselves, owe their radiance to a "light divine". The 
connections drawn here indicate that Wordsworth's verse will 
be dealt with, initially, by examining the central concept 
of "natural piety", and then the divergent conceptions of 
mind, imagination and experience arising out of attempts to 
deal with the precariousness of both "natural piety's" 
beliefs and the epiphanic moments underwriting them.
Chapter 3 Section A deals with those parts of Wordsworth's 
work - Tintern Abbey and the Invocation to The Prelude are 
central texts - in which affirmations that mind and world
are "kindred streams" are 'relatively unproblematical. 
Detailed attention to the language of the poetcy shows how 
calculated verbal and syntactical ambiguities erode hard and 
fast distinctions between perception and the world 
perceived. However, ambiguities of diction and syntax 
present even in the Invocation reveal a latent tension
between two strands i.j Wordsworth's work, one in which the 
mind half-percQives and half-createe, use a phrase of
Tintern Abbey, and one in which objecti ars, to a greater
degree, constituted as aspects of eel^. One way to deal
with the Bolipsiam latent in "natural ?j.esy's" problematical 
attempt to believe simultaneously \e the independent 
existence of the world and the n:,?-'' - dependence of
perception would be to simply colcbrat ,.e autonomy of mind 
incipient in many passages of The Pra.f •i^ i> ■ This occurs to a
dfigrao in IV 247-1)7, analyovd in nomo Untail, ami in a 
remurknblo colobratitni <>£ tho nind na "linrd ami nnstor of 
outward sense". Thio in, however, proiilfimafcical, for the! 
poet is then "ci»Df\rre<i" i;tom "Nature's inagor.". The Hccomi 
response to the pieuariontmesn of the opiphanic moment has 
already boon outlined above. In the iiiim.Ion-i'ayia pann.-iqo w/5 
soe the emorgenco of an amhiguouoly "autonomous“ 
imagination, the "unfathered vapourdetached from the 
objects of the natura.’. world to the extent that it seeks 
participation in the divine. These two divergent responses 
to the fragility of "natural piety" arc dealt with in 
Section » of Chapter 3.
Soction 0 deals with tho Iircortalifcy Ode, a poem recording a
loos of the “celestial light” and '"visionary gleam" which
reveals the fundamental precariousnesn of the visionary
faculty celebrated in the Sinplon-l’ast? passage. Nostalgic
hankerings after a discredited "natural piety", expressed in
stanza 3, only come to highlight the flight of the <\
"visionary gleam", the din junction botwr on the "celestial
light" and the prioon-houno into which our birth is said to ,
no a descent. flunpendnd between a difioredi t-ed "natural
olcty" and attenuateci trunt in a faculty of vinion whose
orecarioiiflnesfi ha m  hroa revealed, Wordnworth attempts to
r<»< .trcilr? tho poem's tonoiona, unnuccenafully in my opinion,
with the notion of Platonic recollection. In revnllection
jtr a .Jit,
«
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the significance of the child's immediate participation in 
the divine is retrieved for consciousness, the "visionary 
gleam" being simultaneously retained and transformed in the 
“philosophic mind". ® This seems questionable, for if 
our birth is a descent into the "Shades of the 
prison-house", earthly existence must surely be beset by an 
ever increasing blindness which leaves the child "best 
philosopher". The dissertation concludes that Wordsworth's 
‘.vor:< as a whole is characterised by inconclusive oscillation 
between various ultimately divergent accounts of mind, 
experience and the world.
Th 2 Epilogue explores th« continuities between Romanticism 
and Modernism, suggesting that the much celebrated belief in 
p. reciprocal interchange between mind and nature may well be 
Romanticism's most conservative aspect. Romanticism's 
concern with the subject/object dialectic, with the already 
noted uncertainty about the extent of the mind's 
constitutive role in experience was, however, to be 
massively influential. I argue that we see, in Wallace 
Stevens' work, a paradoxically simultaneous radicalization 
of the claims made for imagination on one level, and their 
attenuation on another. Modernist writers often imply that 
a nearly absolute autonomy of imagination, rarely seen in 
Wordsworth, is intrinsic to sensc-perccption. And yet the 
activity of the mind in perception never yields anything
like a celebration of the "One Life", of a metaphysically 
underwritten "fellowship of eesen.e'' of man and nature. 
Redemptive acts of imagination have merely individual 
significance. ^  This diminished metaphysical confidence 
is perhaps a reason why one particular aspect of 
Wordsworth's response to the fragility of "natural piety", 
his radicalization of the subject/object dialectic was 
influential, rather than the Simplon-Pass passage’s attempt 
to ground our perception of "glory" in natural objects 
transcendentally.
CHAPTER ONE : INTRODUCTION
SECTION A
A suggestive hint of what I take to be a central problem of 
Romanticism is found in Hopkins' sonnet to R.B., in which 
imagination is characterized as the "widow of an insight 
lost."* In Hopkins1 sonnet, imagination is only born at 
the moment-when an unproblematic unity of self and world has 
already been lost and, as Hopkins’ characterization may 
suggest to us, it is the paradoxical task of consciousness 
to recover in an enhanced form the unity for whose loss it 
was initially responsible. Hopkins' poem articulates, 
albeit in an elliptic manner, a problem that had become 
widely diffused in European thought and literature from the 
time of Schiller onwards.
In the letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man Schiller 
gave the same distinctively Romantic diagnosis of what many 
of the period’s most eminent writers and thinkers perceived 
to be the fragmentation of contemporary man's experience. 
Although Schiller at times nostalgically contrasted the 
modern condition with what he perceived to be the ideally 
harmonious existence of the Greek polis - the accuracy of
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this assessment need not detain us - Schiller's letters also 
suggest the fragmentation, both individual and collective, 
to be an unavoidable product of self-consciousness itself: 
"If the manifold potentialities in man were ever to be 
developed, there was no other way but to pit them one 
against the other. - This antagonism of faculties and 
functions is the great instrument of civilization - but it 
is only the instrument, for as long as it persists, we are 
only on the way to becoming c i vilized.These concerns
run through Schiller's text like a leitmotif, and are
perhaps mosc precisely formulated in the opening of the
sixth letter - "Such a portrait, you will tell me, does
indeed resemble mankind today, but does it not resemble any 
people caught up in the process of civilization, since all 
of them, without exception, must fall away from Nature by 
the abuse of Reason before they can return to her by the use 
of Reason”.^
In Schiller’s letters On the Aesthetic Education of Man, as 
in Hopkins' sonnet, beauty and reflection, nature and 
consciousness, seem to belong to different orders of being 
that stand in an antithetical relation to one another. 
Precisely to the extent that Schiller's "Reason" comes to 
the fore, it seems that "Nature" is irretrievably lost.4 
Ernst Cassirer has shown in a magnificent essay^ how the 
problems engendered by polarities of "Life" and "Thought",
"Nature" and "Spirit" have continued to beset modern 
"philosophical doctrines of man.”® Similar polarities 
also loom large in the work of a poet such as Wallace 
Stevens indicating - despite the by and large far more 
optimistic thrust of the work of Wordsworth and Coleridge - 
that Romantic categories are, for better or worse, still 
influential. Indeeed, much of ou/ thought on these matters 
still wrestles with problems first articulated clearly at 
the close of the eighteenth century.
At its best, far from being an unsophisticated primitivism, 
the work of Romantic poets and thinkers seeks to convert 
thought into something more encompassing than t' rsly 
intellectual.^ It hopes to attain, paradoxical.- tgh
consciousness, a second or "organized innocence very 
similar to Blake's ideal in the Songs of Innocence and 
Experience. As Schiller's antitheses between "Reason" and 
"Nature" suggest, the means for achieving this is a 
dialectic of contraries. The most succinct account of this 
central Romantic motif ia given by a famous Von Kleist 
parable in which he claims that "..We have eaten from the 
tree of knowledge. Now paradise is bolted shut, and the 
angel stands behind us. We must journey round the world and 
see perhaps whether it is open again somewhere on the yonder
"Then we would have to eat again from the tree of knowledge. 
in order to fall back again into the state of innocence?"
"To be sure" he answered "That is the last chapter .in the 
history of the world".®
M.H. Abrams, writing on Schiller, though the theological 
overtones of Von Kleist's parable are even more obvious, 
considers the letters On the Aesthetic Education of Man to 
be a transposition of "a traditional theological concept - 
the paradox of the felix culpa."9 Abrams is correct to 
point to the religious nature of the "structure of 
experience"9® implicit in Schiller's text. It would, 
however, perhaps be even more accurate to relate the texts 
of Schiller and Von Kleist to the work of a theologian such 
as Briugena, in which we find an exposition of a basic idea 
various transformations of which have subsequently been 
"essential to all Northern mysticism of the pantheistic 
kind."10 As Kolakowski has noted this, "Speaking in the 
mocw general terms ... the idea of the potential Absolute (a 
semi-Absolute, if this expression can be permitted) which 
attains to full actuality by evolving out of itself a 
non-absolute reality characterized by transi- ice, 
contingency, and evil; such non-absolute realities re a 
necessary phase of the Absolute's growth towards 
self-realization, and this function of theirs justifies the
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course of world history . . . The Absolute had to exceed its 
own boundaries and create a contingent, finite and transient 
world in which it could contemplate itself as in a mirror, 
so that, having re-absorbed this exteriorization of itself, 
it might become other than it originally was, richer oy the 
totality of its relationship with the world: instead of a
closed self-sufficient system it becomes an Absolute known 
and loved by its own creation. We have here a complete 
schema of “enriching alienation," serving to explain the 
whole history of being, the vision of a Deity who develops 
by a process of decline and re-ascent ... God, when the 
cosmic epic is concluded, will find himself in a different 
state than before, enriched by his own creatures' knowledge 
of him, so also man, though he return to his ‘first 
■ginnings', will not be purely and simply in his original 
states for he will be in a condition in which a second fall 
is impossible and his unity with God is eternal and 
indissoluble.
Much Romantic thought, as the texts examined so far mp.ke 
clear, could indeed be plausibly regarded as a secularised 
variant of just such a schema of "enriching alienation". 
The unproblematical unity of self and world shattered, as 
Hopkins1 characterization of imagination suggests, by the 
divisiveness of self-consciousness, is, in its own tersii, 
reminiscent of the initial state of Eriugena1s God or the 
neo-Platonic Absolute of the Enneads". 2 The neo-Platonic
Absolute is an undifferentiated and non-contingent being in 
whom essence and existence oo-incide.'*’^  Accordingly evil, 
within such a theogony, is construed as a Call into disunity 
and division. This identification o£ evil and death with 
disunity and division is endemic to much Romantic thought: 
"So long as I am identical with natnro ... I understand what 
a living nature is well as I understand my own life • - » 
As soon, however, as I separate myself from nature, nothing 
more is left for me but a dead object".
Where the two schemas differ most fundamentally of all, 
however, is in the third and final stage of the tripartite 
"structure of experience" outlined above, a structure of 
experience also implicit in the texts of Hopkins, Schiller 
and Von Kleist. As traditional revelation no longer 
commanded intellectual assent, it seemed difficult to accept 
a doctrine in which spiritual integration was finally 
attained when God, “richer by the totality of his 
relationship with the world", re-absorbed the finite 
existents which had formerly - see Kolakowski - functioned 
as an "exteriorization", a self-constituted "other". The 
paradoxical functions assigned to consciousness and 
knowledge in the texts under examination indicate a strong 
awareness that, in an age cf diminished or lost faith 
integration, if possible at all, was only to be had by 
continuing further "along the hard road of culture and 
civilization". The attempt to retrieve, through
consciousness and for consciousness, a state in which 
knowledge - see Von Kleiet - and unity of being are no
longer incompatible, amounts to nothing less than a
"self-deificationof sorts, in which mind achieves 
integration through a "diale'ctic of self-cancelling 
exteriorization",^'1 It is only through some such 
dialectic that the positives of religious experience could, 
as the intellectual climate of the age demanded, be regained 
immanently within experience itself.18
The quasi-religious metaphysical reconciliation of the
sundered polarities of "Nature" and "Spirit" gestured
towards in the texts of Schiller, Von Kleist and Hopkins is 
deeply problematical. It seems vitiatingly circular to hope 
that consciousness can overcome the divisions which it is 
held to have engendered, or believe that we can, through an 
expansion of awareness, annul our sense of the world's 
"otherness" in a manner compatible with continued belief in 
its independent existence. Nonetheless, a dialectic similar 
to that implicit in the texts of Hopkins, Schiller and 
Von Kleist remains central to any understanding of Romantic 
poetry. Much of the poetry of Wordsworth is engaged in a 
search *or that secularized state of Grace in which we come 
to understand as well as fsel
...How exguiritel^ Vs individual Mind 
...to the external 'tid 
Is fitted:- and how exquisitely tooi- 
Theme this but little hoard <>£ aroonfl Mt#n - 
The external World is fitted tu the Mind.
(T)na Kxcuraion, Preface: 63; 65-8)
Whether or not the oundecN polarities of "Reason" and 
’Nature" can be fused through n re-attainment of unity of 
being ic one of fcV d central conc m o  of Romanticism. As the 
Preface to The ft :5ursion indie.iteo, Word;. <rth, Coleridge 
and ';her Romantic posts attempted to overcome the 
dichotomies of c:-lf and world, subject and object, knowledge 
and integral. by trying to articulate a relationship
between mind . i world that is act ivo and reciprocal, from
which c-’lf-cc: . .•iouness of a type associated with the
Knlighter.nont hao boon excluded. In order to understand why 
dichotomic." b< tween coif and vorld should have been so 
sharply ozr 'fionced at this poriod in European history, it 
will be ticv }fi::ary to examine what has come to be known as 
the "Cartnsian fli'l it" .
1
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The kinds of procedure and modes of argument initiated by 
Descartes contrast sharply vnth and were designed to 
supplant ic conventionally religious Medieval and
Renaissance view of the “world as text". ® In a universe
thought of as the product of the Creator's intentions, the 
immanent meaning of an object is hierarchically determined 
by its place in the whole. Knowledge accordingly consisted 
in finding the potentially infinite correspondences between 
beings whose relations to one another embodied a divinely 
underwritten order, and explanation was conceived of as 
purely analogical.
These last two points can be confirmed by a brief extract 
from an early seventeenth century attempt to refute 
Galileo's claim to have discovered Jupiter's moons. 
"...Thera are seven windows given to animals in the domicile 
of the head, through which the air is admitted to the 
tabernacle of the body, to enlighten, to warm, and to 
nourish it. What are these parts of the microcosmos? Two 
nostrils, two eyes, two ears and a mouth. So in the 
heavens, as in a macrocosmos, there are two favourable
stars, two unpropitious, two luminaries, and Mercury
undecided and indifferent. Prom this and from many other
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sirailarities in nature, sueh as the seven metala1 etc, which 
it were tedious to enumerate, we gather that the number of 
planets is necessarily seven. Clearly this passage is 
structured by the assumption that the same conceptual 
categories apply to both thought and the world, and that 
correspondences discovered between objects accordingly 
express the same idea. The implicit assumption that objects 
were the material embodiments of ideas which could be read 
off the book of the world ceased, under the impact of 
religious upheaval and the revival of Pyrrhonism scepticism, 
to be intellect' lly tenable for many by the end of the 
Renaissance. By the turn of the sixteenth century thinkers 
such as Sir Francis Bacon accordingly hoped to elaborate a 
philosophy which would acknowledge the explanatory power of 
the newly emergent physical sciences.
Pre-eminent among those philosophers inspired by 
mathematics, a science in which logical relations between 
propositions were both transparent and necessary, Descartes 
hoped to justify our claims to knowledge of the external 
world in a quasi-mathematical way by means of a series of 
logical deductions from a first principle that could be 
incorrigibly known. In the course of elaborating an 
epistemology simultaneously inspired by and giving impetus 
to the success of mathematical modes of explanation in 
seventeenth century mechanical physics, Descartes was the
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first to formulate a specifically modern account of man as a 
"subject of experience."
The first principle from which reconstruction of our claims 
to knowledge could begin in the absence of traditionally 
religious modes of explanation lay in the cogito, the 
"thinking being" of Descartes1 "I think therefore I am". 
The nature of the certitude, if any, that Dev cartes 
uncovered has been intensely debated^ in a way that need 
not concern us here. What is important for our purposes is 
the Cartesian distinction between "thought events,"^2 the 
realm of the cogito, of which certain knowledge is possible, 
and the world of common-sense experience, bracketed in the 
famous "methodical doubt." This doctrine entails conceiving 
of mind and matter, subject and object, as ontologically 
distinct. In short Cartesian thought entails a distinction 
between the modern self-defining subject of experience and 
the external world about which it comes to have at best 
problematical beliefs.22 At a stroke man becomes the 
privileged being in and through which "representation" in 
the modern sense of the word becomes possible,2* and the 
incorrigibility of the cogito's acts of thinking, believing, 
intending etc the starting point of philosophy.
The divide between mind and matter, conceives of as 
ontologically distinct substances, is what has become known
as the "Cartesian Split." It cannot be sufficiently 
stressed that Descartes1 attempt to ground our knowledge in 
the "self-certainty of the knowing subject"25 led to a 
conception of the knowing subject as externally and 
contingently related to the world. In particular the 
attempt to locate certitude in the cogito led to the 
distinctively modern conception of the problem of knowledge 
as one of "inner representation". Inevitably, its central 
difficulty was that of moving in a logical way from mental 
representations, the data given to consciousness 
indubitably, to the full richness of our experience of the 
external world.^
As the considerations raised in the previous paragraphs 
.suggest, the split between mind and matter, between the 
knowing subject and the objects about which it comes to hold 
problematical beliefs through "inner representation", would 
seem unavoidably to result in scepticism. Descartes proved 
unable to overcome the scepticism generated by his inability 
to justify knowledge of the world whose existence haC been 
bracketed in the "methodical doubt" deductively. He could 
only do so by using the logically unacceptable notion of God 
as guarantor of the objectivity of our perceptions. As 
Kolakowski writes "... this passage from cogito to God 
revealed, from the very beginning, so many logical lacunas 
that the effect of Descartes' efforts turned out ho
contradict his intentions : his strictures on the
reliability of current ways of cognition seemed much 
stronger than his endeavour to build a firm foundation for a 
new kind of certainty; the sceptical side operated better 
than the logically fragile reconstruction of the universe in 
a meaningful order."27 The effect of this lacuna in 
Descartes' philosophy is deeply ironic. Given Descartes* 
failure to justify inferences from the "thought-events" of 
the cogito to knowledge of the external world, scepticism is 
the inevitable consequence of a philosophy that had aimed to 
ground the claims to knowledge implicit in our everyday 
beliefs in a certitude that would establish them once and
The distinction between the modern self-contained and 
self-defining subject and the objects of experiece about 
which it comes to hold at best problematical beliefs, the 
divide between mind and matter conceived of as ontologically 
distinct substances and the scepticism it seemed to entail 
was intolerable to the Romantics. Wordsworth, Coleridge and
other Romantic poets and thinkers attempted to rebut this
picture of the mind externally and contingently related - if 
related at all - to the world by implicitly challenging the 
subject/object model of our epistemological predicament. 
They hoped to show that, far from being an inevitable
consequence of rational thought, such a model rested on
questionable assumptions.
The quasi-mathematical nature of Descartes' attempts to 
reconstruct our knowledge o£ the external world from clear 
and distinct ideas and the inferences that can be drawm from 
them implies a second cluster of equally important 
assumptions, namely assumptions about what can count as
objectivity and rational explanation. One of the most
important assumptions of all was that the laws of nature 
were specifiable by mathematical formulae encoding
regularities "underlying sensible appearances".28 These 
mathematically specificable laws could be uncovered through 
controlled observation, experiment and the use of human
rationality. The capacity for rational thought enabled 
everyone, at least in principle, to attain knowledge in 
science, philosophy or the human sciences by making valid 
inferences fron simple truths known indubitably.28a In 
particular it was believed by many that the success and 
unprecedentedly rapid development of the physical sciences 
would allow ono to extrapolate from their procedures a set 
of rules that would be applicable to furthering knowledge in 
all disciplines, at least in principle. The elaboration of 
a method capable in principle of placing the study of human 
nature on a scientific footing would result in a precision 
capable of resolving or debunking once and for all the 
endless metaphysical debates engaged in by scholastic
Some philosophers, such as Leibnis, encouraged by the fact 
that the methodological elaboration of the differential and 
integral calculus had not merely been a means of statically 
representing the already known, but a means of creating new 
objects of knowledge, hoped to found a "mathesis 
universalis" ie a universal science of measurement, orders 
and relations.^  Others, such as Voltaire, more concerned 
with social and political thought, placed more emphasis on 
"' le bon sens', re-inforced by observation, experiment"^ 
and a polemical willingness to combat prejudice and bigotry 
wherever they were to be found. More important by far than 
such differences of emphasis was the belief that "all 
genuine questions were in principle answerable? truth was 
one, error multiple; the true answers must of necessity be 
universal and immutable, that is, true everywhere, at all 
times, for all men, and discoverable by reason, by relevant 
experience, observation and the methods of experiment, logic 
and calculation. A logically connected structure of rules, 
laws, generalisations, susceptible of demonstration or, at 
least in pr-'ttice, of a high degree of confirmation 
could, at least in principle, be construe ;cd, and could 
replace the chaotic amalgam of ignorance, laziness, 
guesswork, superstition, prejudice, dogma, fantasy and, 
above all, what Helvetius called 'interested error', which 
... had throughout human history been largely responsible 
for the vices, follies and miseries of mankind."32 This
confidence in the power of unaided reason and the 
potentially universal applicability of scientific method is, 
though by no means entirely unchallenged, representative of 
what Isaiah Berlin has called "the central tradition of the 
Enlightenment,
One of the most important consequence of Descartes1 
introduction of quasi-mathematical modes of explanation to 
philosophy was an atomistic and mechanistic conception of 
experience itself. Cartesian ideas, it is important to 
note, are atomistically conceived of as distinct and 
separate, perhaps on analogy with the elementary particles 
of Galilean physics. The British empiricists, not to 
mention the more extreme French Enlightenment materialists 
such as Condillac, La Metrie and Helvetius, beli<ved that a 
genetic reconstruction of the most complex abstract thoughts 
in terms of the association and dissociation of impressions 
rooted in sensory experience was possible.34 Locke, in 
the Treatise on Human Understanding, defines knowledge in 
terms of the inner connection and agreement of our ideas. 
These ideas are, as Berlin makes clear, almost conceived of 
as distinct particles whose agreement with or disjunctness 
from one another can be seen by the "inner eye" of the mind 
in much the same way as the eye itself can group objects on 
the basis of shared properties,33 In such a scheme, human 
nature itself is in principle knowable through and through
jwr a
by means of a scientific psychology whose proper objects are 
to be revealed through introspection. This strand of 
thought is best exemplified by Hume's belief that a science 
of human nature could be elaborated in which the principle 
of the association of ideas would, in the manner of Newton’s 
law of Motion, account for any mental phenomenon by 
explaining why various perceptions come to be "present to 
the mind".^6
As the procedures of mechanical physics and tne attempt to 
produce a scientific psychology with the association of 
ideas as its guiding principle show, a scientific account of 
a range of phenomena has, in a sense, to abstract from the 
particular. This tendency is, the early Hartleyanism of men 
like Wordsworth and Coleridge notwithstanding, fundamentally 
at odds with the deepest strains of Romanticism,^ 
Obviously scientific generalisations can only have 
predictive force if the phenomena to which they apply have 
properties which are not context-dependent.38 In short,, a 
fundamentally "expressive" notion of the universe of the 
type against which the Enlightenment reacted has been 
replaced by a world of purely empirical correlations to be 
mapped by observation,^® for Descartes and the 
Enlightenment, both Renaissance exegesis of the potentially 
infinite correspondence.'.- expressing the intentions of a 
creator and Romantic notions of the world as embodied
spirit, could only seem to be misguided anthropomorphism and
sentimental self-projection.
Charles Taylor is correct to point out that, at a very deep 
level, the modern notion of a subject of experience and the 
atomistic and mechanistic conception of experience outlined 
above are intimately connected with one another. For,
precisely to the extent, that mind and matter are conceived
of as ontologically distinct, the cogito becoming that which 
determines the being of objects of experience, these objects 
come to be regarded as things to be manipulated and
controlled. It is at this point that the Cartesian notion
of subjectivity becomes most strongly linked to the 
technological control that mathematics and mathematically 
inspired modes of explanation had made possible. “This 
control over things which has grown with modern science and 
technology is often thought of as the principal motivation 
of the scientific revolution and the development of the 
modern outlook. Bacon's oft-quoted slogan "knowledge is 
power" can easily give us this impression, and this 
1 technological' view of the seventeenth century revolution 
is one of the reasons why Bacon has often been given a 
greater role in it than he deservos, alongside Galileo and 
Descartes. But ... we can read his motivation in a 
different way. We rather see the control as valuable not so 
much in itself as in its confirmation of a certain view of
spirit, could only seem to be misguided anthropomorphism and
sentimental self-projection.
Charles Taylor is correct to point out that, at a very deep 
level, the modern notion ot a subject o£ experience and the 
atomistic and mechanistic conception of experience outlined 
above are intimately connected with one another. For,
precisely to the extent that mind and mattsr are conceived 
of as ontologioally distinct, the cogitu becoming that which 
determines the being of objects of experience, these objects 
come to be regarded as things to be manipulated and
controlled. It is at this point that the Cartesian notion
of subjectivity becomes most strongly linked to the 
technological control that mathematics and mathematically
inspired modes of explanation had made possible. "This 
control over things which has grown with modern science and 
technology is often thought of as the principal motivation 
of the scientific revolution and the development of the 
modern outlook. Bacon's oft-quoted slogan "knowledge is 
power" can easily give us this impression, and this 
'technological' view of the seventeenth century revolution 
is one of the reasons why Bacon has often been given a 
greater role in it than he deserves, alongside Galileo and 
Descartes. But ... we can read his motivation in a 
different way. We rather see the control as valuable not so 
much in itself as in its confirmation of a certain view of
things : a view of the world not as a locus of meanings, but 
rather of contingent de-facto correlations. Manipulability 
of the world confirms the new self-defining identity as it 
were : the proper relation of man to a meaningful order is 
to put himself into tune with it; by contrast nothing sets 
the seal more cl«e.i’ly on the rejection of this v )ion than 
successfully treating the world aa object of control. 
Manipulability both proves and celebrates this vision of 
things as 'disenchanted' (entzaubert) to use Max Weber's 
famous phrase ...The point of using this term is to mark the 
fact that for the modern view categories c£ meaning and 
purpose apply exclusively to the thoughts and actions of 
subjects, and cannot find a purchase in the world they ttiinx 
about and act on. To think of things in these terms is to 
project subjective categories, to set aside these categories 
is thuc to 'objectify'. This marks a new, modern notion of 
objectivity correlative to the new subjectivity.
SECTION C
An atomistic conception of experience, mechanistic notions 
of explanation, and a radical separation of subject and 
object leading to a perception of the world as 
‘disenchanted," wAr« aspects of post-Cartesian thought 
contributing to the spiritual dilemmas of many poets end 
thinkers whom we loosely term 'Romantic'. Yet poets and 
thinkers could not overcome the subject/object, 
nature/spirit dichotomies or respond to a world which, in 
Carlyle's words, made it impossible even to fine solace by 
believing in a devil,^ by falling back on the theocentric 
world-view. After the assaults of the Elnlightcmant the 
integration of "fact" and "value" sketched in cur brief 
characterization of the Renaissance no longer, as .riicated 
earlier, inspired general intellectual conviction.
If the ideal articulated by Schiller's letterr cr.;' Von 
Kleist's parable of uniting the poles of “L; ascr.and 
"Nature" without sacrificing either was to be achieved, 
sound reasons would have to be given t"' chow that the 
dichotomies of Enlightenment thought resteil ,«n an insdoquato 
and incomplete concapbion of experience itself. Tho first 
philosophical movement to try and do justice to the period's 
aspirations for wholeness and integration wao German
Idealism, and the thinker most influential in this respect 
may well have been Schelling. It is Schelling alone who 
will be briefly examined here, partly because an attempt to 
give a history of German idealism from Kant to Hegel will 
burden the exposition with details of technical philosophy 
not relevant to our concerns. More importantly, however, in 
comparing the two men, £.D, Hirsch is quite correct to speak 
of a "structure of experience" which Wordsworth and 
Schelling shared.4,2 The "structure of experience" 
examined by Hirsch is also, it might be added, relevant to a 
consideration of those aspects of Coleridge's work that will 
be examined in Chapter 2. The many parallels that may be 
drawn between these three figures indicate a measure of 
homogeneity in the concerns of European Romanticism.
It is precisely this attempt to articulate a new and more 
comprehensive conception of experience that was 
Romanticism's attempted answer to the Enlightenment, and a 
clue to its nature can be seen in Blake's polemical
statement that "An atom is a thing which does not
exist."43 Blake's point is that it is the "atom" or the 
Newtonian particle that is an illegitimate abstraction from 
the sensory data. What is actually perceived is the life of 
things, and to treat a living organism in the manner of
science is to lose the truth inhering in one's perception of 
the living, the unique and the particular.
11 connecting the concept of truth with the irreducible 
particularity of perceptions, Blake was drawing attention to 
w iat he conceived V- be the limitingly instrumental nature 
o : scientific thoughts "... our intelligence is constructed 
ir such a way as to be able to deal adequately with inert 
m.'tter and to organize it according to the needs of life; 
it is primarily an organ of survival and of progress in 
technical skills. Its tendency is to red, a qualities to 
qulutitative differences, new phenomena to old patterns, the 
unique to the repeatable and abstract ..."44 Blake 
attempts to counterpose to a reductively instrumental 
rationality a mode of cognition that is, as noted, 
simultaneously a communion with "what is unique and 
therefore inexpressible"4  ^ in the obj .cts "What is real is 
alfays unique ... abstractions have no equivalents in 
reality? since they serve to isolate, for pratical 
purposes, certain qualities, to group objects into classes, 
t\ey are not, strictly speaking, cognitive instruments and 
di not open up any avenues leading to genuine acquaintance 
with reality".4® It is this ostensibly non-abstracting 
rode of cognition claiming to yield a knowledge of the world 
■ iurqed of the taint of utilitarian considerations that many 
iomantic thinkers, from Jacobi onwards, called 
"intuition".4 ' h Blakean strcms on the unique and 
particular makes it clear that intuition is a "kind of 
quasi-identification with the object"4® in which we are
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able to identify with its "life directly, 
 ___  49
a movement of
Schelling was the philosopher who, more than any other, 
attempted to give such intuitions a systz ,<iatic philosophical 
grounding. If the dualisms of post - Cartesian European 
thought were ever to be overcome i c seemed that this was
only possible, as t-hf -• ..„»aerations raised in the previous
paragraph suggest, on the assumption of a connection between 
man and the world that is metaphysical and necessary rather 
purely external and contingent. For as long as I
subscribe to a subject/object epistemological model, "I 
assert that “ *ternal things exist independently and cause 
representations of themselves in me, I necessarily set 
myself above thing and representation. And I thus
implicitly affirm myself as spirit. And the question at 
once arises, how can external things exercise a determining 
causal activity un spirit?1,50
Kant, it is true, had accorded the mind a more active role 
in perception than his materialist predecessors had done. 
His insistence that man only knows phenomenal reality by 
virtue of the a-priori categories in terms of which raw 
sense data are synthesized seemed, however, to leave us with 
the dilemma that we have knowledge only of the phenomenal, 
not of things as they are in themselves. ^  To Schelling
jmt a j t t
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and others the notion of "things in themselves" independent 
of our experience of them seemed intolerable, imposing in 
the last analysis a scepticism that left all the dualisms 
bequeathed by post-Cartesian thought intact. The core of 
Schellirr11s System of Transcendental Idealism lies in his 
attempt to show that the unity of Nature and Spirit in which 
he passionately believes has an ontological foundation. 
Such a connection could be established "not by asserting, as 
Kant had done, that reality for us is a product of 
consciousness, but by asserting that mind and the objective 
world have ultimately the same character.
Schelling believed that he was justified in postulating an 
identical essence for Nature and Spirit for two important 
reasons. Firstly, and most importantly, Schelling's 
somewhat erratic and suspect reflections on scientific and 
biological phenomena display an interest in the genesis of 
organic nature out of the inorganic. This process seemed to 
him to justify regarding the natural world as an evolving 
organism in which several levels of being could be 
distinguished and which could only be properly understood in 
terms of the direction in which it was evolving The 
final stage of this evolutionary process was the stage in 
which, "by imperceptible degrees ... spirit emerged from 
within the material world"54 in the form of man. Since it 
was from within the natural world that spirit emerged
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Schelling, to continue taking him on hie own terms, regarded J , <
man as the essential realization of that world's intrinsic -
nature. If man is the essence of the world embodied and
rendered animate and conscious,5  ^ any attempts to sunder
the two conceptually must be mistaken. Schelling, far from
agreeing with Kant that the notions of purpose and teleology
were purely regulative, telling us nothing substantive about
the world in itself, believed that the considerations
outlined above were sufficient to justify rejecting any
scheme that consigned the physical and the spiritual to
different orders of being.
Schelling also believed, wrongly I think, that the
dichotomies of the Enlightenment were even the upshot of an______________
imperfect interpretation of scientific procedure itself.
The sheer fact of nature's intelligibility, as demonstrated
by the success of scientific experimentation, seemed to
Schelling to be explicable only on the assumption of an
inner kinship with spirit or thought: "Every experiment ...
involves putting a question to Nature which Nature is forced
to answer. And this procedure presupposes the belief that
Nature conforms to the demands of reason, that it is
intelligible and in this sense ideal ..,"^7 In such a
scheme the rift between man and nature opened through
reflection would be resolved, not merely through a 1
sentimental assertion of the primacy of feeling, but at the
level of reflection itself through philosophy and art.58 
In Schelling1s System of Transcendental Idealism the 
distinctions between subject and object, nature and spirit 
can never be absolute because "unconscious subjectivity in 
nature tries to rejoin full subjectivity. But reciprocally, 
conscious subjectivity tries to unite itself to its 
objective counterpart. And this is essential. For the best 
nature can do on its own is life.
It is clearly only some such synthesis that could begin to 
satisfy the demand cf finding in consciousness itself the 
means to overcome the divisions to wnich it had initially 
given rise. It was only if justified on grounds like this 
that unity both within and without, a oneness of self and 
world that did not degenerate into a simple-minded 
primitivism, could be made to seem plausible. Schelling's 
metaphysic is of course at best deeply problematical, 
depending as it does on the ability to give an account of 
nature as embodied spirit that is philosophically 
plausible. Nonetheless it represents an important and 
influential attempt to show that the Cartesian legacy could 
be overcome by showing that this legacy rested on a partial 
and inadequate conception of experience, man and the world.
Speculations about affinities between Wordsworth, Coleridge 
and Schelling should be treated with a measure of caution.
As Hirseh and others have pointed out frequently, 
Wordsworth's knowledge of German was hardly such as to allow 
him to obtain an intimate understanding of texts as 
difficult as those of Fichte and Schelling. Furthermore, 
although the possibility of indirect influence by the far 
more philosophically minded Coleridge cannot be entirely 
discounted, Wordsworth could comment with hostility that he 
"never read a word of German metaphysics, thank Heaven."6®
Nonetheless, if we examine some of the Lyrical Ballads, or 
the mystical vision into the "life of things" that forms the 
climax of Tintern Abbey, it is difficult not to feel that 
Wordsworth was attempting to deal with problems similar to 
those associated with German Romanticism. His poetry bears 
testimony to a sensibility and intuitive Weltanschaung that 
is in many ways strongly reminiscent of Schelling.
Innumerable passages in Wordsworth and Coleridge testify to 
a "Schellingesque" belief that the relationship between mind 
and world is one, in Keats’ words, of a "fellowship of 
essence",®* and that in a post-Enlightenment world fact 
and value can be reintegrated and the hazards of individual 
isolation countered through the mytn of an interchange 
between the self and nature. One of the most famous 
passages celebrating such an interchange is the description 
in The Prelude of the baby at the mother's breast:
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Por him, in one dear Presence, there exists 
h virtue which irradiates and exalts 
Objects through widest intercourse of sense.
No outcast he, bewildered and depressed ...
For feeling has to him imparted power 
That through the growing faculties of sense 
Doth like an agent of the one great Mind 
Create, creator and receiver both.
Working but in alliance with the works 
Which it beholds ...
(1850 Preludes II 238-41; 255-60)
The purposeful ambiguity of the meaning of "sense" makes any 
absolute distinction between mind and the natural world 
quite untenable, the mind working in loving reciprocity with 
"the works/ Which it beholds". Keats' "fellowship of 
essence", the reciprocal relationship between subject and 
object in which neither lose their identities but 
nonetheless possess a deep kinship underwritten by the "one 
great Mind,“ fully justifies E.D. Hirsch in speaking of a 
"structure of experience" which Wordsworth and Schelling 
share in common. Given Wordsworth's lack of concern for a 
rigorously philosophical justification of his intuitions in 
these matters this is probably the strongest defensible 
statement of the relevant similarities. The nonetheless 
striking nature of the parallel is indicative of a measure
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of homogeneity in European Romanticism, both with respect to 
what thinkers and poets of various nationalities considered 
problematical and their attempted solutions. In the
follow! nf/ chapters it will be necessary to assess what
influence a "Schellingesque" attempt to overcome the
dualisms bequeathed by post-Cartosian thought had on the
poetry and theorising of Coleridge and Wordsworth.
CHAPTER TWO
SECTION A
As was stated in the last chapter, the thinkers and poets of 
European Romanticism were above all concerned with what was 
perceived to be -he fragmentation of modern man's
experience- This concern manifested itself in various 
attempts to overcome the dualisms of post-Cartesian thought 
by elaborating a more comprehensive doctrine of the nature 
of experience, man and the world than that bequeathed by the 
mechanistic world-view of the Enlightenment. A 
representative example of such an attempt is to be found in 
Schelling's "Naturphiloophie". This was chosen for
examination because it formulates, in an admittedly more
abstract way, doctrines whose essential kinship with the 
view of nature in much of Wordsworth’s and Coleridge's work 
is not difficult to see.
The attempt to provide a philosophically rigorous grounding 
for the intuition of nature as embodied spirit made an 
enormous impact on Coleridge in particular during his two 
year period of study in Germany. Schelling's work, by his 
own admission, greatly influenced Coleridge's own
philosophical attempts to elaborate a metaphysics showing 
the essential kinship of nature and spirit. Such an 
intuition had already received powerful expression in the 
new genre of the Conversation Poem. It is accordingly 
through the work of Coleridge that the concerns examined in 
Chapter 1 came to play a significant part in the development 
of English Romanticism.
It will be evident from this that I do not agree with the 
belief that the "philosopher" and the "poet" in Coleridge 
were antithetical to one another. No reader of both the 
poetry and texts such as Biographia Literaria and the 
Statesman1s Manual should fail to realise the ways in which 
the Conversation Poems, for example, shed light on the 
concerns of the subsequent philosophical writings and, of 
course, conversely. Both Coleridge's poems and theoretical 
work not only attempt to articulate a rather Schellingesque 
"Naturphilosophie," but also show, in a most concentrated 
form, the difficulties inherent in any such philosophy. In 
My Heart Leaps Up, the poem significantly used by Wordsworth 
aa an epigraph to the Immortality Ode, wo are told that 
Wordsworth hopes to achieve wholeness a*jd integration toy 
"binding his days" together through a "natural piety" 
markedly reminiscent of Coleridge. Accordingly an 
examination of Coleridge's attempts to articulate a 
"Naturphiloeophie" of sorts, along with the difficulties
they encounter, enhances one's understanding of Wordsworth's 
poetry as a whole by placing his concerns within the wider 
context of English and European Romanticism. The ways in 
which Wordsworth's poetry reflect t't<; concerns and problems 
discussed here will be the subject matter of Chapter 3.
A reading of the Biographia Literaria shows that Coleridge 
experienced in the years 1796-7 a crisis very similar to 
that of Wordsworth's as described in Book 11 of The 
Prelude.1 The speculations of the Biographia Literaria 
make it clear that, like Schelling, Schiller and Von Kleist, 
Coleridge's personal crisis derived from the sense of 
metaphysical homelessness attendant on a perception of what 
he took to be the spiritual bankruptcy of Enlightenment 
thought. Like Schelling, Coleridge believed that only a 
full-scale revolution which did not merely tinker with 
individual doctrines of. post-Cartesian thought, but totally 
transformed the nature of philosophical method and enquiry, 
could overcome the spiritual sterility of the 
Enlightenment's "world-view".
For Coleridge the Enlightenment's conception of experience 
was dead and alienating because of the metaphysical 
sovereignty accorded to the "pretensions of atomism and 
mechanism - In Coleridge's view, a useful working hypothesis 
for physical resoa: -h which had been converted first into
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fact, and then into a total wocld-view".2 instead of 
treating the procedures of mechanical physics merely as 
heuristic devices Descartes and later philosophers had 
"propounded it as truth of fact and instead of a World 
created and filled with productive forcc-s by the Almighty 
Fiat left a lifeless Machine whirled about by the dust of 
its own Grindings..."2
As suggested in Chapter 1, the radical separation of subject 
and object implied by Descartes' methodical doubt and the 
atomistic conception of experience that seemed to follow 
from the methods of mechanical physics left a world that was 
truly disenchanted, in which fact and value, fact and human 
purpose were completely sundered. Coleridge4 was to rail 
repeatedly against what seemed to him the essentially 
alienatin-" and de-humanising nature of these doctrines. In 
particular he deplored the way in which the distinctively 
religious dimension of pre-Cartesian philosophy and world 
views had been loot. In this Coleridge displayed very 
similar leanings to thinkers such as Schelling and poets 
like Novalis. Also wishing consciously to restore a 
religious dimension to men's conception of experience, they 
pointed to thoir affinities with German mystics such as 
Jakob Boehme and Meister Eckhnrdh.5
In The Friend Coleridge eSfers a blanket characterisiation. of 
the tenor of Enlightenment thought a s "that intuition of 
things ... which presents itself when we think of ourselves 
as separated beings, and place nature in antithesis to the 
mind, as 01 = ct to subject, thing to thought, death to 
life. '/"• jstract knowledae or, the science of mere
underst- This is contrasted with a very different
philosophical dpoint. In expounding a new metaphysics
Coleridge hoped to make transparent "the contemplation of 
reason, namely, that intuition of things which arises when 
we possess ourselves, as one with the whole, which is 
substantial knowledge ... By this we know that existence is 
its own predicate, self affirmation ... It is an eternal and 
infinite self-rejoicing, self-loving, with a joy 
unfathomable, with $i love all comprehensive."^
The characterization of "existence" as "an eternal and 
infinite self-rejoicing" flies consciously in the face of 
the view, outlined in Chapter 1, that any attempt to see the 
universe as an "expressive totality", whether this totality 
is conceived of in traditional religious terms or not, can 
only be a matter of sentimental self-projection, a 
fundamentally incoherent anthropomorphism attempting vainly 
to apply categories of human purpose to a world in whioh 
they can never be applicable. By trying to formulate a 
metaphysics in which the external world could be shown to be
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deacribable in conceptual categories applicable to human 
purpose Coleridge, no less than Schelling, can be seen to 
return in a sense to the religious notion of "the world es 
text" as expounded in Chapter 1. (see pg 9-10; 17-19) But, 
as with Schelling, Coleridge's philosophy as we may 
reconstruct it from Biographia kiteraria. The Statesman's 
Manual and The Friend was in intenticn anything but a mere 
return - Coleridge realised that no attempt to overcome the 
"Cartesian split" could be based purely on a theocertric
worldview that no longer inspired general intellectual 
conviction. The above-quoted passage ohows that Coleridge, 
with Schelling and others, attempted to overcome
post-Cartesian auaJ.isms by articulating a conception of 
nature as, in its essence, embodied spirit. In articulating 
this notion, the debt Coleridge owed to German Idealism in 
general -nd Schelling in particular can be spelled out at a 
level more concrete and pr-scise than broad analogy.
The distinction between "Understanding" and "Reason" drawn 
in the above quotations derives from Kant, the thinker to 
-horn Coleridge was initially most powerfully drawn.
Although Kant's use of the relevant terminology in the 
Critique of Pure Reason is not always consistent,® the 
"Understanding" is frequently characterised as "the
intellect in so far aa it co-operates with the senses, or 
works uyon empirical data."9 It is accordingly through
t „ „ 4&m d&A jw *
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"Understanding” that we attain our grasp of the phenomenal 
world of experience as ordered toy the a-priori forms o£
intuition and categories o£ judgement. "Reason" on the 
other hand refers to "the intellect insofar as it aspires to 
go beyond the empirical sphere altogether and arrive at 
knowledge of e non-empirical reality ... Reason also turns 
out to have -its own pure concepts, the ideas, each of them 
specific-tions of the fundamental notion of the 
unconditic >ed, and its ambition is to argue on the basis of 
these ide-Ad to the existence and properties of a series of 
non-empirical existents, the soul, the world as an absolute 
whole, God. Kant in a sense regarded these ideas as
inevitable and valuable, provided that they were recognised 
to be purely formal and regulative principles of totality 
that we are inevitably led to entertain during the course of 
empirical enquiry. As purely formal principlas of totality 
they can however yield no positive knowledge, and any 
attempt to make them do eo represents an attempt to use a
category of judgement to transcend experience in an
illegitimate manner.^ Nonetheless, the Kantian
distinction between "Understanding" and "Reason" seemed 
suggestive to Coleridge, who proceeded to modify it in a way 
reminiscent, again, of subsequent German Idealist thought.
Coleridge, in the example given from The Friend, uses the 
category of "Understanding" in a different and more
simplistic manner. Here too Undersx-anSing refers to the 
intellect in so far as it orders empirical data and 
generalizes on tit ° basis of a sense-experience. But in 
Coleridge's usage the category of "Understanding" d, notes 
something mechanical, something akin to the Enlightenment's 
atomistic conception of experience. Coleridgean
"Understinding" refers to something different in kind from 
Kant's structuring of the phenomenal world of experience by 
the a-priori forms of intuition and categories of 
judgement, a process in which mind indeed has a 
constitutive role in perception.
Coleridge's distortion, even if one thinks it in principle 
mistaken, is not unmotivated, for it is accompanied by a 
correlative shift in the use of "Reason". This shift is 
designed to try and overcome Kant's injunction to regard the 
Ideas of Ramon as purely regulative as well as Kant's 
scepticism about the capacity of metaphysics to provide 
knowledge other than self-re^Loxive knowledge of the a-priori 
structuring of human experience. "Reason" becomes for 
Coleridge the intuitive, non-discu-uive awareness of 
spiritual truths. In these matters Coleridge was obviously 
at variance with Kant. J.S. Mill correctly saw that 
Coleri ige dissented from th $ "view that all knowledge 
consists of generalizations from rxoerience, and that he 
claims for Reason, as distinct from the Understanding, the
power to perceive by direct intuition realities and truths 
which transcend the reach of the senses. Although the 
revelation of the "One Life" in the Eolian Harp forces us to 
qualify this remark by remembering that such "truths" 
nonetheless remain intrinsically connectad, for Coleridge, 
with the world of sense, Mill is correct in implying that 
the Kantian terms have been reformulated to accord more 
closely with something resembling the German Idealist 
distinction between "Verstand" and "Vernunft".
As Copleston, Wellek"^ and others hav«i rightly insisted, 
Coleridge hardly succeeds in making even the epistemological 
distinctions crucial to his thinking quite clear. 
Nonetheless the example from The Friend also serves to 
illuminate a second dimension in Coleridge's use of the term 
“Reason". In purporting to perceive, through "Reason", the 
joyous self-affirmation of existence, it is evident that 
this "perception" is for Coleridge a direct intuition of 
spiritual truth in the sense outlined above. Indeed this 
perception of the cosubstantiaLity of the life within and 
without us is for Coleridge perhaps the essential spiritual 
truthi The language of the pussage however also refers to 
the "productive energy"14 of mind behind the perception of 
nature as embodied spirit. This characteristically 
Coleridgean shift of emphasis from product to process, from 
the spiritual truth intuited to the process by which it is
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intuited, results in alternative characterizations of the 
"Ideas" we gain access to through "Reason" such as this: An
idea "is that which is deeper than all intelligence, 
inasmuch as it represents the will and its essential 
underivability."15 In this sense, as Dorothy Emmet points 
out, our ideas seem to be "energies of thinking and 
imagining" involved with "the thinker's own individual 
style"2-6 rather than concepts in any ordinary sense of 
this term. Coleridge's constant vacillation between the use 
of a term like "Reason" to designate either supposedly 
untnediated spiritual truths immediately and non-discursively 
accessible to consciousness on the one hand, and the energy 
of will behind such apprehension on the other, is of course 
philosophically confused. The nature of the confusion 
however indicates the strength of the belief for which 
Coleridge is trying to provide conceptual foundations, the 
belief that the radiance perceived in existence and the 
powers of mind which are the enabling conditions of this 
perception are essentially one.
The risks of an attempt to make "Ideas" ultimately denote - 
although Coleridge’s use of key terms is seldom rigorous and 
systematic - something more akin to powers, potencies and 
agencies than abstractions seemed to Coleridge unavoidable 
if the mechanical world-view of post-Cartesian philosophy 
and science was to be avoided. The shift of vocabulary
intuited, results in alternative characterizations of the 
"Ideas" we gain access to through "Reason" such as thiss An 
idea "is that which is deeper than all intelligence,
inasmuch as it represents the will and its essential 
u n d er i va b il i ty . In  this sense, as Dorothy Emmet points 
out, our ideas seem to be "energies of thinking and
imagining" involved with "the thinker1b own individual
style"16 rather than concepts in any ordinary sense of 
this term. Coleridge's constant vacillation between the use 
of a term like "Reason" to designate either supposedly
unmediated spiritual truths immediately and non-'-discursively 
accessible to consciousness on the one hand, and the energy 
of will behind such apprehension on the other, is of course 
philosophically confused. The nature of the confusion 
however indicates the strength of the belief for which 
Coleridge is trying to provide conceptual foundations, the 
belief that the radiance perceived in existence and the 
powers of mind which are the enabling conditions of this 
perception are essentially one.
The risks of an attempt to make "Ideas" ultimately denote - 
although Coleridge's use of key terms is seldom rigorous and 
systematic - something more akin to powers, potencies and 
agencies than abstractionts seemed to Coleridge unavoidable 
if the mechanical world-view of post-Cartesian phi iouophy 
and science was to be avoided. The shift of vocabulary
allowed Coleridge to attempt to show explicitly the 
interconnections between what he regarded as two related 
sets of truths. Firstly, the sundered realms of fact and 
value could begin 1-o be brought together again within the 
framework of a more comprehensive doctrine of the nature of 
experience, a doctrine which would show the genesis of 
thought in feeling and will.^ In the Animae Postae 
Coleridge speaks of metaphysics as an activity which "makes 
all one's thoughts equally corrosive on the body, by 
inau£=i.-' t of making momently and common thought the
subject ommon interest and intellectual energy 8
In this pcasage and countless others of similar impw.*. 
Coleridge attempts to bridge e gap between binary 
oppositions such as fact and value, feeling and thought, 
mind and body. Like Schelling, Coleridge's metaphors 
gesture towards a philosophy which would do justice to the 
emergence of consciousness from a stream of life of which we 
no less than any natural object, are a part? and, as part 
of this stream, thought, so far from being distinct from the 
nature?, wofld, can be regai'lofi ao the essence of that world 
rendered conscious and articul.ite,
Coleridge’s use of terms like "Roaonn", as opposed to 
“Understanding", to designate the faculty through which we 
perceive the spiritual potencies connecting thought to its 
roots in feeling, emotion, will and much else normally
considered to have no relation to the conceptual, also 
enabled him to try and give substance to a doctrine of 
nature which sees the world and man as cosubstantial. 
Speaking of Nature in an appendix to the Statesman's Manual 
Coleridge writes:
I seem to myself to behold in the quiec objects, on 
which I am gazing, more that an arbitrary illustration, 
more than a mere simile, the work of my own fancy. 1 
feel an awe, as if there were before my eyas the same 
power as that of the REASON - the same power in a lower 
dignity, and therefore a symbol established in the truth 
of things. I feel it alike, whether I contemplate a 
single tree or flower, or meditate on vegetation 
throughout the world, as one of the great organs of the 
life of Nature.19
If tor Coleridge the "Ideas" intuited through the faculty of 
"FGaoon" could be regarded as energies or potencies holding 
together diverse material in a unity which was for Coleridge 
the essence of the spiritual, much the same could be said 
about the organic unity of the "single flower or 
tree. The mind's symbolising powers and the phenomena
of organic growth could be regarded as essentially 
continuous with one another.
,JP, w
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considered to have no relation to the conceptual* also 
enabled him to try and give substance to a doctrine of
nature which sees the world and man aa cosubstantial. 
Speaking of Nature in an appendix to the Statesman's Manual 
Coleridge writes:
I seem to myself to behold in the quiet objects* on 
which I am gazing, more that an arbitrary illustration, 
more than a mere simile, the work of my own fancy. I
feel an awe, as if there were before my eyes the same
power as that of the REASON - the same power in a lower 
dignity, and therefore a symbol established in the truth 
of things. I feel it alike, whether I contemplate a 
single tree or flower, or meditate on vegetation
throughout the world, as one of the great organs of the 
life of Nature.*®
If for Coleridge the "Ideas" intuited through the fac-1*-y of 
"Reason1 could be regarded as energies or potencies “r.lding
together diverse material in a unity which was for Coleridge
the essence of the spiritual, much the same could be said 
about the organic unity of the "single flower or
tree.“*9a The mind's symbolising powers and the phenomena 
of organic growth could be regarded as essentially
continuous with one another.
There is considerable overlap between Coleridge's 
speculations on the essential kinship of thought and the 
world and his writings on beauty and the essential task and 
nature of poetry. Indeed art assumes for Coleridge an 
importance fully comparable to that which it has for 
Schelling, for he too believes it to be the point of union 
between the conceptual and the pre-conscious and emotive 
wellsprings of thought.Copleston correctly points out 
that Schelling's use of art in this pivotal position in his 
metaphysical system is closely related to hi. thoughts on 
the nature of genlv, and the artistic process itself: "If
we consider aesthetic intuition from the side of the 
creative artist, the genius, we can see that in a real sense 
he knows what he is doing: he acta consciously and
deliberately ... AL the same time, however, we can equally 
well say that genius acts unconsciously. Genius is not 
reducible to a technical proficiency which can be imparted 
by instruction: the creative artist is, as it were, the
vehicle of a power which acts through him. And for 
Schelling this is the same power which operates in Nature. 
In other woids, the same power which acts without 
consciousness in producing Nature, the unconscious poetry of 
the Spirit, acts with c insciousness in producing the work of
» . jyr a
art. That is to say, it acts through the consciousness of
the artist. And this i- aotrates the ultimate unity of the
unconscious and the conscious, of the ideal and the
real."21
It is because art, as the locus of the conceptual and the 
non-conceptual, is a mixed and intermediate mode, that it is 
so peculiarly suited to body forth in symbolic form the "One 
Life" of which Coleridge was to speak in The Eolian Harp. 
Speaking of the intermediary nature of the arts, Coleridge 
writes that they owe their reconciliatory power to belonging
to the outward world, for they all operate by the images 
of sight and sound, and other sensible impressions? and 
without a delicate tact for these, no man over was, or 
could be, either a Musician or a poet? nor could he 
attain to excellence in any of these Arts; but as 
certainly he must always be a poor and unsuccessful
cultivator of the Arts if he is not impelled first by a 
mighty, inward power ... nor can he make great advances 
in his Art, if, in the course of his progress, the 
obscure impulse does not gradually become a bright, and 
clear, and living Ideal.22
The Secondary Imagination, the faculty which is associated 
with poetic creativity in Coleridge's thought, is described
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in the BiograpMa Literaria as an echo of the Primary 
Imagination. The Secondary Imagination co-exists with "the 
conscious will, yet still ac identical with the primary in 
the kind of its agency, and differing only in degree, and in 
the mode of Its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, 
dissipates, in order to recreate? or whore this process is 
rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to 
idealize and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as all 
objects (aa objects) are essentially fixed and dead".^
~-;spite a characteristic ambiguity and lack of focus in 
Coleridge i formulation of the relations between Primary 
Imaginat: Secondary Imagination and Fancy, the Secondary
Imagination, as opposed to Fancy, seems to be the faculty 
which creatively refashions the "givens" of perception in 
such a way as to exhibit the organic connections between 
phenomena superficially considered to be unrelated and 
distinct. By contrast, the associations of Fancy remain 
uncreative and mechanistic - Coleridge remarks that "FA’tCY 
on the contrary has no counters to play with but fixities 
and definites".^  The Secondary Imagination diffuses and 
dissipates in ouch a manner as to lead to a spiritual 
intuition of wholeness and intorconnectedness, to "idealize 
and to unify". Through being the power behind the 
production of the arte in general und poetry in particular, 
the Secondary Imagination becomes the mediatory device
* jut .i -JkhT , %
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through which subject and object, V;uught and feeling,
sensuous experiences, images and thought are reconciled.^ 
The ideal poem could for Coleridge be thought cf as a
“concrete universal" of sorts; the poem is that in which 
our intuition of the "One Life", the "joyous
self-affirmation" of existence which Coleridge spoke of in 
The Friend, can be embodied.26 To the extent that the
work of art is successful on those terms it can be regarded 
as beautifuls Co'eridge writes of beauty as something 
objective, consisting in a perception of a "pre-established 
harmony between the organs and their appointed 
objects."27 In embodying beauty in the Coleridgean sense 
art is “the mediatress between, and reconciler of, nature 
and man.
For Coleridge then art, as a mode of apprehending the world 
has enormous cognitive significance. This can be so because 
the Secondary Imagination is grounded in the Primary 
Imagination, the latter being the ultimate guarantor of the 
creativity of all perception through repeating "in the 
finite mind ... the eternal act of creation in the infinite 
I AM".29 Coleridge’s Metaphysics, propounded in the 
Biographia Literarj , and The Statesman's Manual is, despite 
a time-lapse of nearly twenty years, in no way distant from 
the actual accomplishment of the Conversation Poems. The 
metaphysics is in many ways a philosophical attempt to
* . . A m  vm* jut a
philosophically formalize and clarify the implications of 
effects achieved in the poetry itself. Coleridge's poetry 
and his subsequent speculations on the nature of mind 
perception, art and imagination all seem ultimately to 
depend - this will be elaborated on in Section D of this 
Chapter {see p. 66 foil) - on a transcendent ally 
underwritten metaphysics. Even Primary Imagination seems to 
be a local manifestation of the creative energy of the 
"infinite I AM", the ultimate reconciler of subject and 
object and all other metaphysical dualisms. In this 
metaphysics, -=>3 the definition of Primary Imagination and 
the passages on existence's joyous self-affirmation in The 
Friend make apparent, the identity of subject and object, 
mind and matter, the real and the ideal or spiritual is the 
ultimate principle not merely of our knowledge, but of being 
itself.30
The function of art and poetry was to embody, in and through |
images, a perception of the ideal within the real. The
notion through which Coleridge linked his pre-occupation
with wholeness, inherited part from those strands of
German Idealist thought selectively examined in Chapter 1,
with his theorising about poetry, was the symbol. Although
the concept of the symbol is of great importance in
Coleridge's aesthetics, it is seldom explicitly dealt with. |
Coleridge's most suggestive treatment is to be found in The ’ f
Statesman's Manual.
4ak _ J E m .  «.*.
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It is among the miseries of the present age that it 
recognises no medium between the Literal and the
Metaphorical. Faith is either to be buried in the dead
letter, 01 ics name and honours usurped by a counterfeit
product of the mechanical understanding, which in the 
blindness of seif-complacency confounds SYMBOLS WITH 
ALLEGORIES. Now an Allegory is but a translation of 
abstract notions into a picture-language which is itself 
nothing but an abstraction from objects of the senses; 
... On the other hand a Symbol .... is characterized by 
a transxuconce of the Special in the Individual or of 
the General in the Especial or of the Eternal through 
and in the Temporal. It always partakes of the reality 
it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the 
whole, abides itself as a living part in that Unity, of 
which it is the representative.^1
Coleridge and Schelling considered art to be of supreme 
importance because it was through art that a vision of the 
cosubstantiality of all being, of the essential kinship of 
man and world, received concrete embodiment. The symbol in 
particular concretely embodied this vision because, through 
being the desired "medium between the Literal and 
Metaphorical", it could partake of the reality it
simultaneously represented. In the Statesman's Manual, a 
work largely devoted to theological matters, Coleridge pays
indirect tribute to the reconciliatory power of art and the 
faculty of Imagination by insisting that symbolical 
perception was not appropriate merely to the scriptures, but 
also to "another book - Hkewioo a revelation of God - the
which naM.e is regarded as embodied sp.’rit and the 
relationship between man and world as a "fellowship of 
essence" has, as noted before, certain affinities with the 
Renaissance notion of "world as text". The irreducible 
"concreteness" of the symbol is shown by Coleridge's 
characterization of it as the "translucence of the Special 
in the Individual". The sense of th'-- numinous and 
sacramental in the natural world celebrated by art is given 
actually rather than as received revelation. Fact and 
value, man and world are re-integrated in the religious 
notion of a world which embodies the "One Life" in all its 
parts. The positives of religious experience would have 
been recaptured, as the intellectual climate of the time 
demanded, by a "natural supernaturalism"33 that locates 
the s-cred, the animating life-force, immanently within the 
world and experience itself.
Before proceeding it is worth briefly noting a recurrent 
tension in Coleridge's philosophical thought, a tension 
which will be dealt with in section D of this chapter. This
great book of hid servant Nature."'*2 «. metaphysics in
Jfer a
tension can be seen in Coleridge's characterization of the 
symbol as the translucence of the "Eternal through and in 
the Temporal". The main thrust of the argument so far has 
been to locate the “eternal", the "ideal", within the 
natural world and our experience of it. The formulation is 
however ambiguous, for the radiance manifested "through and 
in the Temporal" could well have a source other than the 
merely natural. A similar ambiguity is apparent in 
Coleridge's grounding of Primary Imagination in the activity 
of the "infinite I AM". The explicitly theological nature 
of the way in which Secondary Imagination is grounded 
indicates a tendency in Coleridge's thought to move from a 
"natural supernaturalism" in Abrams' sense to a stance 
which, although ambiguous, resembles a theism of a more 
traditional kind. This instability in Coleridge's 
argumentation causes legitimate doubt about the possibility 
of recovering our sense of the sacred, the religious 
dimension of Renaissance thought, using purely secular means.
The insistence that the symbol "partakes of the reality it 
renders intelligible" stresses its concreteness in such a 
way as to leave little doubt that here, at least, " the 
eternal" bears a strong resemblance to the "sentiment of 
being" spoken of in The Prelude. If the eternal manifested 
"through and in the Temporal" is essentially kin to the "One 
Life" of The Eolian Harp, the epiphanic moment in which the
"One Life" is revealed is grounded in our experience of the 
natural world. Coleridge's principal poetic problem was 
accordingly to find a language and structure for a poem 
adequate to displaying the experiential process through 
which the translucsnce of eternal in the particular, in 
natural objects, comes to be perceived.
This necessitated a revolutionising of poetic language and 
the creation of an essentially new form, that of the 
Conversation Poem, as exemplified in The Eolian Harp, This 
Lime-Tree Bower My Prison, and Prost at Midnight. Not even 
poetry of the "sentimental" tradition of the eighteenth 
century was adequate to conveying a vision of reality 
demanding a connection between mind and nature more intimate 
than any the Enlightenment had been prepared to entertain. 
Coleridge came to dislike in a sentimental poet like Bowles 
what he called hie "moralizing trick", his didactic habit of 
connecting the landscapes, ostensibly the cause of his 
meditations, by "dim analogies with the moral world.
Ir. keeping with his beliefs that thought, emotions and the 
natural object stood in essential and metaphysically 
necessary rather than external and contingent connection 
with one another, Coleridge insisted that "a poet's heart 
and intellect should be combined, intimately combined and 
unified with the great appearances of nature, and not merely
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of formal similes."3^ In speaking of the totalizing power 
of the symbol, a totalizing power at the heart of 
Romanticism's own self-understanding, Coleridge is searching 
for a language adequate to a moment of unmediated insight in 
which all the antimonies of post-Cartesian thought are 
reconciled. This search for a language that could attain 
ideality adequate to the translucence of the Eternal in the 
Temporal places Coleridge in a philosophical tradition whose 
attitude to language is \'timately mystical.3®
Far from striving to reform language by purging it of its 
metaphorical imprecisions3  ^ Coleridge emphasised a view of 
language which makes its primary functions “gnostic.”38 
Similar thoughts are obliquely present in some of 
Wordsworth1a strictures on the artificiality of the poetic 
diction of the eighteenth century as a whole. The deep 
spiritual kinship with Coleridge, the "Schellingesque” 
sensibility and concern for wholeness Wordsworth shared with 
him, is strikingly obvious in one of Wordsworth's explicitly 
theoretical statements, made in the third Essay on Epitaphs.
Words are too awful an instrument for good and evil to 
be trifled with: they hold above all other ernal
powers a dominion over thoughts. If words be not 
(recurring to a metaphor before used) an incarnation of 
thought, bu-v only a clothing for it, then surely will
they prove an ill gift: such as some of those poisoned 
vestments, read of in the stories of superstitious 
times, which had the power to consume and to alienate 
from his right mind the victim who put them on. 
Language, if it do not uphold, and feed, and leave in 
quiet, like the power of gravitation or the air we 
breathe, is a counter-spirit, uremittingly and 
noiselessly at work to derange, to subvert, to lay 
waste, to vitiate, and to dissolve
Accordingly, examining the achievements of Coleridge's early 
work, as well as the difficulties and ambiguities inherent 
in his poetry's attempt to resolve the subject/object 
dualism, will enhance our understanding of Wordworth's own 
practice, especially in Tintern Abbey, and The Prelude.
1 (
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The Conversation Poems as a whole, of which Frost at 
Midnight and The Eolian Harp will be taken as examples, 
share a common ternary structure. As Humphrey House and 
other have correctly pointed out**0 the centre of these 
poems is the ego or meditative "I", first encountered in a 
state of isolation and seeking to overcome a dissociated 
sensibility through regaining an integrated awareness of 
life and the self's unity with it. Such an awareness is 
often attributed either to the "I" at an earlier stage of 
its development or an implicit and silent auditor. The hope 
is that the initial egoism of the meditation's starting 
point will ultimately become "revelatory" .*'L In the 
course of a poem such as Frost at Midnight, the "I" 
recovers, through a sustained interchange of self and world, 
an intuition of the connection between its moral and 
intel. tctual impulses and the nacv.v.j. world of which it is a 
part.4"* The self to which the meditation must finally 
return will be enriched, to use a &'taphor of The Prelude, 
by its regained capacity to "bind its unys together"• The 
whole point of the poem's circular return, with a 
difference, to be sure, to its point of departure, lies in 
the qualitatively enhanced nature of the perception and 
insight the "I" has gained.4  ^ This insight unifies matter
f$ *  -
■‘d
v
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and spirit, self and world in an intuition of the nominously 
grounded correspondences or analogies between the "I", the 
world, E:nd the "One Life within us and abroad". In a letter 
of 1815 Coleridge commented that "th3 common end of all
narrative ..... nay, of all poems is to convert a series
into a whole; to make those events, which in real or
imagined history move on in a strait line, assume to our 
understandings a circular motion - the snake with it's Tail 
in it's Mouth."44
The Conversation Poems try to make events "assume to our 
understanding a circular motion," to counter the solipsism 
implicit in their starting point through the use of Nature 
in a way that is both descriptive and analogical. A 
perception of kinship between man and world arises out of a 
dynamic interchange between fche two.
A second structural device through which the Conversation 
Poems attempt to avoid the dangers of soxlpeism is their use 
of an implied auditor which may or !’•=$/ not be the poet's 
former self.45 Ideally the implied auditor or auditors
present in the poems to be discussed receive the act of 
meditation which is the po* as a "living
communication."4® In Frost at ':ht, a poem which
perhaps displays more successfully % any other example
all the general structural features ■.>£ the Conversation
Poem, this allows a "benedictory c o n c l u s i o n i n  which 
the poet's past and present selves and the natural world are 
once more reintegrated. The sense of renewed human 
community is an analogue of the kind of natural scene 
depicted in The ftttghtingaie, where the various components of 
the landscape reflect and echo one another in mutual 
sympathy.4® The state of mind achieved by the "I" in the 
course of the poem is clearly far closer to this 
all-inclusive intuition of mutual ‘sympathies than the 
circumscribed, alienating self-consciousness which forms the 
starting point of Frost at Midnight and This Lime-Tree Bower 
My Prison. These concerns will now be made more concrete by 
a brief analysis of the movement of Frost at Midnight.
The first section of Frost at Midnight, comprising the first 
twenty-three lines of the poem, depicts a state of isolation 
in which the "I's" search for what the poem calls a 
"companionable form" meets with frustration. The frost of 
the poem's opening which "performs its secret ministry / 
unhelped any any wind" embodies the powerful but silent and 
inscrutable productive energies of the natural world. The 
silence in which it operates firmly resists the "I's", 
attempt to perceive human similitudes in nature.4® In 
direct contrast to the experience of the poet, the frost's 
"secret ministry" is part of a comprehensive and purposeful 
•rder - the icicles of its creation are in their turn
A :
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reflected in the moon**0 - but not an order on which 
categories describing human emotion and thought have any 
purchase. Significantly the child Hartley is at one with 
the "numberless goings on of life / Inaudible as dreams 
emphasising the divisive self-consciousness of the "I” vexed 
to meditation by the aamo “extreme silentness.Spencer 
HillJ  ^ has pointed out the way in which the poet tries to 
master the isolating silence by listing the natural objects 
and scenes that are part of it, but the act of articulation 
and naming does not elicit the sought after sense of
correspondence with the objects named. The only 
"companionable form" found is, ironically enough, the film 
fluttering on the grate. Its unrest is both an external
analogue of the unease the post would overcome and
symbolises the uselessness of the agitated intellection with 
which he attempts to do f- ‘ 6.
The way in which the fluttering film makes a "toy of 
thought" indicates the narcinsistically self-enclosed nature 
the "idling spirit" which seeks "echo or mirror ... of 
itself". By the end of the first movement of Frost at
Midnight human thought does not have any natural similitudes 
of the kind it Geeks. The poet's agitated response to the 
"silence" within which the frost performs "its ministry" is 
a measure of the natural world's resistance to being 
•,ncorporsted into the "conversation" which the poem would
wish to make both its central topic c-i achievement.
Nonetheless the work performed by the first movement of 
Frost at Midnight is not to be understood in merely negative 
terms. By showing that only a more inclusive and felt 
response can bring about the desired integration, the
opening of Frost at Midnight can be said to be voiding 
habitual consciousness by showing its inadequacy.5^ In
doing so a "space" of sorts is created which may be filled 
with something more productive and life-giving than the 
disquiet that is displaced.
The film on the grate is a key transitional image. It
evokes, by association, memories of the poet's school days 
when the unhappy boy tried to alleviate his distress through 
superstitious reverie, taking heart in the fact that such
taken to promise the return of an absent companion or 
friend. The companionable form in question here is the 
poet's sister "retails! as a narcissistic twin from the lost 
paradise when even sexual differentiation was 
unperceived. As such the sister is not so much a flesh 
and blood person in the economy of Frost at Midnight as a 
projected alter-ego, a "companionable form" in the most 
literal sense. This illusory and projective attempt at 
fulfillment in the child parallels the misery of the man. 
As Frederick Garber writes, the sense of imprisonment is
..i&m .
heightened by the shift in which the p&*t "has moved from 
being a spectator of his current working consciousness into 
staring at himself as a child; and what he was doing then 
as a child is exactly what he is doing now as an adult, 
playing spectator to an earlier acting self ...^6
The image of the film is however transitional in another 
sense, associatively linked as it is with the idyllic 
happiness of Coleridge's early boyhood days at Ottery- The 
imagery describing the church-bells of Ottery - images of 
much the same import as the sympathetic echoes in The 
Nightingale - allow Coleridge to superimpose two strands of 
autobiographical material onto one another57 in such a way 
as to provide a transition to the third and last section of 
the poem. Jolted by the Ottery - associations into 
remembering that Hartley will grow up among "companionable 
forms" in an environment different from that presided over 
by the "stern preceptor" of Christ's Hospital, the poet, in 
a more heartfelt and inclusive response than any achieved 
until then, perceives the analogies between Hartley's 
breathings and the natural processes taking place in the 
silence with which the poem opened. Frost at Midnight is 
concerned with the way in which our perceptions of the 
natural world and our thoughts merge into -r. almost mystical 
apprehension of the cosubstantiality of all being, the 
essential kinship of consciousness and the world in which it
The suggestive ambiguities of key words in the poem 
beautifully record a perception whose essence is an 
awareness of the ways in which the category distinctions of 
normal awareness are broken down to yield to a more
inclusive sense of wonder and mystery.57a The unnatural 
calm that had originally ve^ed the poet to inconclusive 
meditation is no longer threatening. The sounds of the 
wind, the owlet's cry, and the silence within which the 
frost performed its ministry, no longer stand in an 
antithetical relation to one another. All participate in 
something akin to the spirit that “rolls through all things" 
in Tintern Abboy. Even Hartley's breathings are analogous 
to and "Fill up the interspersed vacancies / And momentary 
pauses" of the poet's thought. The "ministry" acquires a
retrospective enlargening of significance, encompassing not 
merely the activity of the frost, but the "restorative 
qualities of the natural process" as a whole. 
Technically and in every other way, Frost at Midnight is one 
of Coleridge1 s most secure achievements, and as fine an 
example of the interrelationship of Coleridge's poetry, 
aesthetic theorising and subsequent metaphysics as can be 
found.
Frost at Midnight, to show that the procedures used there
are not unique, can be usefully juxtaposed to the first part
of The Eolian Harp, which contains an explicit formulation
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of the "creed" everywhere implicit in Coleridge'a work. The 
opening of the poem is, as has often been pointed out, not 
merely pastoral and idyllic, but quite self-consciously 
paradisical, containing implicit references to the 
pre-lapsarian state of Adam and Eve in Bk 4 of Paradise
Lost. ^  The lovers' contentment is suggested by the 
completely balanced and satisfying combination of peace and 
movement in the landscape itself, the "serenely brilliant" 
Evening Star contrasting with the "murmur of the distant 
Sea" and the scents moving to the cottage from the bean
field.^ The numerous personifications of both natural 
objects and human virtues - Jasmin, Myrtle and the Sea as
well as Innocence, Love and Wisdom are all spelt wit'
capitals - are all functional. The poem's quasi-apostrophi- 
and incantatory mode of referring to natural objects serves, 
almost in the manner of ritual, to constitute them as beings
with whom one can enter into living relationships. As Bloom
has pointed out in his book Shelley's Mythmaking, this I - 
Thou relationship also constitutes the poet in typically 
■Romantic fashion as seer and visionary, as one who can 
perceive the essential kinship of all things and therefore 
one to whom the natural world might in turn speak.®1 This 
purposeful blurring of the distinctions between natural 
objects and human attributes prepares for the transition to
the central image of the harp itself.
* dr**' w u  in afrit* Shir- j t  JBSm , #
To embark on an extended analysis of the next 20 odd lines 
would entail needless repetition, so only a few general 
remarks will be made. The metaphors playfully linking the 
sound of the harp "by the desultory breeze caressed" to the 
awakening of love give way to comparisons of the "floating 
witchery of sound" to "gentle gales from Faery Land", 
comparisons which make explicit the Edenesque nature of the 
poem's o p e n i n g . A s  in the first twelve lines, the 
intermingling of metaphors allows perceptions of both human 
emotions and natural objects to shade off into an almost 
mystical intuition of the unity underlying both, in a way at 
once elusive and suggestive. M.H. Abrams rightly remarks 
that the poem "In its final form (1817-28) ... is still a 
love poem, but a cosmic love-poem, in which the love between 
the poet and his bride becomes the exponent of a universal 
relationship - the "union of the individual with the 
Universe1 . . in a manner suggestive of Keats's Ode to
a Nightingale, the imagery paradoxically becomes more 
sensuous as, through the approach to "Faery Land", it seems 
much less clearly descriptive of the world and objects. In 
remarkably synaestheaic imagery, ; eminiscent of Keats, 
phenomenal objects and properties lose their distinctness to 
such an extent that by line 29 reference can be made to "A 
light in sound, a sound - like the power in light." 
Finally, in the conclueiion of the The Solian Harp's second 
movement, the breeze is described in terms almost
indistinguishable from those that evoked the sound of the 
harp, and the "mute still air / Is Music slumbering on her 
instrument". (Lines 32-3)®4 In Frost at Midnight and the 
Eolian Harp underlying analogies between all things, the 
ability to read the objects of the natural world as 
signatures of consciousness, mark an ascent to visionary 
insight into the "One Life":
01 the one Life within us and abroad,
Which meets all motion and becomes its soul,
A light in sound, a sound like power in light.
Rhythm in ail thought, and joyance every where - 
Methinks, it should have been impossible 
Sot to love all things in a world so filled?
Wh-' ‘.he breeze warbles, and the mute still air 
Is Music slumbering on her instrument.
(Lines 26 - 33)
This epiphanic revelation of the "One Life" in the Eolian 
Harp is one of the finest possible examples of the 
operations of Coleridgean "Reason" - see p. 37 foil - and 
its capacity for seemingly unmediated apprehension of and 
participation in the "infinite self-rejoicing" of life 
spoken of in The Friend. Indeed in this climax of the 
Eolian Harp a diversity of material is held together in that 
organic unity which we have already indicated to be the
hallmark of the "spiritual" for Coleridge. Poems such as 
the Eolian Harp embody, :io less than the explicitly 
philosophical writings, a search for a "richer conception of 
rationality" enabling a movement within experience itself 
"from the particular to the universal so that we can say the 
latter is adequate to the former".6  ^ The conception of 
the relation between universal and particular in the verse 
under consideration is at antipodes to that of Enlightenment 
thought in which universals are either abstractions or 
"reflective principles of unity operating only within the 
faculty of judgement"^® whose relation to particulars is 
subsumptive and classificatory. Instead such a view has 
been jettisoned in an attempt to formulate “a richer 
conception by which universals should actually be developed 
out of and not just applied to experience".^
This recasting of the relation between universal and 
particular is, as Rosen has pointed out in his magnificent 
book on Hegel, connected with a similar and related 
transformation in Romantic thought of the notion of the 
"infinite".
In much Romantic thought and poetry the infinite is 
characteristically not conceived in either strictly 
mathematical terms or Platonically as a "realm of ideas . . . 
thought of as if it were a world of individual entities - 
the archetypes - existing in separation from the finite
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world".68 Rather, the non-abstractive, empathic act of 
intuition on which, - see Chapter 1, - a perception of the 
"life of things" is founded, leads to a conception of the 
"infinite", not as an abstract realm above and beyond 
experience, but as "manifestation or embodiment of the 
transcendent",C9 Thus, although the ultimate "spiritual" 
truth accessible to "Reason", an unmediated insight into the 
cosubstantiality of all being can be said, in a sense, to 
transcend the sensory world, it remains nonetheless rooted 
in experience. This embedding of the transcendent in the 
finite is essential if the positives of religious experience 
are, as demanded by the intellectual climate of the age, to 
be recovered in purely secular terms. This secularisation 
of religious notions results in an altogether new emphasis 
on "the quality of the experience or manifestation"70 
through which the eternal manifests itself "through and in 
the temporal". The way in which the vision of the "One 
Life" is generated from the response of a highly 
particularised speaker to an equally particularised 
landscape is a magnificent example of the way in which a 
"Schellingesque" world view embodies elements of the 
traditionally religious notion of "world as text" without 
being a mere return: "Both views stand against the modern 
vision of an objectified universe which is devoid of 
significance for man. But in one case the world is seen as 
embodying a set of ideal meanings, and our contact with it
is the contemplation of iceas? .r the other case, nature is 
seen as a great stream of life o," which we are part, and our 
way of co:-.Vact is thus by sympathetic* insertion into this 
stream. What is sought for is interchange with a larger 
life, not, ratiorsl vision of o r d e r " T h i s  attempted 
"insertion" into an all-encompassing, sympathetic "stream ot 
life" was given memorable expression in the BoLian Harp for 
possibly the first time in English Romanticism. This poem
accordingly has as good a claim aa any to have initiated a
genre that was perhaps, as will be suggest 3d in Section A of 
Chapter 3, to receive its culminating expression in :ntern 
Abbey.
If, ac the previous paragraphs suggest, what the 
Conversation Poena hope to reveal and make available to
comprehension is "eyaibo., construed as an intuition of the 
cosubstantiality o£ all being and the translucence of the 
eternal through and in the temporal, then the epiphany is 
the primary meano jy which "symbol" is revealed. The
epiphany has been characterises by Langbaum as "a 
manifestation in and through the visible world of an 
invisible life."72 Langbaum goes on to say that the 
epiphany
is a way of apprehending value when value is no longer
objective ... The epiphany grounds statements of value
j.n perception; it gives the idea with its genesis, 
establishing its validity not as conforming to a public 
order of values but as the genuine experience of an 
identifiable person. It gives us the idea, in other 
words, before we have to pass judgement on its truth or 
falsity? befo.i.t. it has boon abstracted from perception 
- while it is still in union with emotion and the 
perceived object. ... In traditional poetry the unified 
response belongs to the poet ... as the appropriate 
response to an objective reality which combines fact and 
value. But it comes in the epiphany as the climax of a 
dramatic action, and lasts a moment only. We are then 
returned to the world of ordinary perception and left 
with the question whether the idea we carry away from 
the experience is true ..."^
It is perfectly correct to stress the quest of Wordsworth 
and Coleridge for a means of fusing fact and value, mind and 
matter, the real and the ideal or sacred that would be 
experisntially based. To that txtent our perception of the 
numinous would have a pantheistic flavour in that the 
"sacred" is immanently located within natural objects rather 
than, as in traditional religious schemes, above and outside 
them. It is this "sentiment of Being” that is apparent in 
the close of Frost at Midnight, the passages examined in The 
Eolian Harp and numerous passages of Tho Prelude (from which
in perception? it gives the idea with its genesis,
establishing its validity not as conforming to a public 
order of values but as the genuine experience of an 
identifiable person. It gives us the idea, in other
words, before we have to pass judgement on its truth or 
falsity: before it has been abstracted from perception
- while it is still in union with emotion an <5 the
perceived object. ... In traditional poetry the unified 
response belongs to the poet ... as the appropriate
response to an objective reality which combines fact and 
value. But it comes i the epiphany as the climax of a
dramatic action, and lasts a moment only. We are then
returned to the world of ordinary perception and left
with the question whether the idea we carry away from
the experience is true ..."^
It is perfectly correct to stress the quest of Wordsworth 
and Coleridge for a means of fusing fact and value, mind and 
matter, the real and the ideial or sacred that would be 
exper.ientially based. To that extent our perception of the 
numinous would have a pantheistic flavour in that the 
"sacred" is immanently located within natural objects rather 
than, as in traditional religious schemes, above and outside 
them. It is this "sentiment of Being" that is apparent in 
the close of Frost at Midnight, the passages examined in The 
Eolian Harp and numerous passages of The Prelude (from which
the phrase itself in fact comsa). The strand of Coleridge's 
wo*k concerned with epiphanic revelation of the "sacred" in 
al . things, which t/ercoives our essential kinship with a 
na .ure regarded as embodied spirit, is all that has been 
coi sidered up to now. It is from this strand of Coleridge 
thrt wordaworth's concept; u£ "tidlural piety" in part 
derives. Nonetheless there have been largely unexsminefi 
tensions in the arguments considered in this chapter, and it 
is r.o a brief examination of them that we must now turn.
SECTION D
Langbaum is quite right to stress the precariousness of the 
epiphanic moment. In particular, the antitheses dr%wn 
between the insight and the idea, the experience and the 
idea are most interesting. The poet hopes in the moment of 
epiphany to achieve an unmediated perception or vision, a 
moment in which all mediatory acts of interpretation fall 
away in the face of a perception that is self-validating, 
that contains the "certitudes of knowledge" within it 
In the moment of epiphany the natural objects perceived 
reflect back to the perceiver a living reality because the 
act of perception is an act of sympathetic identification in 
which the "living consciousness perceived in the object is 
our own."7  ^ The dualisms of post-Cartesian thought 
briefly examined in Chapter 1 seem to be overcome in an 
unmediated insight into the life of things because our 
perception of the sacred and numinous in things is given as 
experience rather than, as Langbaum says, an idea we may 
agree or disagree with. Such an act of knowing allows us to 
commune with what is unique, individual and living within 
the object. However, precisely because the certitude of the 
vision into the life of things is, if it is to be credible, 
given immanently wi;hin experience itself - hence the 
antitheses drawn between experience and idea and the
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disequilibriuie noted between them - such certitude runs the 
risk o£ being incommunicable.
The problems to which the precariously self-validating 
nature of the epiphanic moment gives rise are expressed by 
two distinct and yet not altogether unrelated tendencies in 
the work of Wordsworth and Coleridge. One of these is most 
powerfully illustrated by the contradiction which makes the 
Eolian Harp a broken-backed poem. In an unfortunate 
passage, ostensibly /.he result of Sara's orthodox misgivings 
about the "nature-mysticism" of the first part of the Eolian 
Harp, the poem concludes contradictorily by lapsing back 
into an orthodox theism. This has usually been explained 
merely in terms of the influence of Sara herself, but the 
actual difficulty runs ouch deeper and can be seen to scar 
the theoretical and philosophical speculations of Coleridge 
too. Even in Coleridge's theoretical writings, indeed 
accorded a central place in these writings, ia a strand of 
thought that sits uneasily at best with Abrams's "natural 
supernaturalism," construed as an attempt to salvage the 
experiental values of traditional religion in a secular 
manner."7® In the Biographla Liiararia we have seen that 
Coleridge ultimately grounds the Primary Imagination and 
therefore, indirectly, the Secondary Imagination, the 
faculty of artistic creation, in the activity of the 
"eternal I AM". This oscillation between a "natural
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supernaturaliom," a nature-pantheism of sorts, and gestures 
towards a rather more traditional kind of theology, scars 
Coleridge's theoretical thought constantly. Even in 
Coleridge's exposition of the concept of the symbol, 
explicitly designed to be a mode between the literal and the 
metaphorical and cosubstantial with the reality it 
represents, there is a similar tension. If one of the 
symbol's functions is to show the "translucence of the 
eternal through and in the temporal," it is not clear 
whether the light of the eternal is in fact purely immanent 
in the natural world or whether the object assumes 
importance only to the extent that it reflects a radiance 
not ultimately its own. These considerations sit uneasily 
with those aspects of Coleridge's thought attempting to 
derive the notion of the "One Life" from experience and a 
reflection on the implications of that experience alone.
The deeper reason for this oscillation is, I think, the 
impossibility of a purely self-authenticating perception of 
the kind that the epiphany aspires to be. Even if 
attainable it would not be communicable, hence the 
distinctions drawn by Langbaum between the moment of 
perception, which seems certain, and the idea abstracted 
from it, which seem much less so. Accordingly we als-- find 
places where Coleridge treats the symbol in a manner similar 
to his discussions of the sacraments in hi- theological
4
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writings.^ If, as Coleridge writes in The Friend, it is 
true that ’the solution of phenomena can never be derived 
from phenomena,’1^ ® then the doctrine of the 
cosubstantiality of all being must be construed in more 
traditionally theological or, at the very least, a ratner 
more Platonistic manner. Licence for such an interpretation 
is given by Coleridge himself in Aids to Reflection where he 
categorises all thinkers as fundamentally Aristotelian or 
Platonic in their leanings, the former willing to invoke 
"spirit" as an explanation of anything only as a last 
resort. Coleridge considered himself to be a Platonist
The ambiguities inherent in Coleridge's and Schelling's 
differing atterpts to construct a "Naturphilosophie" of 
sorts are richly reflected in Wordsworth's poetry. In the 
Immortality Ode the rainbow comes and goes without eliciting 
a response, not because of the loss of a "natural piety" 
analogous to the more pantheistic strains of the thought of 
Coleridge and Schelling, but because of a loss of the 
"visionary gleam", a loss of light from a source other than 
the merely natural. In the light of thib one can better 
understand Wordsworth’s tentative use of the Platonic notion 
of pre-existence in his preface to the Ode to explain how 
his earlier response to the natural world was possible. The 
Simplon Pass passage of Bk 6 of The Prelude also, in a 
manner rare for Wordsworth, decisively privileges an
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ambiguously "autonomous1 imagination over mere perception. 
Objects are here also seen as bearers of a "glory not their 
own", and the imagination is "autonomous", an "unfathered 
vapour". Given that completely secular repossession of our 
sense of "the sacred", purely secular overcoming of the 
dualisms of post-Cartesian thought, may well only be 
possible by means of an impossibly self-validating 
perception, this turn from perception to vision, from 
doctrines of a pantheistic nature to a theism of sorts in 
both Wordsworth and Coleridge, is readily comprehensible. 
It is a product of the precariousness and instability 
noticed by Langbaum in the moment of epiphany itself. The 
problematical sense in which imagination may be said to have 
assumM "autonomy" in these passages will be examined in 
Section B of Chapter 3.
The second danger constantly confronting doctrines 
attempting to regard nature as embodied spirit and thus 
essentially connected with the human wcrld and the 
conceptual categories applicable to it is that of 
solipsism. The danger is evident in an entry Coleridge made 
in 1805 in his notebook while at Malta:
In looking at objects of Nature while I am thinking ...
I seem rather to be seeking, as it were asking, a
symbolic language for something within me that already
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and forever exists/ than observing anything new. Even 
when that latter is the case, yet still I have always an 
obscure feeling as if that new phaenomenon twre the dim 
awakening of a forgotten or hidden Truth of my inner 
Nature.
Wordsworth too spoke in a note of the difficulty he 
sometimes experienced as a child in believing in the 
existence of material objects as material objects.®*
Indeed if, as Langbaum ambiguouely puts it, the living 
conociouness perceived in objects is our own, it is
difficult to see whether what we are dealing with is
genuinely an insight into the spirit that "rolls though all
things" in Tintern Abbey, or an act of self-projection in a 
more liraitingly solipsistic sense. Both of the means used 
to try and overcome the problem in the Conversation Poems, 
the natural world itself, and an implied auditor or auditors 
which Implicitly cast the poems in the form of a dialogue, 
are of a questionable value. As the quotation from 
Coleridge's notebook makes clear, it is quits possible that 
vocabulary used in the poetry to designate a metaphysical 
kinship of nature and spirit may be projective, may, in the 
last analysis, designate a relation of the human subject to 
itself. Secondly, the implied auditors of the Conversation 
Poems are either silent or absent. In Frost at Midnight it 
is as a "breathing," not as an articulate being that Hartley
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is perceived to be kin to the frost's "secret ministry" and 
the other natural processes described. As such, "like 
Nature Herself, the infant is silent ... it neither confirms 
nor denies the vision that Coleridge projects onto 
it The threat of mind becoming autonomous in a
solipsistically self-reflexive sense, autonomous in the 
manner described by Coleridge's notebook entry, also finds 
expression in Wordsworth's work. This tendency will, in 
Sections A and B of Chapter 3, be shown to be implicit in 
the vocabulary and syntax of the Invocation to the 1805 
Prelude, more strongly suggested by*^ 247-67 of the same 
work, and celebrated by the paean to mind as "Lord and
master of outward sense." If the attempt of "natural piety"
to deny that there are any categorical distinctions between 
mind and world is always plagued by the spectre of
solipsism, an unambiguous celebration of mind's constitutive 
powers may be one way of attempting to resolve this 
tension. Indeed, although in the context of celebrating 
objects as bearers of the "light divine", there is a rare 
moment in both versions of The Prelude where Wordsworth
seems to openly affirm the consitutive power of his own 
poetry s "And, through the turnings intricate of verse / 
Present themselves as objects recognised, / In flashes, and 
with glory not their own". An imagination which ultimately 
seeks participation in the "light divine" cannot be said to 
be autonomous in the same way as an imagination celebrated
as "Lord and master of outward sense", an imagination which 
simply constitutes objects of experience as modifications of 
self. Nonetheless, the common celebration of mind and 
poetry's constitutive power indicates that the different 
responses to the precariousness of the epiphanic moment 
outlined here seem, at least to a degree, to converge with 
one another. Both the characterizations of mind under 
consideration deal, whatever their differences from one 
another, with an imagination hostile to the merely "bodily 
eye" of Tintern Abbey. An argument along these lines 
seeking to disentagle the various problematical senses in 
which "autonomy" is attributed to mind in Wordsworth's work 
will be advanced in Chapter 3 Section B - see p. 124-28.
An examination of Coleridge's philosophical writings, his 
practice in the Conversation Poems, and the connections 
between the two reveals, in concentrated form, the 
difficulties inherent in a "Naturphilosophie" or a concept 
akin to Wordsworth's "natural piety", the instrument, he 
tells us in My Heart Leaps Up, by which he hopes to "bind 
his days together". Looked at as a whole, Wordsworth's 
poetry can intelligibly be seen as an examination of the 
difficulties of trying to do this and, ultimately I think, 
of why such attempts must necessarily fail. In examining in 
Chapter 3 the way in which Wordsworth's poetry reflects 
aspirations towards a nature-pantheism or mysticism and the
>
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difficulties inherent in this, I shall begin by examining 
those parts of his work in which the idea of an interchange 
between self and world seems relatively unproblematioal. 
Tintern Abbey and some passages of The Prelude will be 
central texts. I will then move on to consider more complex 
and ambiguous manifestations of Wordsworth's poetic 
imagination, ending with the perplexities reflected in the 
Immortality Ode. Such an approach will, I hope, have a 
certain conceptual logic.
dtoat&
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In the poem My Heart Leaps Up, given retrospective 
significance by Wordsworth's use of part of it as an 
epigraph to the Immortality Ode, Wordsworth states a desire 
fundamental to any appreciation of his work:
My heart leaps up when I behold 
A Rainbow in the sky*
So was it when my life began;
So is it now I am a man;
So be it when I shall grow old.
Or let me diel
The Child is Father of the Man?
And I could wish my days to be 
Bound each to each by natural piety.
Wordsworth is seen in this poor to aspare to the kind of 
wholeness, the abate o£ integration o£ self anti wcrld 
expressed by Coleridge in the Conversation Pooma e:tamir.od. 
Although the tone and mood of My Heart Leaps Up are about as 
assured as anything one may find in Wordsworth's work, it is
still noticeable that the last two lines are tentative- 
They represent the "natural piety" which could bind the 
poet’s adult and childhood selves together as an achievement 
to be striven after rather than a state of being securely 
and permanently possessed. The task of binding one's days 
together through "natural piety", achieving a state of 
sustained integration of self and world at antipodes to the 
reductively analytic intellection of The Tables Turned, was 
to be ore of the primary concern of Wordsworth's work-
My Heart Leaps Up also contains, in admittedly embryonic 
form, motifs that connect both with Wordsworth's subsequent 
work and the concerns dealt with in the previous two 
chapters. The desire to unify the poet's life in such a way 
that it is expressly the "child" that is "father of the Man" 
is an indication of the need to retain, within the state of 
adult self-consciousness, the felt unity of self and world 
expressed by the heart that leaps up at the sight of the 
rainbow. The state of mind desired is, as with Coleridge, 
one in which the connection of thought with the affective 
and the "non-conceptual" is retained in an inclusive 
awareness that transmutes thought into something finer than 
the merely intellectual.* This desire for integration and 
wholeness, to attain through consciousness a state of mind 
inclusive enough to suspend the dualism of mind and external 
world, relates Wordsworth's work to the concerns of both 
Coleridge and European Romanticism in general.
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Wordsworth's primary task then, as with Coleridge's 
Conversation Poems, was to produce a poetry which plausibly
exploring the complexities of the process of perception and 
the knowledge we derive from it- Purposeful verbal and 
syntactic ambiguities are, as I hope will be shown, one of 
Wordsworth's chief weans of - jgesting that there is no 
difference in kind between terms descriptive of the world 
and terms descriptive of mind and perception.
There are innumerable passages in Wordsworth's work which 
speak of the interpenetrability of tiio world and the mind 
that expsriences it. One of the best known and most 
frequently quoted of these passages is the Boy of Winander 
Bnj.-jode, an extract of which will be given here:
And there, with fingers interwoven, both hands 
Pressed closely, palm to palm, and to his mouth 
Uplifted, he, as through an instrument,
Blew mimic hootings to the silent owls
That they might answer him. - And they would shout
Across the wat’ry Vale, and shout aa^'n.
Responsive to his call, with quivering peals.
And long hallooe, and screams, and echoes loud 
Redoubled and redoubled? - concourse wild
embodied the world-view implicit in a "natural piety". 
Wordsworth did this, as Colin Clarke suggests,2 by
«
Of mirth and jocund dint And when it chanced 
That pauses of deep silence mocked his skill.
Then sometimes, in that silence, while he hung 
Listening, a gentle shock of mild surprise 
Has carried far into his heart the voice 
Of mountain torrents, or the visible scene 
Would enter unawares into M s  sM 
With all ii= solemn imagery, its rocks,
Its woods, and that uncertain Heaven, received 
Into the bosom of the steady Lake.
(1805, The Prelude: V 395-413)
The responsi Vx,...;ss to the boy's call and the echoes 
"Redoubled and redoubled" indicate-ae in the sympathetic 
echoing and re-echoing in the landscape of The Nightingale - 
a fundamentally sympathetic universe, a world in which there 
is an effortless reciprocity between the boy and his 
surroundings. It is such a sense of reciprocity that 
constitutes "joy" in the Wordsworthian sense of the term. 
The silence in which the "voice/of mountain torrents" comes 
into the boy's heart 1r reminiscent of the "ice-skating" 
passage in Bk 1 of The Prelude. Here too the unusual 
perspective, the jolt perception receives through encounter 
with nature in an unexpected manner, strips away the 
habitual and the familiar to yield a sudden and epiphanic 
insight into the "One Life", the essential kinship of all
things. Expressions such as "far into his heart", and talk 
of the "solemn imagery" of the rocks, soften the boundary 
between the world and our perceptions of or emotional 
responses to it3. In particular the use of the word 
"imagery1, applicable both to the boy's immediate 
sense-perception and the objects perceived,4 recalls 
Coleridge's speculations on the power accruing to poetry by 
virtue of its being a mixed mode, its power to concretely 
embody a metaphysical perception of the ideal in the real, 
of the spiritual essence shared by man and the world. 
Speaking of the peculiarly liquid and insubstantial quality 
of so many Wordsworthian landscapes, Colin Clarke remarks 
that in the Boy of Winander passage "the 'visible 
scene'...exists outwardly along with the rocks and woods of 
which it is composed? and yet it enters the mind as though 
it were of the same stuff as the mind."5
The Bov of Winander passage literally incarnates Coleridge's 
belief, expressed in Bk 12 of the Biographia Literaria. that 
"During the act of knowledge itself, the objective and 
subjective are so instantly united that we cannot determine 
to which of the two priority belongs.Coleridge called 
the philosophy claiming to demonstrate the unity of the 
subjective and the objective "Ideal Realism".  ^ In his
defence of "Ideal Realism" Coleridge insists that it is j
"naive realism's" belief in the absolute independence of
J t . ,
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natural objects from perception that is untrue to lived 
experience. It is only through transcendentalist
assumptions that we can explain how "something essentially 
different from ourselves... could possibly become a part of 
our immediate consciousness; in at ler words, how that which 
ex-hypothesi is and continues to be extrinsic and alien to 
our being should become a modification of our b e i n g . F o r  
Coleridge the Idealism which reveals the essential kinship 
of the life within and without us through according mind a 
constitutive role in perception is simultaneously "the
truest and most binding r e a l i s m " T h e  passages of
Wordsworth emblematic of "natural piety" and a perc-%pr.ion of 
essential kinship with the natural world accord fully with 
these convictions.
The way in which the poetry of the 1605 Prelude tries to 
suggest an epistemological model of reciprocal casuality - 
the mind acting "in alliance with the works/Which it 
beholds," self and object constituted and articulated 
co-instantaneously - emerges interestingly in the Invocation 
to Book I . This passage enables us to continue our 
exploration of the effect which the concerns outlined so far 
have on the actual language of the poetry.
The Invocation to Book I of the 1805 Prelude stands in an 
antithetical relation to the "bondage" of the city walls.
In contrast to the inhuman fragmentation of the city life, 
the landscape of the opening lines has an overtly 
sacramental quality:
Oh there is blessing in this gentle breeze
That blows from the green fields and from the clouds
And from the sky: it beats against my cheek,
And seems half-oonscioua of the joy it gives.
0 welcome Messenger I 0 welcome Friend<
A captive greets thee, coming from a house 
Of bondage, from yon City's walls set free,
A prison where he hath been long immured.
Now 1 am free, enfranchised and at large,
May fix my habitation where I will.
What dwelling shall receive me? In what Vale 
Shall be my harbour? Underneath what grove 
Shall I take up my home, and what sweet stream 
Shall with its murmurs lull me to my rest?
The earth is all before me: with a heart
Joyous, nor scared at its own liberty,
1 look about, and should the guide I chose 
Be nothing better than a wandering cloud,
I cannot miss my way.
One of the most important means through which Wordsworth 
intimates a "kinship of essence" between subject and object# 
self and world, spirit and matter is, as has been suggested, 
purposeful ambiguity of both individual words and syntax. 
Such verbal nuances are used with characteristic subtlety by 
Wordsworth in this invocation. Reciprocity between self and 
world is implied from the outset by the ambiguous source of 
the "blessing" in line 1. It could emanate not merely from 
the "gentle breeze", as the main thrust of the syntax of 
line 1 would suggest, but from the poet himself*®. Of 
course, and the tenor of the passage as a whole tacitly 
suggests this last interpretation, we are free to erode all 
epistemological dualism between subject and object by 
locating the "blessing" in both. The breeze blows from the 
"green fields, and from the clouds/And from the sky" thus 
imbuing - here the reading which locates the blessing in the 
breeze is stressed - the entire landscape with a sacramental 
quality both complementing and corresponding to the 
reverential nature of the protagonist's response. However 
the poet is himself an embodied part of the natural world in 
which the "ideal" or the "sifcred" is immanent. The blessing 
accordingly also encompasses him when the wind returns to 
beat on his cheek11.
The ambiguity analysed with respect to the source of the 
bi oing reappears in the vocatives of Line 5. It is
ittf
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uncertain whether the "weloome" of "0 welcome messenger 1 0 
welcome friend<“ is an active welcoming o£ the breeze by 
the poet or, on the other hand, a more passive 
acknowledgement of a blessing that has been bestowed by a 
companioneble but nonetheless external agency*2. In Line 
5 the ambiguity of the vocatives - unlike the ambiguity of 
Line 1 where the syntax tends to locate the blessing more 
firmly in the breeze than the poet - seems to me to be 
rather more complex. It is precisely this undecidability, 
the difficulty of locating spiritual agency conclusively in 
the poet or the breeze, which is Wordworth's point. All 
this by no means exhausts the play of purposeful ambiguity 
in this passagt,.
The use of the vocative, of explicit personification in Line 
5 is in itself interesting. The personifications concerned 
serve, as observed in the discussion of a similar effect in 
The Bolian Harp, to const tute the breeze as a "presence". 
Such a "presence", a word used throughout The Prelude to 
very powerful effect, is an animate being with which one can 
enter into a living relationship. Reciprocally the poet is 
constituted as one to whom the animate face of the natural 
world may in turn speak. Significantly much of
Wordsworth's poetry that celebrates an achieved "natural 
piety" is cast in the form of an implicit dialogue between 
self and world. This is true in a very simple manner of the
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uncertain whether the "welcome" of "0 welcome messenger 1 0 
welcome friendl" ia an active welcoming of the breeze b> 
the poet or, on the other hand, a more passive 
acknowledgement of a blessing that has been bestowed by a 
companionable but nonetheless external agency*2. In Line 
5 the ambiguity of the vocatives - unlike the ambiguity of 
Line 1 where the syntax tends to locate the blessing more 
firmly in the breeze than the poet - seems to me to be 
rather more complex. It is precisely this undecidability, 
the difficulty of locating spiritual agency conclusively in 
the poet or the breeze, which is Wordworth's point. All 
this by no means exhausts the play of purposeful ambiguity 
in this passage.
The use of the vocative, of explicit personification in Line 
5 is in itself interesting. The personifications concerned 
serve, as observed in the discussion of a similar effect in 
The Sollan Harp, to constitute the breeze as a "presence". 
Such a "presence", a word used throughout The Prelude to 
very powerful effect, is an animate being with which one can 
enter into a living relationship. Reciprocally the poet is 
constituted as one to whom the animate face of the natural 
world may in turn speak.13 Significantly much of 
Wordsworth's poetry that celobratea an achieved "natural 
piety" is cast in the form of an implicit dialogue between 
self and world. This is true in a very simple manner of the
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anewering response, the leap o2 the heart on seeing the 
rainbow in My Heart Lsaps Up, and the previously examined 
extract from Book 2 of The Prelude, where the mind both 
gives and receives. This transformation of nature into
“presence's" is necessary if the external is to become in 
some sense a possession of consciousness - note that for 
Wordsworth this implies an interchange between world and 
self, net a denial of the former's independent existence - 
rather than remaining irreducibly other. The syntax of the 
passage has, however, constituted a slightly ambiguous 
experience in which consciousness is simultaneously 
perceived in the object itself on the one hand, and 
projected in such a way that the object seems to be a 
modification of self whose independent existence is perhaps 
more precarious on the other,
Despite this last reservation, the assertion of a living 
unity between self and world in which both actively 
contribute and yet enjoy independent existence is as secure 
here as in any passage to be found in Wordsworth. This 
accordingly makes the passage an excellent example of the 
characteristic procedures of Wordsworth’s verse at its most 
convincing. The suggestion that the breeze is 
"half-conocious of the joy it gives" aeoms to represent an 
active thrust of mind through which the joy of the poet, the 
product of having escaped from the alienating life of the
city, is imputed to the breeze itself^*. This response
to the blessing diffused through the breeze, fields and 
clouds enhances our sense of a "natural piety" in which the 
mind both gives and receives. This activo projection of 
subjectivity reaches its height in the concluding 
apostrophes, in the invocation of the breeze as messenger 
and friend. However even here, despite a slight 
reservation suggested by the contrasting characterizations 
of the wind as "messenger" find "friend”, the model of
reciprocal causality in which self and world, despite being 
constituted and articulated simultaneously, retain 
independent existence, structures the poetry. The wind 
construed as "friend" would seem, in a slightly solipsistic 
sense, to be a "companionable form" similar to the sister in
Frost at Midnight. The characterization of the wind as
"messenger" however suggests an alternative reading in which
the poet remains a beneficiary of a blessing brought to 
him. In this case his joy is a product of his perception 
of "the sacramental" genuinely inhering in the natural world
i t s e l f . T h i s  ambiguity is very similar, it should be
noted, to the syntactic ambiguity noted on p. 86. The full
implications of theea ambiguities will be explored at the 
close of this section of Chapter 3 - p.104 foil.
No discussion of "natural piety" in Wordsworth's work would 
be complete without an examination of 'i’intern Abbey. This
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poem contains what may well be the moat powerful expression 
of that aspect of Wordsworth's poetry celebrating the 
essential kinship of subject and object, mind and world:
To look on nature, not as in the hour 
Of thoughtless youth, but hearing oftentimes 
The still, sad music of humanity,
Not harsh nor grating, though of ample power 
To chasten and subdue. And Z have felt 
A presence that disturbs me with the joy 
Of elevated thoughts? a sense sublime 
Of something fat mote deeply interfused.
Whose dwelling is the light of setting euns,
And the round ocean, and the living air.
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man,
A motion and a spirit, that impels
All thinking things, all objects of thought,
And rolls through all things. Therefore am I ntill 
A lover of the meadows and the woods,
And mountains; and of all that we behold 
From this green earth? of all the mighty world 
Of eye and ear, both what they half-creute.
And what perceive? well pleased to recognize 
In nature and the language of the sense,
The anchor of my pu ''st thoughts, the nurse.
For I have learned
4
The guide, the guardian of my Leart, and soul 
Of all my moral being.
(Lines 89 - 112)
The vision of reciprocity between world and self, of the 
mind that half-cr&ates and half-perceives, is the essence of 
"natural piety." The "interfused spirit" of this climactic 
passage is located, as such a doctrine of perception would 
lead one to expect, in the ocean, air, sky and the mind of 
man. By the end of the poem it emcompasses both the 
protagonist and Dorothy in ; world which has become 
"pel]ucidly beautiful as the divine glow shines through each 
particle of it."*®
The climax of Tintern Abbey owes much of its power to the 
technical virtunity with which the poem's language suggests 
a vision of nature as embodied spirit. In no poem can we 
see more clearly the distance Wordsworth had travelled from 
the eighteenth century "sentimental" tradition. No poem 
better fulfils Coleridge’s demand that a "poet's heart and 
intellect should be combined, intimately combined and 
unified with the great appearances of nature."*^ As in 
the Bov of Wlnander episode of The Prelude, Wordsworth's 
purposeful ambiguity of diction explores the complexities of 
perception, complexities in which "the boundary between what 
is given and what bestowed" becomes "a sliding one, to be 
established as best one can from the individual context."*®
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The soimdittg cataract 
Haunted me like a passion: the tall rock,
The mountain, and the deep and gloomy wood,
Their colours and their forms, were then to me 
An appetiti' a feeling and a love,
That had * a remoter charm,
By thoug. or any interest
Unborrowed from ■ v eye.
(Lines 77 - 84)
The "forms" of rock, mountain and wood, far from having the 
unambiguous substantiality that the reference to their 
"colours" seems to confer on them, are also "An appetitie: 
a feeling and a love" for the boy. The "forms" of this 
passage are essentially analogous to the "forms of beauty" 
of Line 24. The "forms of beauty" which provide emotional 
renewal in ’Pintern Abbey are, in a manner now familiar from 
the Bov of Winander passage and the invocation to Bk. 1 of 
the 1805 Prelude, not merely the objects of the perceived 
landscape, but also the stuff of memory. This accounts for 
the curiously Wordsworthian kind of past tense in which the 
poem is written. This past tense is particularly well 
suited to registering the strange insubstantiality of many 
Wordsworthian landscapes.^  The ambiguity of the word 
"forms", which one raitjht expect to refer unambiguously to 
the external world, is matched and complimented by a similar
W M ,  -
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ambiguity in the no less crucial word "sensations", which 
refers not merely to the senses and sense - impressions, but 
to passions and reflection. This interfusion of categories 
used to describe the mental and the physical is essential to 
the organization of Tintern Abbey as a whole. The kind of 
double-reference noted in the use of "forms" and 
"sensations" is echoed by the usa of words like "wild" to 
refer x>th to the scene before the poet and Dorothy's eyes, 
and of "beauty" to refer to both the objects of the world 
and our perception of them.2® To avoid needless 
repetition only one more passage using this technical device 
will be considered:
Five years have passed; five summers, with the length 
Of five long winters! and again I hear 
These waters, rolling from their mountain-springs 
With a sweet inland murmur. - Once again 
Do I behold these steep and lofty cliffs,
Which on a wild secluded scene impress 
Thoughts of more deep seclusion; and connect 
The landscape with the quiet of the sky.
(Lines 1 - 8 )
The word "impress" functions in the same way as the examples 
given above, referring explicitly to "Thoughts", but also 
evoking by implication the weight and solidity of the
J t .
cliffs. This example shows that ambiguity of syntax may 
well play an important part in achieving the kind of
doublA-referencs under discussion. The placement of 
"impress" at the end of Line 6 leads the reader to
erroneously expect an intransitive construction in which 
what would be "impressed" on the scene would merely be the 
weight '-•f the cliffs themselves.21- in keeping with the
collapse of distinctions between spirit rod matter 
foreshadowed in the opening eight lines, the "human" and 
"natural" elements of the landscape intermingle 
harmoniously, the borderlines between cottages, homesteads, 
lawns, groves and copses becoming progressively more 
indistinct. In Line 8 this intermingling is extended by the 
connection of landscape and sky. The verb "connect",
appropriately enough, has the kind of multiple reference 
analysed ao far, syntactically related as it is to the 
protagonist, the cliffs and the "Thoughts".22 In a 
hostile but characteristically perceptive analysis, Empson 
insisted on the way in which the meaning of Tintern Abbey is 
"shuffled across a series oi grammatical ambiguities."2^
In Tintern Abbey Wordsworth's syntax, znora successfully chan 
<n many of his poems, creates the illusion of the meditative 
speaking voice, of the observing consciousness of the 
protagonist modifying and beinc modified by the landscape 
perceived.^4 Geoffrey Hartmann has correctly noted that
this effect Is "linked in Tintern Abbey to a vacillating 
calculus of ga-n and loss, of hope and doubt. More
will be said of Hari matin's “vacillating calculus" Inter. It 
is however essential to realise that this effect is re ated 
to the remarks on the epiphany in Section D o£ Chapter 2. 
It is the irreducible concreteness of the perspective 
through bhich the landscape is mediated to us, the fact that 
we are forced to share the view of a highly particular: sed 
speaker, that enables Wordsworth to regain an essentially 
mystical vision into the "life of things" in secularised 
terms. This vision, given immanently within experience 
itself, is described in one of the most famous passages of 
Tintern Abbey;
Though absent long,
Thoce forms o£ beauty have not been to me,
As is a landscape to a blind man's eye:
But oft, in lonely rooms, and mid the din 
Of towns and cities, I have owed to them.
In hours of weariness, sensations sweet.
Felt in the blood, and felt along ;he heart.
And passing even into my purer mind
With tranquil restoration ......
Nor less, I trust.
To them I may have owed anow. - gift.
Of aspect more sublime? that blessed mood,
In which the burthen o£ the mystery,
In which the heavy and the weary weight.
Of all this unintelligible world 
Is lightened:- that serene and blessed mood,
In which the affections gently lead us on.
Until, the breath of this corporeal, frame,
And even the motion of our human blood 
Almost suspended, we are laid asleep 
In body, and become a living soul:
While with an eye made quiet by the power 
Of harmony, and the deep power of joy.
We see into the life of things.
(Lines 23-30? 36-49)
The doctrine of mind as active in perception, as 
half-creating as well as half-perceiving, is both cause and 
effect of a "consecration or sacreti'ental vision" in which “a 
primal unity is manifested simultaneously in all subjects 
and all objects".^
So far only the technical devices through which Wordsworth 
makes vivid "the life of things" for the reader have been 
examined. In the passages quoted from Tintern Abbey in this 
analysis there has been a strong contrast between the 
protagonist's childhood pleasures and perception of the 
landscape and the contemplative joy derived from a mature
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insight into the "life of things". The poem, it will be 
remembered, begins with an unarticulated sense of a loss for 
which, in a mysterious way, "Abundant recompense" has been 
received. Tintern Abbey, as Langbaum notes, is "about the 
dissociation of sensibility from thought and their
reintegration".^  The cyclical structure of Tintern Abbey 
must be briefly examined if the significance of the view of 
experience implicit in the poem is to be fully understood.
It will be remembered that the boy experienced the "forms" 
of trees, rocks and mountains as an "Appetite". The stress 
on the appetitive indicates the immediacy of a response to 
nature unconcerned with bringing interests "unborrowed from 
the eye" to the landscape. In manhood self-consciousness 
interposes between the protagonist‘s perception of the
natural world and his response to it. However what is lost 
in immediacy is more than compensated for by the gain in 
comprehensions "With the sanction of what he once felt, the
poet looks upon the same forms and feels a joy which has
been chastened and subdued by human experience. Experience 
provides new relational categories and a wider perspective. 
Now the pout explicitly relates man to nature? he has ideas 
about the cosmos. But these relational ideas are founded 
upon the original immediate feelings of joy? they 
represent, in fact, a development of those feelings. The
sense sublime of something far more deeply interfused is an
<***' - a* d, JSM.
explicit interpretation of the meaning that was implicit in 
the immediate joys of childhood. Thus, the new visit to tiie 
scene of earlier experience becomes a renewal on a different 
level of the earlier affirmation .... The man is the 
explicit result of that which the child was 
implicitly".28 Tintarn Abbey embodied, perhaps more 
clearly than any other single poem of Wordsworth’s, the 
"structure of experience" examined in Chapter 1. The great 
Romantic hope of recovering, through consciousness, the loss 
of unity for which consciousness was initially responsible, 
seems to have been realised. The joys "Unborrowtsd from the 
eye" are deepened and extended by the adult’s supervening 
perception of the "life of things".
If a poem as complex as Tintern Abbey can be said to be 
"about" anything, it is about the ways in which a perception 
of life's oneness can be renewed, deepened and extended in 
memory and reflection. The organic connection of childhood 
joy and adult perception enables the poet to bind his days 
together in "natural piety". The figure of Dorothy is of 
great inipor'.-'.nce in this regard in Tintern Abbey. Her 
youthful wildness is a link with what the protagonist once 
was, and, in his present self, he perceives what she will 
become, ^  The humanization of the natural world in 
Tintern Abbey leads to a connection, to which a book of The 
Prelude is devoted, between the love of the world and the
love o£ man. The recognition of "nature" and the "language 
of sense" as “the anchor" of the poet's "purest thoughts" 
and "moral being" flows over into a love of Dorothy who 
embodies the unself mscioue power of his former response to 
the natural worlds
. .. and in thy voice I catch 
The language of my former heart, and read 
My former pleasures in the shooting lights 
Of eyes. Oh I yet a little while
May i 3 in thee what I was once,
My dear, dear Sister!
(Lines ,.:7 - 22)
The interaction of Dorothy and Wordsworth adds power to 
Tintern Abbey by functioning, in a sense, as an objective 
correlati ve of the union of human feeling and the natural 
world, the binding of the poet's days together through 
memory and recollection with which the poem is concerned.
The considerations raised by the previously analysed 
passages in Tintern Abbey an«Z The T m  lude jan now be 
profitably amplified by an examination of the "correspondent 
- breeze" passage of Thu Prelude:
For 1/ methought, while the sweet breath of Heaven 
Was blowing on my body, felt within 
A corresponding mild creative breeze,
A vital breeze which travelled gently on 
O'er things which it had made, and is become 
A tempest, a redundant energy 
Vexing its own creation. 'Tis a power 
That does not come unrecognised, a storm 
Which, breaking up a long-continued frost,
Brings with it vernal promises, fche hope 
Of active days, of dignity and thought,
Of prowess in an honourable field,
Pure passions, virtue, knowledge, and delight,
The holy life of music and of verse,
(1805, The Prelude: 1 43-54)
The "correspondent breeze" of fciiis passage .is quite 
obviously a metaphor for the achieved reciprocity of self 
and wo^Id, man and nature that the poetry of both Coleridge 
and Wordsworth represents ac both task and accomplishment. 
The "corresp-ndent breeze" elicited within the poet vexing 
hire to creativity, directly answers and compliments the 
breeze blowing on hi.a body. The "sweet breath of tleaven," 
encompassing both, imbues this correspondence with a by now 
equally familiar sacramental quality. This passage's 
structurally vital position in the opening lines of the 1305
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Pcelude stresses how important the "natural piety" so often 
celebrated in Wordsworth's work is. The task of 
art culating a reciprocity between man and nature is 
explicitly linked with the proper functions of poetry and 
imagination.30
In a manner closely resembling the capacity of Coleridge's 
"Secondary Imagination” to idealize and unify, to re-arrange 
the "givens" of perception and experience so as to reveal 
kinship and analogy between that which normal consciousness 
keeps separate, the task of imagination is to celebrate, in 
the "holy life of music and of verse"f an interchange 
between man and nature. The ho.liness of music and verse is 
a response to the "breath of Heaven" in the breeze which 
blows on the poet's body. The choice of the metaphor of a 
"correspondent breeze" to designate the birth of imagination 
firmly establishes the kinship, the near identity in fact, 
of the movement of imagination and the natural v ^cesses 
which elicit it and to which it is a living respond.'. In a 
famous metaphor of exactly the same inport, Wordsworth 
refers elsewhere in The Prelude to the activity of the mind, 
perception and natural processes as "kindred streams".3'5.
The dissolution of all dualisms between spirit and matter, 
mind and world, and the delicate balance between these two 
potentially disjunct sets of terms achieved in such a
- -  . - 4  -  J k t  d
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dissolution, has an importance for Wordsworth that can be 
gauged by a passage in Book 6 of the 1805 Prelude in which 
the speculations of "The Schoolmen" become "The Self-created 
sustenance of a mind / Debarred from Nature's images, / 
Compelled to be a life unto herself (lines
312-14). The assertion that the state of isolation in which 
imagination becomes a "life unto herself" is an imprisonment 
leave us in no doubt of the terrors that a disjunction 
between mind and world held for Wordsworth.
The harmonious interplay of man and nature achieved by and 
celebrated in "natural piety" is also a means of avoiding 
the opposite dangers
I had been taught to reverence a Power 
That is the very quality and shape 
And image of right reason, that matures 
Her processes by steady laws, gives birth 
To no impatient or fallacious hopes,
No heat of passion or excessive zeal,
No vain conceits, provokes to no quick turns 
Of self-applauding intellect, but lifts 
The Being into magnanimity,
Holds up before the mind, intoxicate 
With present objects and the busy dance
JMT
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Of things that pass away, a temperate shew
Of objects that endu.e ...
(1805, The Prelude; XI1 24-39)
The personified "Power" stresses the vital and educative 
force to be found in the natural world by those willing to 
attune themselves to it. It tempers the intellect and the 
passions by placing them in reciprocal relationship with 
nature, with "objects that endure. Thib state is
contrasted with the fate of a mind "intoxicate with present 
objects." If the reciprocity of self and world celebrated 
in the metaphors of the "correspondent breeze" and the 
"kindred stream" is to be sustained, it is vital that 
neither pole of the subject/object dialectic be given 
priority. If priority is given to subjectivity minu is, as 
seen in the first quotation, debarred from nature's living 
images. If, on the other hand, exclusive priority is given 
to the objective pole, the mind is left "intoxicate / With 
present objects" in a manner which suggests a destructive 
dissipation of any sense of self.33ti
3y and large Wordsworth's poetry seeks to avoid both these 
dangers through articulating a comprehensive view of 
experience in which thought and the affective base from 
which it springs, our moral being, and the natural world 
which shapes it, are united in a "natural piety" sustained.
*1
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deepened and enriched through memory and reflection. The 
activities of mind, imagination/ and the natural processes 
which modify and are modifind by them, are perceived to be 
"kindred streams". More often than not this insight is 
gained through an epiphanic revelation of the kinship of 
nature and spirit. This revelation is a natural outgrowth 
of the poet's intense response to i highly particularized 
and finely characterized natural scene.
This facet of Wordsworth's work asserts a living, productive 
interchange between man and nature, and stands in close 
relatioi to much of Coleridge's philosophy, to his poetical 
practic aa exemplified in Frost at Midnight and The Eolian 
Harp and, in a looser sense, to the thrust of Schelling's 
"Naturphiloaophie" as examined in Chapter 1. In all of 
these instances we are dealing with an attempt to answer the 
Enlightenment by formulating doctrines of experience 
articulating a view of nature and the world as essentially 
kin to man in their spiritual essence. Nonetheless, the 
idea of a "natural piewy" can be shown to be subj. ct to the 
game tensions and difficulties that, it was suggested at the 
close of Chapter 2, were inherent in Coleridge’s practice in 
the Conversation Poems. The rest of this chapter will 
concern itself with such matters. Ironically enough, such 
an investigation can begin by touching on Tintern Abbey, in 
many ways the key to understanding Wordsworth at his most
Tintern Abbey begins by reflecting on a disparity between 
the response the poet gives to the landscape now and his 
response of five years ago - in Tintern Abbey, a "sad 
perplexity" interposes between the visible landscape and the 
poet's memory of it. The "sad perplexity" is not heavily 
dwelt on but its mere presence imparts a certain 
precariousness to the epiphanic revelation of the spirit 
that "rolls through all things" in the poem’s climax. As 
has been suggested with reference to Coleridge's work in
Chapter 2 the epiphanic moment is intrinsically precarious. 
Langbauts has rightly suggested that the epiphany represents 
an attempt, in the absence of conventional religious 
certitude, to fuse fact and value, the real and the sacred, 
in a manner that would be experientially based. It is
precisely this rooting of the poet's perception of the life
of things in the concrete and particular that en-ibles one to
believe in the revelation as experience.
As the next section of Chapter 3 will examine in more detail 
the ways in which Wordsworth's poetry, like Coleridge’s, 
reflects the precariousness of the epiphanic moment, a 
simultaneous recapitulation and recasting of arguments 
outlined in Chapter I Section D is perhaps advisable here. 
The instability of the epiphanic moment is, it was 
suggested, related to the concreteness and particularity 
stressed in the previous paragraph. The epiphany represents
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an attempt to overcome the dualisms of post-Cartesian 
thought in an experientially given, self-validating moment 
of perception. But bosause of the epiphanic moment's 
would-bu status as dramatised experience such certitude, if 
given at all, is given only momentarily, for as long as the 
flash of insight itself lasts. Therefore any 
generalizations made from such moments in an attempt to 
extrapolate, from the epiphanic insight, a comprehensive 
doctrine of experience such as that implicit in "natural 
piety", are ,vy definition problematical. Precisely because 
the certitude t.f our perception of the "One Life" lasts only 
for a moment there is, as Langboum pointed out, a 
disequilibrium between the moment of insight and any idea or 
set of ideas we may hope to abstract from it.^4
This difficulty can be clarified &,y being considered in 
another way. So long as we consider the moment of 
dramatised experience and insight alone, the judgemental 
predicates of truth and falsity do not seem applicable to 
it. In a moment such as the insight into the "life of 
things" which is the culmii n of Tintern Abbey, it seems 
that we can intelligibly speak of the experience as "given 
or not given", but not as "true or false".^ Whether or 
not an experience can be "given" in the sense of being 
"unmediated",^  as the epiphanic moment claims to be, is 
doubtful. But for the moment it will be best to take the
Romantics on their own terms. Whatever our convictions on
this matter, this is obviously not so of any attempt to
extrapolate from the moment of experience a generalization 
or doctrine of experience intended tu be applicable, at
least in intention, to human experience as a whole. Such
generalizations or doctrines could clearly be true or false 
and, to that extent, uncertain. Given the irreducible 
concreteness of the epiphanic moment in which the relation 
between man and world comes to be perceived as Keats' 
"fellowship of essence", the "knowledge" it contains would 
seem, strictly speaking, to be private and incommunicable. 
This impasse seems to be unavoidable, for the epiphanic 
moment's claims to authenticity rest, as shown, on its being 
a moment of dramatised experience.
The consequences of all this for Wordsworth's verse a^a very 
serious. The insight achieved in Tintern Abbey into the 
"life of things" seemed to do the impossible by combining 
reverential recognition of and participation in the "One 
Life" with a conception of perception assigning mind a far 
more formative role in experience than much post-Cartesian 
thought would allow. The epiphanic moments analysed in 
Tintern Abbey, the Invocation to Bk 1 of the 1805 Prelude, 
The Boy of Winander and the "correspondent breeze" passages 
all attempt, with great virtuosity, to show how, despite the 
independent existence of the natural world, its objects
M lfjE iiW ll , Jt.-
Page - 106 -
could be instrumental in the growth of a poet's mind. It is 
only because of this deeply felt "kinship of essence" with 
the natural world that Wordsworth could hope to write a 
history of his mind's formation through progressively 
articulating the significance cf his childhood experiences 
of nature, experiences which at once modify consciousness 
and are modified by it. Epiphanic revelation of the unity 
of man and world and a sympathetic understanding of the 
significance of such a revelation by a mind whose role in 
perception is active and creative are the two pillars on 
which a doctrine of "natural piety" rests. As the 
perception of nature as embodied spirit was given actually, 
allowing the positives of religious experience to be 
recaptured in secular terms, a doctrine of "natural piety" 
held out the prospect of overcoming the Cartesian dualisms 
discussed in Chapter 1 in an intellectually satisfying 
m a n n e r . T h e  above considerations also show - see p.98 
foil - that only through "natural piety" did it seem 
possible to stabilize the subject/object dialectic, to avoid 
the opposite yet related iangers of the mind becoming 
"debarred" from "Nature's living images" or "intoxicate with 
present, objects". To the extent that the perceptions and 
aspirations of "natural piety" are based on the precariously 
self-validating epiphanies scattered throughout The Prelude 
and poems like Tintern Abbey, its projected resolutions and 
syntheses are also vulnerable.
As noted, doctrines of "natural piety" rest on a 
participation in the "One Life" and a conception of the mind 
as active in perception. But it is difficult to maintain 
without contradiction simultaneous beliefs in the 
independent existence of the natural world and the 
essentially mind-dependent nature of perception. The 
analysis of the Invocation to Bk 1 of the 1805 Prelude - see 
p» 84-87 - showed a significant tension to be suggested by 
the diction and syntax of Wordsworth's verne. The need, 
expressed in the vocative personifications of the breeze ao 
"messenger" and "friend", to constitute natural objects and 
forces as "presences" so as to make them in some sense 
internally related to consciousness is, at best, ambiguous. 
At worst, it is indicative of a tendency on the part of mind 
towards solipsistic projection - see the entry in 
Coleridge's Malta notebooks quoted at the end of chapter 2. 
This tension will be examined in the first part of Section B 
of Chapter 3, at least in part, through an analysis of IV 
247-67 of the 1805 Prelude. The suggestion that objects of 
perception acquire radiance through being "crossed" with a 
"gleam" exclusively associated with the perceiver's "own 
image" radicalises the tensions implicit in the Invocation 
and looks forward to the solipsistically self-reflexive 
autonomy of a mind that has become "Lord and master of 
outward sense". One way of dealing with the spectre of 
solipsism is to embrace it, to counteract the precariousness
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of the epiphanic moment by defiantly asserting the 
constitutive power of mind, by making perception an act of
The rather different "autonomy" of imagination celebrated in 
the Simp^r-n-Pass passage is related to the second response 
to the precariousness of the epiphanic moment outlined in 
Chapter 2 Section D. As the contradiction in the Eolian 
Harp showed, this fragility could also result in an attempt 
to ground a perception of the "life of things" more securely 
in something resembling a more orthodox theism. Even, for 
instance, the reference to the "sweet breath of Heaven" in 
the "correspondent breeze" passage, is slightly ambiguous. 
Although the predominant thrust of the passagri is 
undoubtedly pantheistic in its flavour, the personification 
of "Heaven" makes it ultimately uncertain whether the 
"sacred" is wholly immanent in the natural world, or whether 
it is a power or force existing independently of man and 
nature but beneficently encompassing them both. In the
Simp'’ on-Pass passage, what is most often merely an 
occasional tension in Wordsworth's poetry gains full 
expression, objects having value only in so far as they
reflect a light and glory other than the merely natural.
This transcendent light can only be apprehended by an 
imagination - hence the celebration of the "unfathered
vapour" - that, despite its participation in the divine, i
mastery and subjugation.
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also alleged to have become "autonomous" in some or other 
sense. This aspect of Wordsworth's verse will be dealt with 
in the concluding part of the following section of Chapter 
3. An argument will be advanced trying to partially justify 
the suggestion, given in Chapter 2 Section D, that the 
tendencies examined here may tentatively be understood to 
indicate the various "careers" on which an imagination 
opposed to the merely "bodily eye" of Tintern Abbey may 
embark. The investigation ot those aspects of Wordsworth's 
verse sketched here will, to form a link with what has gone 
before, initially be examined by reviewing ,>nd extending 
arguments already advanced in the analysis of the Invocation 
to Bk 1 of the 1805 Prelude.
SECTION B
As has been suggested, Wordsworth’s desire to "humanise" the. 
natural by articulating a structure of experience allowing 
for a more intimate relationship between self and world than 
any the Enlightenment would allow can result in a 
solipsistic tendency, ultimately at odds with the "natural 
piety" examined so far. This can be seen by looking again 
at the syntax of the invocation to the 1805 Prelude.
In the passage concerned it was pointed out that the 
ambiguities of syntax left open precisely to what extent the 
mind's role in perception was a constitutive one. In Line 
1, though even here the exact source of the blessing in the 
breeze is not entirely unequivocal, the diffusion of the 
blessing through fields, clouds and sky before the breeze 
beats against the poet's cheek seems to locate the life 
animating the scene predominantly in the natural world 
itself. However the personifications of L^ne 5 in which the 
breeze is welcomed first as messenger and then as friend 
complicate this picture. The invocation of the breeze as 
messenger clearly retains the main thrust of the opening 
line. The blessing implicitly comes from an agency which, 
no matter how beneficent, is still seen * rnal to the
poet himself • Howeve*-, in the s e intimate
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invocation of the breeze as friend, ouc sense that the 
poet's joy results from a perception of the sacramental 
inhering in the landscape is modified.
A friend, as noted, would seem to be a "companionable forsi" 
in a more intimah* sense than a messenger. In this second 
personification there is perhaps a suggestion that the 
consciousness perceived in the object may, as Langbaum puts 
it, to a slightly greater degree, be the poet's own.^® 
This construction is given further support by the assertion, 
in Line 4, that the breeze seems "half-conscious c>f the joy
it gives". Here it seems possible that the poet's sensation
of joyous release at having escaped the confines of the city 
has been projected onto the external world.
Of course Wordsworth intends this slight shift of emphasis 
fco allow the passage to incarnate the notion of the mind as 
(in the extract quoted from Book ‘ of Tie Prelude) "working 
in alliance with the works / 'h it beholds." The 
blessing permeating the entire landscape is met with an 
active and reciprocal thrufit of mini. Th-3 sense of the 
numinous elicited in the poet through his exposure to nature 
is deepened and enriched by an active and joyous response 
essentially similar in kind. In this particular passage of
The Prelude one may readily concede that the two strands of
thought implicit in the verse cannot easily be disentangled
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so as to give the one priority over the other. Nonetheless, 
the vocative personifications of Line 5 make us aware that 
the objects of the natural world must m  a sense be 
constituted as "Presence's" or "Powers" - both words are 
used frequently in Wordsworth's work to convey a sense of 
what A.D. Nuttall calls the "numinous quasi - allegorical 
figure of Nature"^* - if they are to be seen as animate 
beings with whom relationship is possible. The passage 
displays, in latent form, two strands. In one the poet
responds with appropriate reverence to an epiphanic 
revelation of "being" in the natural world. In the other an 
active projection of consciousness makes the object seem, to 
a greater extent, a modification of self whose independent 
existence is more precarious. It is this second strand that 
accounts for what Colin Clarke rightly calls the "haunting 
insubstantiality"of many typically Wordsworthian 
landscapes.
This peculiar evanesence can indeed be found frequently in 
Wordsworth's work. In the extract from the Bov of Winander 
the ambiguity of the key word "image," .•--plicable to both 
the protagonist's perceptions and the .-ojects perceived, 
gives the landscape the same fluidity. ‘ihile enjoying a
strangely independent existence, the l&;.u* .-pe is yet "of 
the same stuff as the mind."^ It ■ s this seeming
co-extensiveness of the mental and the cal which allows
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the landscape to exist so easily as inner representation. 
It is obvious that the doctrines concerning the nature of 
the mind's role in perception implicit in each of the two 
strands referred to in Wordsworth's work do not entirely 
agree with one another, seeming as they do to embody 
ultimately divergent accounts of human experience and 
possibility. There is no doubt that these ambiguitiee about 
the role and nature of perception were, in poetic terms, to 
prove immensely productive in Wordsworth's work. These 
tensions were for Wordsworth "part of the nature of things, 
a dilemma felt on the pulses. His conviction that the 
natural world is solid, and substantially 'other' than the 
mind that contemplates it, had to come to terms with his 
conviction that what we perceive is inevitably 
mind-dependent. A dramatic tension in his poetry was 
frequently the result. A well known pasrage in Bk. 4 
of the 1805 Prelude both reflects ar d gives a new twist to 
the concerns discussed so far:
As one who hangs down - bending from the side 
Of a slow-moving Boat, upon the breast 
Of a still water, solacing himself 
With such discoveries as his eye can makw,
Beneath him in the bottom of the deeps.
Sees many beauteous sights, weeds, fishes, flowers,
Grots, pebbles, roots of trees, and fancies more,
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Yet often la perplexed, and cannot part 
The shadow from the substance, rocks and sky. 
Mountains and clouds, from that which is indeed 
The region, and the things which there abide 
In their true dwelling? now is crossed by gleam 
Of his own image, by a sunbeam now,
And motions that are sent hr-, knows not whence, 
Impediments that make his task more sweet;
Such pleasant office have we long pursued 
Incumbent *'er the surface of past time 
'-ith like success; nor have we often looked 
On more alluring shows (to me, at least,)
More s o f o r  less ambiguously descried,
Than those which now we have been passing by,
And where we still are lingering.
This passage is about a realm which Wordsworth himself calls 
"ambiguously descried," a realm in which r e f l e c t ! o n  
objects seen increases rather than alleviates the difficulty 
of distinguishing between the outside world, perception and 
memory. These "Impedimenta" to distinguishing clearly 
between the external scene and "the surface of past time" 
make the poet's "task more sweet," testifying as they do to 
the mind becoming interfused, as in Tintern Abbey, with the 
world. A few lines later, immediately before describing
IV 247 - 68)
subsequent social distractions, Wordsworth assures us that
all he saw he "loved / Lovtu deeply." Perception of beauty 
leads to an enlargening of moral sympathies, to the "joys / 
Of subtler origin" mentioned earlier. As Colin Clarke 
correctly points out, "'I loved, loved deeply' becomes
equated in the imagination with the meaning ' I saw
deeply.'1,43
Nonetheless, there is a countermovement in this passage 
corresponding to the second train of thought implicit in The 
Prelude's invocation, one which tacitly seems to assign the 
mind a more constitutive role in perception than has been 
exhibited in most of the passages considered so far. The
mind not merely "sees many beauteous sights" but actively 
"fancies more." Moreover the "beauteous sights" listed are 
the objects actually constituting the realm "ambiguously 
descried." The lack of any firm distinction between what 
the mind "sees" and what it "fancies" is of course the 
reason why reflection and substance cannot be separated in 
the realm "ambiguously descried." The passage's brilliant 
use of the reflections playing in the water is made to 
suggest the ambiguities of the act of perception itself, the 
“weeds, fishes, flowers / Grots" and "pebbles" of the 
river-bottom are merging with the "rocks and sky / Mountains 
and clouds" of the external landscape. The obvious 
syntactic parallelism in the descriptions of the two lists
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of objects serves to enhance the suggestion of identity in 
difference conveyed by the scene as a w h o l e . T h e  
difficulty, of telling which of the objects given in these 
lists belongs exactly where, of telling the "shadow from the 
substance", makes us aware of the way in which the "fancies" 
and “objects ambiguously descried" in this passage 
complement one another, deepening the ambiguity noted 
earlier about the mind’s exact role in perception.
Due to the fluiditiy of the relation between shadow and 
substance, the impossibility of knowing whether the external 
landscape is substance to the water's shadow or conversely, 
the "region" where things "abide / in their true dwelling" 
remains, in principle, impossible to locate precisely. The 
ambiguities noted so far are deepened by the explicit 
statement that the realm "ambiguously descried" is "crossed" 
by the "gleam" of the perceiver's "own image". The gleam of 
the perceiver's image relates to the "fancies" mentioned 
earlier. The use of "image" and "gleam" in this passage, 
the latter strongly suggesting the active nature of 
perception, implies that the mind constitutes objects of 
experience as modifications of self. Of course, "the 
crossing over" through which the self is intermingled with 
the scene of which it is a rt could be used as evidence 
for a living interchange between man and nature in which, as 
in Tintern Abbey, the mind is both giver and receiver. But
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such a reading would in my opinion be i incomplete and 
partial, failing to take note of something in this verse 
giving it a slightly different range of suggestion to most 
of the previously analysed passages.
It is difficult not to feel that this passage gives a new 
twist to the argument sketched in outline in the analysis of 
the Invocation. In the former passage, despite the active 
projection of consciousness implied by the personifications, 
we do not get nearly so strong a sense of the poet's self 
being so dispersed through the natural scene as to almost 
envelop it. The explicitness with which the observed scene 
is said to bu refashioned by consciousness, literally 
"crossed" with the gleam of the perceiver's "own image", 
sits uneasily with a "natural piety" that would fuse self 
and world through a perception and celebration of their 
common essence. Suggestions that the mind works in alliance 
with what it perceives - see for instance the 
characterization of the natural world as a beneficent mother 
in the reference to cne oreast" of the water - conflict 
with so strong a suggestion that "consciousness" is 
perceived in the object only by courtesy of being "crossed" 
with the perceiver's "own image".
The isolation of two strands implicit in Wordsworth's work, 
one in which "joy" is the product of perceiving a "life in
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things" that is objectively and independently there, and a 
second in which mind, given a more active role .in 
perception, at least partially constitutes the object as a 
modification of self, points as noted, to an instability in 
the subject - object dialectic. Accordingly the poetry is 
in effect forced to debate which of the terms of the 
subject/ object, sel5/world dialectic should enjoy 
priority. In this passage it seems to me that a noticeable 
step has been taken in the direction of giving priority to 
the subject, the self. The use by Coleridge and Wordsworth 
of terms drawn from the vocabulary of human emotion and 
response to describe the natural world was the result of an 
attempt to articulate a relation between mind vorld more
intimate than the dualisms of post-Cartesiai- : seemed
to allow, to formulate a view of experience in •.ttich man's 
kinship with nature regarded as embodied spirit was 
perceived. The use of the word "gleam" in the last passage 
examined, seemingly locating the radiance perceived in the 
landscape in the perceiver's image, raises the question of 
whether, in the last analysis, the affective terminology of 
the Romantics tends to designate a solipsistic attitude on 
the part of the perceiver.*^
"Natural piety" attempts to resolve the subject / object 
dialectic through an epiphanic moment in which an insight 
into the "life of things" is given as concrete experience in
things" that is objectively and independently there, and a 
second in which mind, given a more active role in 
perception, at least partially constitutes the object as a 
modification of self, points as noted, to an instability in 
the subject - object dialectic. Accordingly the poetry is 
in effect forced to debate which of the terms of the 
subject/ object, self/world dialectic should enjoy 
priority. In this passage it seems to me that a noticeable 
step has been taken in the direction of giving priority to 
the subject, the self. The use by Coleridge and Wordsworth 
of terms drawn from the vocabulary of human emotion and 
response to describe the natural world was the result of an 
attempt to articulate a relation between mind and world more 
intimate than the dualisms of post-Cartesian thought seemed 
to allow, to formulate a view of experience in which man’s 
kinship with nature regarded as embodied spirit was 
perceived. The use of the word "gleam" in the last passage 
examined, seemingly locating the radiance perceived in the 
landscape in the perceiver1s image, raises the question of 
whether, in the last analysis, the affective terminology of 
the Romantics tends to designate a solipsistic attitude on 
the part of the perceiver.4^
"Natural piety" attempts to resolve the subject / object 
dialectic through an epiphanic moment in which an insight 
into the "life of things" is given as concrete experience in
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an unmediated, self-verifying perception- As noted, the 
synthesis of "natural piety" could be sundered either 
through the mind becoming "intoxicate with present objects" 
or through its assumption of autonomy. The same 
precariousness was referred to, in a different way, through 
pointing out the difficulty of maintaining a belief in both 
the objective reality of the external "world and the mind - 
dependence of perception. If, as suggested on p. 106, the 
beliefs of "natural piety" depend on epiphanic revelation of 
the "One Life within us and abroad" to a mind that 
half-creates and half-perceives, it is hardly surprising 
that mind's role in perception is active in almost all of 
Wordsworth's poetry. As a belief in the activity of the 
mind in fitting our existence to "existing things," in 
"humanising the natural world, was not something Wordsworth 
could relinquish, it is no surprise that in his poetry it is 
usually "the objective which is eroded by the 
subjective."4® This incipient autonomy of mind and 
imagination, often implicit in The Prelude, squares well 
with Geoffrey Hartmann's observation that Wordsworth does 
not "write poetry about Nature as an immediate external 
object ... 'The Prelude' never represents Nature simply as 
immediate or ultimate object, even when the poet's recall is 
most vivid.
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In particular the intimated collapse of the distinction 
between the objective world, perception and memory gives 
substance to Charles Sherry's claim that in some of 
Wordsworth's verse "Nature is not the cause, but the 
occasion for poetry. The imagination seizes upon the 
accidental conjunctions of things in nature, takes them up, 
and subsumes them under the higher laws of its 
operation."*® The subsumption cj which Sherry speaks is 
constantly suggested as a prospect by the incipient autonomy 
of mind in any belief wishing, however guardedly, to 
dissolve categorical distinctions between mind and world in 
the perception of a supposedly common essence. The man 
wishing to bind his days together by means of "natural
piety" is, ironically enough because of the essential nature 
of his beliefs, constantly threatened by the prospect of
being "debarred" from "Nature's images", of being left 
without a world to inhabit. This tension, engendering a
perpetually inconclusive subject - object dialectic, is 
endemic to any worldview engaged in a "Schellingesque"
attempt to "give a plausible interpretation of nature ... as 
the precipitate of a cosmic spirit on the way to a fuller 
realization in self-consciousness".*® This tension points 
to "one of the most painful spots in modern philosophy and 
its persistent temptation. To find a consistent language 
which would embrace both the cogito and the cosmos is 
probably impossible? once we start with one we do not reach
JUT *
the other".^  Despite superficial appearances to the 
contrary, "natural piety" tends to start with the self.
The difficulty of simultaneously asserting the independent 
existence of the natural world and the mind - dependence of 
perception is also revealed by important, almost 
programmatic passages in The Prelude, standing in opposition 
to one another. in one of the innumerable passages of The 
Prelude which shows how love of nature yields to delight of 
a more refined kind, a corresponding harmony of mind aptly 
described as "intellectual charm," Wordsworth speaks of the 
"affinities'1 that fit our existence to "existing things:"
Nor, sedulous as I have been to trace 
How Nature by extrinsic passion first 
Peopled my mind with beauteous forms or grand 
And made me love them, may I well forget 
How other pleasures have been mine, and joys 
Of subtler origin; how I have felt,
Not seldom, even in that tempestuous time,
Those hallowed and pure motions of the sense 
Which seem in their simplicity, to own 
An intellectual charm, that calm delight 
Which, if I err not. surely must belong 
To those first-born affinities that fit 
Our new existence to existing things.
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And, in our ow t,wn of being, constitute 
The bond of un^O' between life and joy.
1805 Prelude; 1 571-85)
It s this unification of the relf through a "natural piety" J •
binding our "existence to existing things" that is "joy," in
the Wordsworthian sense. Nature and perception of natural
beauty gives rise to "joys / Of subtler origin" in such d
way as to root thought, and self-consciousness in the
affective, to root "our moc. sophisticited idea in our most
primitive impulse, uniting youth with ag*., the external with
t.e internal, sense with idea, and matter with spirit."51
Such a passage’s significance is heightened by its
sentiment: being reflected at the close of The Prelude in
the clima::. i c ascent of Mount Snowdon, where the "power" in
nature i;;
The Power which these 
Acknowledge when thus moved, which Nature thus 
ThiMot:; forth upon the senses, is the express 
Rennmblance, in the fullness of its strength 
Made visible, a «iunu1tiG Counterpart 
And Brother of the gloriouti faculty 
Which higher minds bear with them as their own.
This is the very opirit in which they deal 
With a U  the objects of the universe;
They from their native selves can send abroad
Like transformations, for themselves create 
A like existence, and, when'er it is 
Created for them, catch it by an instinct.
1810 Prelude; XIII 84 - 96)
It . v because of the essential analogousness of natural 
presences and the mind that the lat sr can construct from 
its own resources "transformations'1 kindred to the "Power" 
in the landscape. Landscape and mind in the ascent of Mount 
Snowdon are perfect analogues of one another, poetic 
creation consisting of an elucidation and celebration of the 
potentially Infinite correspondences between them.^a The 
mind can respond actively to the beauty of the world by 
forging for itself a "Like transformation" or, with equal 
ease "catch" what has been crerted for it.^lb Here, in 
truly a Schellingesque manner, man, so far from beino 
debarred from nature's living images, is the spiritual 
essence of the natural world rendered conscious and 
articulate. In one of the simultaneously satisfying and 
maddening "circles" so typical of much Romantic thought and 
poetry, it is imagination's task to bring to our awareness 
the unity of spirit and matter in which it itself is 
ultimately grounded. As B.D. Hirsch says "Imagination, like 
life, is characterized by reciprocal activity ... It strives 
to unify seemingly diverse elements and, in so striving, it 
attains the fulfillment it seeks. For, the goal toward
'ww ~ r
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which it strives is, in a deeper sense, already attained. 
The very unity it seeks is that which makes possible its 
seeking, for thought and being are implicitly unified."52
In these key passages, poetry is an act of creation in which 
exploration of the post’s mind is, as the epigraph to The 
Prelude suggests, simultaneously an exploration of the 
world, for the essence of reality is the non-arbitrary 
metaphysical kinship of both. The second strand implicit in 
the poetry's ambiguities of syntax and diction, the strand 
in which the -bject seems to owe its kinship with mine to a 
solipsistic projection of consciousness reminiscent of 
Coleridge's Malta Notebook entry of 1805, is powerfully 
expressed in one of The Prelude's most famous passages:
There are in our existence spots of time,
Which with distinct pre-eminence retain 
A renovating Virtue, ...
A virtue by which pleasure is enhanced,
That penetrates, enables us to mount
When high, more high, and lifts us up when fallen.
This efficacious spirit chiefly lurks
Among those passages of life in which
We have had deepest feeling that the mind
Is lord and master, and that outward sense
Is but the obedient servant of her will.
(1805 Prelude: XI 258-60? 266-273)
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"Outward sense" is here reduced to totally subservient 
status, for all 'outward sense" is an aspect of 
consciousness in a state of affaire in which mind is its own 
object. The tensions between the epistemologioal doctrines 
implicit in each of the two strands of Wordsworth's work 
uncovered by the ar ..lysis of the invocation do not, it can 
now be seen, merely affect individual passages of vei.se. As 
the juxtaposed quotations show, they affect The Prelude as a 
whole, making its structure one of ultimately inconclusive 
repetition and oscillation in which the various "doctrines" 
concerning mind, perception, the world, experience, and the 
relations between them, do not cohere into unity. The 
structure of inconclusive repetition can be seen even more 
clean./ by turning now to an analysis of the Simplon-Pass 
passage, the best example of Wordsworth's alternative 
attempts to deal with the precariousness of the epiphanic 
moment by grounding our perception of "life" in things 
transcendentally in the radiance of a "light divine".
There is a passage at the close of Book 5 of both the 1805 
and 1850 versions of The Prelude foreshadowing the emergence 
of an ambiguously autonomous imagination, the seemingly 
self-engendered "unfathered vapour". Wordsworth speaks of < 
"Visionary Power" which
M r  a .
Attends upon the motions of the winds 
Embodied in the mystery of words;
There darkness makes abode, and all the host 
Of shadowy things do work their dangers there 
As in a mansion like their proper home;
Even forms and substances are circumfused 
By that transparent veil with light divine;
And through the turnings intricate of Verse 
Present themselves as objects recognised,
In flashes, and with a glory scarce their own.
U805 Prelude V 619-29)
Although the main thrust of the poetry here is in the 
direction of attributing a problematical "autonomy" to mind, 
there are some countercurrents. The "there," the precise 
location in which "shadowy things do work their changes", is 
still partially ambiguous. The "there" could be either the 
"Visionary Power" or the "mystery of words." This tension 
is revealed by the complex syntax of the passage. On the 
one hand the run of the syntax seems to quite conclusively 
embody the "Visionary Powers" in "words", which would imply 
that the "Visionary Power" is constituted as such by the 
poet's verse. On the other hand we are confronted with an 
alternative and contrary characterization of language as a 
"transparent veil" in and through which the "visionary 
Power" reveals itself without the intervention of human
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artifice.^3 This ambiguity causes, as we read on, even 
our understanding of the phrase "turnings intricate of 
verse" to be equivocal. The "turnings" of the verse could 
have a constitutive function, for the use of the word 
"turnings" seems to insinuate that the verse has strongly 
independent life and existence of its own. It could, 
however, also denote an effort to make the verse correspond 
ever more closely to the contours of an independent object, 
so that the "Visionary Power" may reveal without 
distortion. But these ambiguities are, I think, almost 
wholly dissipated by the last two lines of the passage, 
whose final and cumulative effect is a celebration of the 
mind1s autonomy. This extract is accordingly directly 
related to that section of the Simplon-Pass narrative in 
which imagination rises like an "unfathered vapour".
Although the characterization of language as a "transparent 
veil" still seems to allow "forms and substances" to be 
conveyed to us in their full radiance without distortion, 
objects are nonetheless suffused with a "light divine" 
disengaging the "Visionary Power" from the natural world 
which it illuminates. Natural objects are finally perceived 
"In flashes," contingent and frail bearers of "a glory 
scarce their own." This disengagement of the natural world 
from the source of its illumination modifies our 
interpretation of "In flashes". Objects are perceivable
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only when illuminated by a "light divine," a light extrinsic 
to them which only an imagination that has - in a sense to 
be considered shortly - assumed autonomy can see. We are 
accordingly entitled, thinking on the import of the passage 
as a whole, to retrospectively regard the presentation of 
objects "in turnings intricate: of verse" as one of th. very 
rare passages in which a celebration of the imagination as 
self-engendered, as an "unfathered vapour", is combined with 
an assertion of the constitutive power of Wordsworth's
A comparison of the 1805 Prelude with the 1850 Prelude
version of this same passage seems to confirm that 
Wordsworth himself may well have regarded this last 
interpretation of the passage's import as a whole to be 
justified. The first two lines of the 1805 version,
“Visionary Power / Attends upon the motions of the winds" 
are changed to "Visionary Power / Attends the motion of the 
viewless winds." In the 1805 version the attending of the 
"Visionary Power" on "the motions of the winds" holds open 
the possibility of. a reciprocity in which the "Visionary 
Power" is intrinsically connected with or even perhaps
immanent in the wind. The 1850 version's characterization 
of the wind as "viewless" seems to foreclose this 
possibility, strengthening the assertion of the last two 
lines that the objects and the "flashes" illuminating them
>'
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are disjunct. The glory of objects is not their own, 
attaining it as they do only when suffused with "light 
divine." A second emmendation in the 1850 version seems to 
work to similar effect. The lines "There, darkness makes 
abode, and all the host / Of shadowy things do work their 
changes there" becomes "There, darkness makes abode, and all 
the host f Of shadowy things work endless changes tnere." 
The replacement of the personal pronoun "their" with 
"endless" disembodies the "shadowy things" even more 
thoroughly, placing in doubt what De Man calls "the 
ontological priority of the sensory object."55 This 
questioning of the sensory object's ontological primacy 
widens the gap between the natural world and the "light 
divine" even more, reinforcing also our sense of the 
constitutive power of the "turnings intricate of verse." In 
conclusion then, in this passage, to which the description 
of imagination rising like an "unfathered vapour" is 
essentially related, we can see an explicit celebration in 
The Prelude of mind severed from its essentially frustrating 
and hampering connections with the world of sense.
It was noted as early as Section D of Chapter 2 that the 
nature of the "autonomy" imagination may be said to have 
assumed in the Simplon-Pass passage was in need of 
explication. It would be difficult for the careful reader
not to feel that Wordsworth's attribution of autonomy to the
«x*i., m  «t
"unfathered vapour" in the Simplon-Pass passage of The 
Prelude is beset with ambiguities. In the Simplon-Pass
passage the emergence of the "unfathered vapour" is
associated with an extinguishing of the "light of sense" and 
a perception of objects suffused with "light divine". 
Objects become contingent bearers of a "glory not their
own". As noted - see Chapter 2 Section D - such
considerations force us to treat the vision of nature as
embodied spirit and the doctrine of the cosubstantiality of
all being in either a more traditionally theological or a 
more Platonistic manner. And yet such a treatment 
multiplies rather than eliminates our difficulties. In
IV247-67 of The Prelude the way in which objects were
"crossed” with the "gleam" of the perceiver's "image" 
enabled one to interpret th> incipient autonomy of 
imagination quite simply as a tendency towards solipsism. 
Wordsworth's characterization of imagination in the 
Simplon-Pass passage as "unfathered" and, by implication, 
self-engendered, seems to insist heavily on autonomy of a 
similar nature. But if the ultimate goal of mind and 
imagination is participation in the divine it is difficult 
to see how they can be autonomous in the same eense^® as 
the mind which is "Lord and master of outward sense". In a 
sense the exact opposite is true, for to the extent that 
participation in the “light divine" is achieved it seems 
likely that selfhood of the kind aggressively asserted by
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the mind which constitutes objects of experience as aspects 
of self will be greatly attenuated or possibly even 
extinguished. This seems to be confirmed, as will be seen, 
by much of the Immortality Ode. In the Ode birth and 
individuation, the process of acquiring a self through 
descent into thi> "Shades of the prison-house", mark the 
beginning of vision's dissipation. In short, an imagination 
seeking participation in the divine may come to disengage 
the poet from any sense of self as surely as it disengages 
him from the world of sense. The disjunction of the natural 
world and the “visionary gleam" in the Ode reveals a similar 
discontinuity between the child, who enjoys immediate 
participation in the divine, and the man, frustrated by his 
hampering immersion in the world of sense. It is hardly 
surprising that the Ode comes to use the notion of Platonic 
recollection as a heuristic device to try and connect the 
natural world and the "visionary gleam", earthly existence 
and the divine, in such a manner as to preserve the reality 
of both.
If the analysis sketched in outline in the last page or two 
has any plausibility whatever, the considerations it raises 
make it extremely unlikely that any fully coherent sense can 
be made of the problematical "autonomy" attributed to the 
imagination said to be "unfathered" and self-engendered. 
The ambiguity of the "autonomy" seems to me to be 
irreducible, the extent to which the imagination celebrated
j £ . *  -iar
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in the Simplon'•J.'ass passage can be said to be "autonomous" 
being largely a matter of the perspective from which we care 
to interpret the Simplon-Pass passage as a whole. In 
elaborating on this suggestion, I shall both recapitulate
and recast arguments already presented.
As has been suggested - see p.130, the attempt to 
participate in the divine implies that the "solution" to 
phenomena, as Coleridge termed it, is not to be found
immanently within them. If objects accordingly become 
contingent bearers of "glory not their own" it is implied 
that the "light divine" which is the source of their
illumination emanates from a "being" that would be 
reminiscent, to a degree, of the Neo-Platonic Absolute - see 
the quotation from Aids to Reflection on p.71. The "One" 
conferring the radiance without which objects, regarded as 
merely natural objects, become "soulless images", usurping
"living thoughts", may well only be capable of being the 
transcendental source of illumination it seems to be if it 
is a "being" which is "absolute, non-contingent, and 
identical with its own existence".®^ As Kolakowski has 
correctly pointed out, even "the term 'existence1 is 
inappropriate to the Absolute" since the "reality of the 0n« 
is inexpressible yet self-evident, since 1 to be' in its most 
basic sense signifies to be immutably and absolutely, to be 
indifferentiated and outside time". Indeed in the 
Simplon-Pass passage the relation between universal and
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particular, finite and infinite is conceived of in a manner 
much different from the Eolian Harp's celebration of the 
"One Life" - see Section C of Chapter 2. The concentration 
on experience as manifestation of the infinite in the 
Simplon-Pass passage is different in kind from the 
"Schellingesque" nature pantheism in which the truth 
inhering in one's perception of the particular yielded a 
sense of the numinous immanent in a world, as suggested in 
an earlier quotation from Morse Peckham, "pellucidly 
beautiful as the divine shines through each particle of it". 
- see p.89
In the Simplon-Pass passage, by contrast, the "Visionary 
Power" is disengaged from the world it illuminates. 
Accordingly, an imagination appeasing its hunger for the 
"sacred", far from perceiving mind and world as "kindred 
streams", would surely tend to embark on a path akin to the 
mystic's via - negativas "Our reason approaches the One by 
way of negation ... But this negative approach is only the 
world of transitory objects which is characterized by 
limitation and participation in non-being".59 As the 
remarks made on p.130-31 about the child's pre-natal 
existence in the "imperial palace" and the process of 
individuation through a descent into the "Shades of the 
prison-house" sugcest, communion with a "Visionary Power" of 
the kind celebrated in V6l9-29 suggests a subsumption of 
the finite in the infinite which dissipates self as
J t .
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thoroughly as the world given to the "bodily eye" of Tintern 
Abbey. As much of the argument of the Immortality Ode 
suggests, in a manner I shall try to make explicit in 
Section C of Chapter 3, commitment to an imagination seeking 
unmediated apprehension of and part"cipation in the "light 
divine" or "visionary gleam" coulc lead to a view of the 
"soul imprisoned in transience, impelled without ceasing 
from the nothingness of what was to the nothingness of what 
is to be" For man's existence to co-incide with his
essence again, he must jettison "all ties with external 
reality, ... so that the soul may commune with that which 
constitutes its inmost being".^ This annihilative 
negation of the finite would seem, paradoxically, to be the 
logical consequence of the "transcendental" perspective we 
are urged to take by the Simplon-Pass passage. It is 
however just as obvious that an imagination of this nature 
is anything but "autonomous". The consequences of the 
attempt to ground our perception of "life" in things 
transcendentally in a "light divine" outlined here are 
almost a point for point negation of anything Wordsworth 
could reasonably be expected to have intended.
And yet another interpretation of the via-negativa spoken of 
by Hartmann,62 as well as arguments advanced in S> tion D 
of Chapter 2 and (p.104 foil) Section A of Chapter 3 perhaps 
yield a jense in which an admittedly problematical 
"autonomy" can yet be attributed to the "unfathered
1
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vapour". As the previous paragraph suggests, the attempt to 
overcome the precariously self-validating nature of the
epiphanic moments on which the doctrines o£ "natural piety"
are based by grounding our perception of "glory" in objects
in a "Visionary Power", is associated with an hostility of 
the merely "bodily eye" of Tintarn Abbey. Imagination, 
construed as a faculty of vision rather t\:an an act of
empathic intuition, liberates mind from its servitude to 
vision, stigmatized at one point in The Prelude as the most 
despotic of the senses. The constitutive power, the "glory" 
of imagination - see VI52S-S5 - retrieves for 
consciousness the significance o: our kinship "with
Infinitude". Wordsworth was above all concerned, indeed 
almost obsessively concerned to ground cur intuitions of the 
"sacred" in the world securely by rendering them 
intelligible. His poetry, as suggcr.'.od on p.US foil, 
oscillated inconclusively between uliinately jivercent 
conceptions of mind, world and the rolat: 3ns betu'^sn them, 
each one of which he at times entortainc.l as an explanation 
of his primordial intuition of a "glory" or radiance
in things. In the light of this last consideration, the 
attempt to formulate a contract, in the context of :he 
Simplon-Pass passage, between tiio "bodily aye" and a facility 
of vision so as to make an instrument of discovery of the 
latter perhaps corresponds more closely with Wordsworth's 
intentions. An attempt to construe the passage in this
J t . ,
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manner should not however blind us to the fact that another 
approach to Wordsworth's poetry which would stress the 
potential dissipation of self .rted earlier would be both 
informative and legitimate.
In summary then, the only partial resolution of this 
exegetical problem I posed initially that I can offer is 
suggested by the opposition between the imagination 
construed as "unfathered vapour" and the Wordsworthian 
notion of "natural piety", construed as a reverence for and 
participation in the "life of things". The oscillation in 
Coleridge's work between "natural piety" and a something 
resembling a more traditional theism was seen in Chapter 2 
Section D to be a probably unavoidable product of the 
unstable moment of epiphany on which the claims of "natural 
piety" to see the "One Life" rests. If the natural world's 
radiance ultimately derives from a source extrinsic to it 
such as the "light divine", then such a light could, by 
definition, not be apprehended by the merely "bodily eye" of 
Tintern Abbey. The "light divine" of the Simplon-Pass 
passage or the "visionary gleam" of the Immortality Ode 
could be apprehended only by an imagination which may, in 
its own way, be no leas "opposed to images culled or 
developed from Nature"^ than the solipsistic mind which 
is "Lord and master of outward sense", Imagination would 
radically question "the ontological priority of the sensory
object", to recall the earlier quotation from Paul De Man. 
An imagination of this nature, when contrasted with the 
imagination o£ "natural piety" could, in a senue, be said to 
be autonomous. As noted before the precariously 
self-validating nature of the moment of epiphanic perception 
left it prone to collapse into either soplisism or something 
resembling a more traditional theism. If the "unfathered 
vapour's" "autonomy" is glc tid in the manner suggested 
above, the Simplon-Pass passage interestingly shows the two 
processes to be not altogether unconnected. It is possible 
that Wordsworth intended something on these lines. None of 
this however really resolves the difficulty noted in the 
previous pages. These unresolvable tensions and ambiguities 
are, I would suggest, evidence of the impossibility of 
recovering a sense of the sacred immanently in experience, 
In purely secular terms. The relationship between the 
Simplon-Pass passage and the metaphors of the "correspordent 
breeze" and the "kindred streamr;” on the one hand, and the 
subtly different celebration of the mind as "lord and master 
of outward sense" on the other, exemplifies the structure of 
necessarily inconclusive oscillation and repetition 
characterizing The Prelude as a whole. For the sake of 
convenience then, in discussions of the Simplon-Pass passage 
and the Immortality Ode, the word "autonomy" will denote a 
state of affairs in which imagination is disengaged from and 
hostile to the merely "bodily eye" of Tintern Abbey,
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iwhatever its problematical relation to the "light divine" or 
the "visionary gleam" might be.
Geoffrey Hartmann, in a study of the Simplon-Pass passage to 
which every subsequent examination must in some way be 
indebted,64 points to a significant change of mood in the 
verue immediately prior to the celebration of imagination's 
autonomo--- „-- =$
The wondrous Vale 
Of Chamouny did, on the following dawn,
With its dumb cataracts and streams of ice.,
A mot1 ’iless array of mighty waves.
Five rivers broad and vast, make rich amends,
And reconciled us to realities.
There small birds warble from the leafy trees, 
The Eagle soareth in the element?
There doth the Reaper bind the yellow sheaf. 
The Maiden spread ths haycock in the sun.
While Winter like a tamed Lion walks 
Descending from the mountain to make sport 
Among the cottages by beds of flowers.
Whate’er in this wide circuit we beheld.
Or heard, was fitted to our unripe state
' UNIJJI   - --------— i p - 7—
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Of intellect and heart. By simple strains 
Of feeling, the pure breath of real life,
We were not left untouched. With such a book 
Before our eyes, we could not chuse but read 
A f equent lesson of sound tenderness,
The universal reason of mankind,
The truth of Young and Old.
(1805 Prelude; VI 456 - 77)
The description of the Alpine landscape culminates in the 
all too familiarly Wordsworthian sense of a reciprocity 
between self and world in which the natural world is a book 
where one may read "The universal reason of mankind". This 
sense of essential kinship with the natural world is 
partially displaced when mingled with "something of stern 
mood.” Immediately after this qualification we are given 
the narration of the crossing of the Simplon-Pass, the final 
upshot of which is that Wordsworth and his companions have 
crossed the Alps unawares.
Upturning with a Band 
Of Travellers, from the Valais we had clomb 
Along the road that leads to Italy?
A length of hours making of these our Guides,
Did we advance, and, having reached an Inn 
Among the mountains, we together ate
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Our noon's repast, from which the Travellers rose, 
Leaving us at the Board. Ere long we followed, 
Descending by the beaten road that led 
Right to a rivulet's edge. and there broke off.
The only track now visible was one 
Upon the further side, right opposite.
And up a lofty Mountain. This tie took.
After a little scruple, and short pause.
And climbed with eagerness, though not, at length, 
Without surprize and some anxiety 
On finding that we did not overtake 
Our Comrades gone before. By fortunate chc-;":. 
While every moment now encreased our doubts,
A Peasant met us, and from him we learned 
That to the place which had perplexed us first 
We must descend, and there should find the road 
Which in the stony channel of the Stream 
Lay a few steps, and then along its Banks;
And further, that thenceforward all our course 
Was downwards, with the current of that Stream.
Hard of belief, we questioned him again,
And all the answers which the Man returned 
To our inquiries, in their sense and substance 
Translated by the feelings which we had.
Ended in this? that we had crossed the Alps.
(1805 Prelude; VI 494 - 524)
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The result is frustration, frustration at the anti-climatic 
annihilation of the significance with which Wordsworth had 
invested the act of crossing. The nature of this
significance however, brought to and imposed on the
landscape by the poet himself, is at antipodes to the
insight into the spirit that "rolls through all things". 
This passage contrasts sharply with the circular movement of 
imagination described in a previous quotation by E.D. 
Hirsch, in which the imagination seeks and finds the unity 
with the natural world which simultaneously underwrites its 
own activity. Hartmann is therefore surely right in 
regarding the "stern mood" as "Wordsworth's premonition of 
spiritual autonomy, of independence from the immediacy of
sense experience ... The traveller's separation from their 
guides, then that of the road from the stream, and finally 
their trouble with the peasant's words, all subtly express 
the soul's desire for a world beyond".6^ It is precisely 
because of this frustration of expected significance, the 
blankness caused by an encounter with the world running 
completely counter to all expectations, that the "original 
disappointment is seen not as a test, or as a prelude to 
magnificence, but as a revelation in itself."®6
It is in that moment of blankness born of thwarted 
expectation that subtle desires "for a world beyond" reach 
fruition in a revelation of imagination’s powers
Imagination! lifting up itself
Before the eye and progress of my Song
Like an unfathered vapour? here that Power,
In all the might of its endowments, came 
Athwart me? I was lost as in a cloud,
Halted without a struggle to break through.
And now recovering, to my Soul I say
11 recognise thy glory.1 In such strength
Of usurpation, in such visitings
Of awful promise, when the light of sense
Goes out in flashos that have shewn to us
The invisible world, doth Greatness make abode.
There harbours whether we be young or old.
(1805 Prelude VI 525-36)
Here, finally, are mind and imagination, autonomous in the 
sense previously indicated. The separation of mind's active 
powers from the natural world is perfectly captured by the 
description of imagination as an "unfathered vapour”. It 
rises self-engendered from the soul whose "Glory" - its 
constitutive power - is explicitly recognised as such for 
the first time. The "invisible world," corresponding to the 
"light divine" of ^ 619-29, can cnly be seen when the 
"light of sense / Goes out" in a moment that reveals our 
true destiny to lie "with Infinitude," The extinguishing of 
the "light of sense" is appropriately called a "usurpation,"
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a moment in which any awareness of natural objects as
natural objects is expunged by the seemingly self-engendered 
and problematically “autonomous" imagination.
The celebration of the imagination as "unfathered vapour" 
has, as its correlative, the denigration of objects as
"soulless images" in an earlier passage:
That day we first 
Beheld the summit of Mount Blanc, and grieved 
To have a soulless image on the eye 
Which had usurped upon a living thought 
That never more could be
(1805 Prelude: VI 452-6)
The usurpation here is a usurpation of imagination's living 
power by the same "lighr of sense" extinguished in the
previously quoted passige. The opposition of the "soulless
image" and the "living thought" it usurps, in addition to 
making the import of the present passage quite clear, 
prefigures a subsequent usurpation which Wordsworth is
uncharacteristically willing to endorse. The "light of
sense" is extinguished so as Vo reveal the "invisible world"
equated with "Infinitude." As the phrase "soulless image"
makes quite clear, the "bodily eye" of Tintern Abbey is 
inextricably meshed with the natural world on which the poet
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turns his back. Objects now only have value to the extent 
that they reflect a "glory not their own," a "light divine" 
very similar to the "visionary gleam", the flight of which 
is lamented in the Immortality Ode.
The strand ot Wordsworth's work examined in this part of 
Section B attempts to overcome the precariously 
self-validating moment of epiphany in which the essential 
identity of spirit and matter, man and nature justifying a 
"natural piety" is revealed, by making objects have value 
only in so far as they are vehicles for the transcendental, 
for the "light divine." In so doing the "light of sense" 
goes out in such a way, as Be Man says, to call into 
question the "ontological primacy of the sensory object." 
In these passages, taken collectively, Wordsworth attempts 
to overcome the difficulties attaching to the impossibly 
"unmediated" self-verifying moment of perception which the 
epiphany attempts to be by relying on vision rather than 
mere perception.
However, this radical attempt to resolve the ambiguities of 
the divergent epistemological standpoints implicit in The 
Prelude is itself precarious. In the first instance, vision 
may fail. Its failure, and the perplexity attendant on the 
flight of the "visionary gleam", is the starting point of 
the Immortality Ode. In Book V 619-29 of the 1805 Prelude
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and in the corresponding passage of the 1850 Prelude, vision 
would indeed seen to be only intermittent, objects being 
illuminated only "In Clashes" by a "glory not their own." 
Lastly, a poet of Wordsworth's temperament, seeking to 
justify the assumptions concerning mind, nature, perception 
and tb<=* relations between them of the "correspondent breeze" 
passage, could hardly remain content with a state of affairs 
in which he remained permanently "Debarred from Nature's 
living images.''67
Particularly for this last reason Wordsworth attempts, 
immediately after the celebration of imagination as an 
"unfathered vapour," to re-establish connections with the 
natural world.68 The result is one of the most famous and 
unusual passages in all Wordsworth:
downwards we hurried fast 
And entered with the road which we had missed 
Into a narrow chasm. The brook and road 
Were fellow travellers in this gloomy Pass,
And with them did we journey several hours 
At a slow step. The immeasurable height 
Of woods decaying, never to be decayed,
The stationary blasts of water-falls.
And every whore along the hollow rent
Winds thwarting winds, bewildered and forlorn.
The torrents shooting from the clear blue sky,
The rocks that muttered close upon our ears,
Black drizzling crags that spake by the way-side 
As it a voice were in them, the sick sight 
And giddy prospect o£ the raving stream,
The unfettered clouds and region of the heavens.
Tumult and peace, the dmrknoBS and the light 
Were all like workings of one mind, the features 
Of the same face, blossoms upon one tree.
Characters of the great Apocalypse,
The types and symbols of Eternity,
Of first and last, and midst, and without end.
(1805 Prelude : VI 551-72)
The poetry's antitheses attempt, in a way familiar by now, 
to yield a climatic insight into thg unity underlying the 
natural sceno. Yet, to me at least, it seems scarcely 
credible that the diverse workings of this paradox-riven 
scene can so readily be assimilated to the "workings of one 
mind." Hartmann may well be right in seeing in this 
particular apocalypse a "self-thwarting march and 
countermarch of elements/ a divine mockery of the concept of 
the Single Way."®^ The imagery of the passage contains 
improbable fusions of stasis and v i o l e n c e . I n  a phrase 
such as "the stationary blast of waterfalls," for instance, 
it is impossible to decide whether primary emphasis should
be placed on "stationary" or "blast," and accordingly to 
decide whether the components o£ the landscape are 
emblematic of an achieved harmony of opposites or of 
irreconcilable conflict, 'i'he confusi'-n is increased by the 
use of the same verb or verbs to characterize different 
phenomena, the "blast" of the wind being carried over into 
the "stationary blast of waterfalls" and the sound of the 
streams being similarly displaced to characterize the "black 
drizzling crags.''71 Even the nature of the "one mind" 
into which all the tensions of the landscape are declared to 
be resolvable is ambiguous. The insistence that the 
landscape is to be read as a book bearing the visible 
imprint of a “power" immanent in nature, to be read as the 
"types and symbols of Eternity,'1 does not entirely preclude 
the possibility that the "one mind" is something akin to 
either the consciousness of the observer72 or even the 
unifying awareness of an undefined but non-temporal Spirit. 
The tensions examined in this passage scar even its 
climactic moment, for the connotations of "Apocalypse" on 
the one hand, and "Eternity" on the other, differ 
significantly. ii.my ^m.-wit commentators, M.H. Abrams 
prominent among them, accept Wordsworth's attempted 
resolutions at face value: "the Scriptural Apocalypse is
assimilated to an apocalypse of nature? its written 
characters are natural objects, which are read as types and 
symbols of permanence in change? and its antithetic
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qualities of sublimity and b-i-suty are seen aa simultaneous 
expressions on the face of heaven and earth, declaring an 
unrealized truth which the chiaroscuro of the scene 
articulates for the prepared mind - a truth about the 
darkness and the light, the terror and the peace, the 
ineluctable contraries that make up our human 
existence."7  ^ It is difficult to believe that the 
problems posed by the dramatic emergence of the imagination 
as "unfathered vapour" can be so readily resolved. The 
ending of the Simplon-Pass passage is unsatisfactory because 
it is guilty of sleight-of- hand. It "resolves" the 
undoubted dilemmas latent in the Simplon-Pass passage and 
Wordsworth's poetry in general through prcclamation and the 
grand gesture. This is not surprising, for the celebration 
of objects as bea <irs of "light divine" raises the 
doubtlessly insoluble problem of explaining the 
participation of the finite in the infinite without 
depriving either the former of its reality or the latter of 
its transcendence.
This passage is, I would suggest, emblematic of the 
difficulties of any untr< ibled reversion to "natural piety" 
after the emergence and celebration of an autonomous 
imagination and mind. If natural objects are indeed 
“soulless images” necessarily opposed to the "living 
thought", it is impossible to see how any celebration of the
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n-’tural world could be acc'eiplished except at the cost of 
the "unfathered vapour", the self-engendered imagination 
whose emergence has been celebrated. For the poet of. the 
Simplon-Pass narrative "Imagination experienced as a power 
distinct f:ror’ Mature opens his eyes by putting them 
out."7* * -• -position between the “soulless image" '
and the "1 ,-ht" suggests, the visionary imagination
van only perceivw. j  "light divine" at the cost of severing
all contact with "Nature's living images." Such would seem 
to be the ultimate fate of any poetry that calls into i
question "the ontological primacy of the sensory object."
Indeed, any merely nostalgic return to an umproblematical ;
belief in an interchange between man and nature is ;
impossible, for the "unfathered vapour" only arose because 
of the fragility of "natural pioty" as a means of "binding" 
one's days together. The ambiguous nature of the "one mind"
in this concluding section of the Simplon-pass narrative •
makes it impossible to locate the uuifying spiritual 
presence in the landscape itself or the observing
consciousness. The passage is ambiguously poissd between ' |
many of the divergent accounts of perception and experience 
implicit in the various strands of Wordsworth's work 
isolated by our analysis of the poetry. If the reader
preserves a measure t E distance from the affective rhetoric ,
of this famous passage so as to avoid excessively simplistic
i
readings of it, the close of the Simplon-Pass narrative may 
well seem one of the most complex passages in all 
Wordsworth. Its by no means wholly coherent ambiguities 
leave it inconclusively suspended between any commitment to 
either "natural piety" or mind's "autonomy", in any of the 
senses considered so far. The "sad perplexity" of being 
suspended between the loss of both "natuval piety"' and che 
"visionary gi> am" will be the subject matter of the 
Immortality Ode, an analysis of which will constitute the 
last section of this chapter -
Prances Feryuson has pointed out that, in all the
collections of his poetry which Wordsworth edited between
1815 and the year of his death in 1850, "the Ode is the only 
one of Wordsworth's shorter poems which he left 
conspicuously un.onnected to any of the categories of his 
classification Wordsworth continually placed the Ode
outside, leaving it to stand in a crucial final
position. Wordsworth'a consistent refusal over a 
period of more than three decades to place it in any of the 
categories into which he divided hiu verse suggests that the 
Ode had a peculiar significance for him. This sense is I 
believe justified, for the Ode powerfully embodies many of 
the tensions in Wordsworth's poetry discussed so far. In 
terms of its intellectual content it can be regarded as a 
summation of the concerns and tensions of Wordsworth's 
poetry and, as seen above, there is external evidence to 
suggest that it came, to hold very special significance for 
Wordsworth too.
The Immortality Ode uses as an epigraph three lines from My 
He;,rt Leaps Up invoking the "natural piety" used as our 
starting point for the investigation of Wordsworth's poetry:
ki
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The Child is Fati of the Man?
And I could wish my i'ays to be
Bound each to each by no,ural piety.
The epigraph, invoking belief in a "natural piety" the 
possibility of which the Ode is to place in question, 
encourages us to read the Ode as a gloss on Wordsworth's 
poetry as a whole. In the Ode, Wordsworth is to display 
more than passing doubts about whether the child indeed is 
father of the man and, if one’s days can indeed be bound 
together, whether "natural piety" is the means to do this.
The echoes of My Heart Leaps Up in the Immortality Ode 
extend considerably beyond the use of the epigraph. The 
second stanza of the Immortality Ode, for instance, makes 
ironically detailed reference to the imagery of My Heart 
Leaps Up, for the rail.’ow is used in My Heart Leaps Up as an 
occasion for displaying exactly the kind of unproblematical 
"natural piety" now being called into questions
My heart Leaps up when I behold 
A Rainbow in the sky:
So was it when my life began,1 
So is it w w  J am a Man? ...
«  <**!•!» _ . a i £ d k  J U T  =i , *
The simple correspondence between the response of the boy 
and the man to the beauty of the rainbow is a perfect
example of the way in which a spontaneous, always renewed
and renewable sense of kinship with the natural world, binds
the poet's different selves together into an ongoing pattern 
of growth and restoration. The constant re-appearance of 
the rainbow makes the renewal that comes through
experiencing it accessible to both boy and man. This in 
itself is a demonstration of the way in which the cyclical 
recurrence of natural processes fosters similar wholeness 
and integration through time in the lives of those who 
respond to natural beauty. Although even the ending of this 
poem is tentative, expressing the hope that this continuity 
of response should always remain possible, there can be no 
doubt that it still represents one of Wordsworth's most 
simple, almost childlike, celebrations of a state in which 
the essential being of man and world art one.
Surely the lines of the epigraph are intended to indicate 
the gulf separating the assertion of such a condition from 
the opening stanzas of the ode, stanzas which seem a point 
for point negation of all the positives of My Heart Leaps 
Up. The Ode begins amidst the perplexity caused by an 
absolute disjunction of response in which the child seems 
anything but the father of the man. The appearance of the 
rainbow only induces a realization that, it can come and go
without eliciting an answering response through which the
appearances of the natural world, our affective responses 
and moral impulses become "interfused" with one another as 
in Tintern Abbey and many of the passages of The Prel’-de 
examined in the first section of this chapter. As the
phrase "celestial light" and its subsequent relation to the 
"visionary gleam" makes clear, what is at stake in this
failure of response is not anything like "natural piety", 
but loss of an unspecified source of illumination that is 
not merely "natural." The opening stanzas of the
Immortality Ode seem then to be related to those passages in 
the Simplon-Pass narrative in which the objects of the
world, "soulless images” in themselves, attain value only to 
the extent that they become contingent, precarious and 
intermittent bearers of a "glory not their own."
The Ode initially seems, like the Simplon-Pass passage, to 
underwrite an attempt to ground our response to the numinous 
in objects more securely in the perception of a divinity of 
sorts. It seems to exemplify the first of the responses to 
the precariousness of the epiphanic moment outlined in 
Section D of Chapter 2 - see p.68 foil. Accordingly, much 
of the Ode articulates a conception of imagination hostile 
to that implicit in the notion of " natural piety", an 
imagination conceived of as "autonomous" in the same 
problematic sense as the "unfathered vapour" - see p.129
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foil. Objects are experienced as valuable only to the 
extent that they reflect the "celestial light", and man can 
experience fulfilment only to the extent that mind and 
imagination, autonomous in the sense suggested in Section B 
of Chapter 3, give access to the transcendentally located 
well-springs of our existence. The opposition between the 
"Heaven" lying about us in childhood, the "imperial palace", 
and the "Shades of the prison-house" into which our birth is 
a descent, all emphasise the essential antagonism between 
the "pleasures" of earth in stanza 6 of the Ode and the 
“visionary gleam" that has fled. Especially in the Ode's 
opening stanzas, the bodily senses are indeed powerless to 
either confer "glory" on natural objects or perceive the 
“celestial light" which is the extrinsic but sole source of 
glory the otherwise "soulless images" can have.
This aspect of Wordsworth's verse arose out of the inherent 
precariousness of the doctrines and perceptions of '"natural 
piety", but that is not to say that this attempted 
resolution is any less fraught with difficulties. At the
close of Chapter 3 Section B it was suggested that an
imagination divorced from the "bodily eye" through becoming 
either "Lord and muster of outward sense" or seeking 
participation in the divine would necessarily become 
problematical for a poet seeking to celebrate the essential
unity of man and nature conceived of as embodied spirit.
, - ait'th .
X ■
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Both these responses to the inadequacies o£ the doctrine of 
"natural piety" risk leaving the poet "debarred" from
"Nature's living images", without: a world he can inhabit.
However the attempt to gi a "transcendental" justification 
for our sense of the "One Life" by celebrating natural 
objects insofar as they reflect the "light divine" is 
precarious in another way. This difficulty, only latent in 
tVj Simplon-Pass narrative, becomes part of the explicit
subject-matter of the Immortality Ode. In the verse 
immediately % -.he Simplon-Pass narrative, a hint as
to the nature . precariousness was given when it was
asserted that objects were illuminated only "in flashes", 
that they were only contingently an.', in a sense, 
gratuitously bearers of "a glory not their own". Vision is 
precarious because it can fail, because it can be
discontinuous. The immortality Ode is in part an 
investigation of the problems attending an attempt to ground 
our perception of the "sacred" in nature in vision, for it 
is with a failure of vision, a loss of the "visionary 
gleam", tha* ths poem opera. The Ode is no longer as 
securely committed to viajon as thi? Simplon-Pass i.iuaaage, 
and seemingly unable to return to th«: :mp]." "iwn v.ral njety"
of its epigraph. The Immortality Odf embodies in itself 
man^ of the tensions and inconclusive oscillations of 
perspective between ultimately divergent conceptions of 
mind, and imagination and the world seen to characterize The
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Prelude. The "sad perplexity1' spoken of in Tintern Abbey 
becomes, in the fullest possible sense, the Ode's explicit 
subject-matter.
If so complex a poem can be said to be "about" anything the 
Ode is, as Frances Ferguson has pointed out in an 
interesting treatment of it, "about connections,"^6 about 
the attempt to forge, if possible, "connections" to replace 
those that have lapsed or proven inadequate. Ferguson goes 
on to note that “Memory, logic and metaphysics - systems of 
establishing connections which are the staples of education 
in its most overt sense - figure almost obsessively in the 
Ode ... Here in the Ode, at the "end" of Wordsworth's 
educational journey with his readers, the rhetoric of 
connections appears with an Intensity which becomes almost 
tragic as the felt, emptiness of the connections becomes 
apparent in tfc# wavering, the almost infinite reversibility 
of each new tack."^ This selective reworking of some 
ideas suggested in Chapters 2 and 3 has, I hopti, helped to 
oituate the I mortality Ode by placing its perplexities 
within the wider context of Wordsworth's work as a whole. 
That this, or something like it, is in fact the dilemma of 
the poem can be seen from a brief analysis of its opening 
four stanzas.
The first stanza begins in wistful remembrance of a time 
when all nature seemed to be "Apparelled in celestial light":
* - .. jut d. «.* -■iae
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There was a time when meadow, grove and stream 
The earth, and every common sight.
To me d'! 3 seem
Apparelled in celestial light,
The glory and the freshness of a dream.
It is not now ae it hath been of yore; - 
Turn whereso'er I may,
By night or day,
The things which I have seen I now can see no more.
(Stanza I: 1-9)
The first stanza of the Immortality Ode is a naked statement 
of grief and perplexity. As in the opening lines of Tintern 
Abbey it is the very sameness of the external landscape that 
induces perplexity in the poet, for the sameness of the 
external details of the natural world means that it cannot 
in itsel'J account for the gnawing sense of loss permeating 
the stanza. The enumeration of "meadow, grove, and stream," 
of all the objects once imbued with a sense of the 
sacramental, reinforces both our sense of the poet's former 
unity with the world in all its manifestations, and of the 
completeness with which this reciprocity has vanished. The 
loss mourned in stanza 1 's connected explicitly with the 
departure of "celestial light", a source of illumination 
extrinsic to and disjunct from the merely "natural". The 
potential faltering of vision, implicit in the intermittent
1
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flashes of the "light divine" of The Prelude, has now become 
a reality. The precariousness and evanescence of the vision 
lost is s'-.rongly suggested by a comparison with the 
necessarily short-lived "glory" and "freshness of a dream." 
As Frances Ferguson has pointed out,''® this effect is 
enhanced by calling the time when the earth indeed seemed 
"Apparelled in celestial light" a time of "yore." To 
suggest that the poet's condition is not "as it hath been of 
yore" imbues both the former natural setting and the poet's 
former feeling of reciprocity with a mythical quality.
The components of the landscape are enumerated in 
traditional images of fertility and plenfcitude reminis jnt 
of the pre-lapsarian bower of Adam and Eve in Paradise Lost, 
making the whole stanza suggest the loss of an Edenesque 
s t a t e . T h e s e  traditional images of paradise, far from 
being mere cliches, are of some structural impvrtance in the 
first four stanzas of t%e Immortality Ode, for the 
pre-lapsarian connotations of the imagery reinforce the 
import of "celestial lioht". The stanza therefore insists, 
both implicitly and explicitly, that objects are contingent 
bearers of a "glory not their own," dependent for their 
lustre on light from a source other than the merely 
natural. The nature u* the loss lamented by the poet is 
such as, to quote Do Man's remark again, "to question the 
ontological primacy of the sensory object."
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The second stanza deepens and extends the lament of the 
poet, insisting on the inability of natural phenomena to 
revive the lost sense of reciprocity with the world.*
The Rainbow comes and goes,
And lovely is thb Rose.
The Moon doth with delight
Look round her when the heavens are bare?
Waters on a starry night
Are beautiful and fair?
The sunshine is a glorious birth?
But yet I know, wher'er I go.
That there hath passed away a glory from the earth* 
(Stanza lit 10-18)
Now, by contrast, the rainbow can come and go without 
eliciting a response. Frances Ferguson has very 
perceptively pointed out the biblical resonances of the 
imagery of this stanza. In stressing his complete failure 
of response "It is as though the poet were countering - and 
banishing - his recollections of the rainbow as God's 
covenant with man, of the rose as a symbol of the heavenly 
paradise, of the trackings of the moon in Isaiah and 
Job.1,80 Indeed the images of the opening of stanza two 
are powerful precisely because they are so completely 
stripped of their traditional symbolic overtones. This
withdrawal of the sacramental from the natural world 
parallels the loan of the suggestively pre-lapsarian state 
noted in stanza cne.
The last half of the stanza ennumerates the various natural 
sights - waters on a starry night and the sunshine that are, 
in purely sensuous terms, beautiful. These lines, 
counterpointed by the "I feel - I feel it all" and "I hear, 
I hear, with ]oy I hear!" of stanza 4, reinforce our 
awareness that even the most impas "ioned co-operation of all 
the ser iea cannot do anything to restore the glory that has 
passe-:'; away fro the earth. The close of stanza 2 merely 
reiterates, in ffect. the despair of the close of the
opening stanza, a despair in which the things the poet had 
been capable of seeing:, he "can see no more." The failure 
of response mourned, it must be stressed, has nothing 
whatsoever to do with any failings in sense - perception and 
sensory awareness of the manifold textures of the natural 
world.^ This only increases our already strong awareness 
of the disjunction between these joys and the "celesti -1 
light" that has departed. The effect is further enhanced by 
a clever use of verbal parallelism in stanza 2, the 
"glorious birth" of the sunshine being fundamentally 
discontinuous- with the "glory" that has passed. Stanzas 1 
and 2 then are central to that aspect of the Ode which 
locates the possibility of salvation, if any such exists, in
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the ''celestial light" accessible to an imagination akin to 
the "unfathered vapour" of the Simplon-Pass passage. And 
yet, as noted, the Ode remains ambivalent, for the departure 
or the "glory" whose loss is lamented makes completely 
single-minded commitment to vision as a means cf redemption 
impossible.
The tensions examined so far are both reflected in and 
intensified by the marked change of perspective of stanza 3:
Sow, while the Birds thus oing a joyous song.
And while the young Lambs bound 
As to the tabor's sound,
To me alone there came a thought of grief:
A timely utterance gave that thought relief,
And I again am strong.
The Cataracts blow their trumpets from the steep.
No more shall grief of mine the season wrong;
I hear the Echoes through the mountains throng,
The Winds came to me from the fields of sleep.
And all the earth is gay.
Land and sea
Give themselves vv to jollity.
And with the heart of May 
Doth every Beast keep holiday,
a#
Shout round n 
Shepherd Boy I
Page - 163 - 
let me hear thy shouts, thou happy 
(Stanza Ills 19-35)
The central image of this stanza is that of the "Echoes" 
thronging through the mountains, for the various parts of 
the landscape do indeed echo and re-echo one another in a 
universal sympathy similar to that depicted in some of 
Blake's Songs of Innocence. The "joyous song" resonates 
with the "tabor's sound", and the "Echoes", the interlocking 
chains of auditory images and descriptions of 
unselfconscious play, evoke a scene in which it can truly be 
said that "all the earth is gay."
The poet's assertion "No more shall grief of mine the season 
wrong" holds out the prospect of a corresponding personal 
renewal. This prospect is seemingly given substance by the 
use of tense in the stanzas examined so far. The first two 
stanzas strangely atemporal use of a continuous present 
tense strongly implied that the blankness and despair 
attendant on the loss of the 1 ’.estial light" extended back 
into an indefinite past and would persist into an indefinite 
future. The past tense of the third stanza however speaks 
of a "timely utternace" that "gave that thought relief". 
The thoughts to which relief seem to be givun are possibly, 
though by no means certainly, the despairing thoughts of the
first two stanzas.82 Superficially, the poet would also 
seem to be regaining the sympathetic imagination of "natural 
piety" through which reciprocity with the natural world 
might be re-established. A comparison with verse like the 
_cy of Winander or the "ice-skating" passages of The Prelude 
would however reveal the similarities of verbal texture to 
be merely superficial.
I shall quote part of the “ice-skating" episode of The 
Prelude to facilitate comparison:
Not seldom from the uproar I retired
Into a silent bay, or sportively '
Glanced sideway, leaving the tumultuous throng,
To cut across the image of a star
That gleamed upon the ice. And oftentimes
When we had given our bodies to the wind,
And all the shadowy banks, on either side,
Came sweeping through the darkness, spinning still 
The rapid line of motion: then at once
Have I, reclining back upon my heels,
Stopped short, yet still the solitary Cliffs 
Wheeled by me, even as if the earth had rolled 
With visible motion her iiurnal round.
Behind me did they stretch in solemn train 
Feebler and feebler, and I stood and watched
Till all was tranquil as a dreamless sleep. ''
(1805 Prelude: 1 474-89)
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These lines are as fine an example of the epiphanic moment 
in which we see into the life of things as any to be found 
in the verse of Wordsworth and Coleridge. The epiphanic 
insight owes its power, as always, to being dramatised as 
experience, the perception of thu "life" in things flowing 
directly from perceived interaction with the natural scene. 
The numerous mimetic effects, especially in the rhythm of 
the verse, - the way in which the placement of "stopped 
short" tries to simulate the action of the boy in skating is 
one notable example - enhance our perception of the boy as 
an embodied part of the nature whose "life" is essentially 
continuous with his own. This embedding of the boy into the 
landscape is however most powerfully felt in the manner in 
which the verse gives rise to the epiphanic moment itself. 
When the skating boy "stops short", the earth still, 
predictably enough, seems to be circling round him with 
great velocity, as if in simulation of his own movements 
while skating. It is through this correspondence of 
movement that he comes to see the "visible motion" of the 
earth's "diurnal round." As Langbaum writes, "the 
extraordinary perspective affords ... an intuition of the 
object in its ultimate reality - in its organic connection 
that is with the observer and, through the observer's innate 
conception of universality, with the universe. It is in 
organic connection with Wordsworth's ... sense of cosmos 
that the mountain and the spinning landscape come alive.
4
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This epiphanic revelation of the essential kinship of man 
and the natural world, man and the Coleridgean “One Life", 
is far removed from the third stanza of the Immortality 
Ode. Far from being an embodied part of the "One Life", the 
observer's .involvement in the life around him is vicarious, 
for he is merely an onlooker with respect to the play of the 
creatures around him. This is made quite clear by the 
opening of stanza 4 in which the observer's perceptions ate 
registered;
Ye blessed Creatures, I have heard the call
Ye to each other make; I see
The heavens laugh with you in your jubilee;
My heart is at your festival,
My head hath its coronal.
The fullness of your bliss, I feel - I feel it all.
Oh evil day) If I were sullen 
While Barth herself Is adorning.
This sweet May-morning ...
(Stan&a IV: 36-44
There is a marked difference between the way in which the 
heavens sympathetically "laugh with" the "blessed creatures" 
of stanza 4 and the poet's ultimately vicarious relation to 
the joy around him. E.D. Hirsch is correct to note the 
shrillness of. "I feel - I feel it all" and "Oh evil day I if
I were sullen / While the Earth herself is adorning, / This 
sweet May- morning , The poet remains, however
sympathetically, an onlooker, vicariously relishing the joys 
and energies of a festival in which he is not a direct 
participant. This sense of distance, subtly,differentiating 
the tota." effect ot the third stanza and the first 
two-thirds of stanza four of the Immortality Ode tror 
superficially comparable passages in The Prelude is apparent 
also in the closing injunction of stanza 3:
Thou Child of Joy 
Shout round me, let me hear thy shouts, thou happy 
Shepherd-boy!
(Lines 33-5)
These lines similarly indicate a desire to experience, by 
proxy if necessary, a unity with the natural world the 
speaker cannot achieve in his own right. The poet's desire 
for a mode of relationship that ultimately eludes him 
suggests an emotional state also, to my mind, implicit in 
the repetitious "I feel - I feel it all" and "I hear, I 
hear, with joy I hear!" In the context of the "ice-skating" 
passage emotively charged interjections comparable to those 
just quoted - significantly they are not deemed necessary - 
would be no more than a rapturous acknowledgement of a felt 
kinship with the natural world. The sense of distance
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'Sif ferentiating stanzas 3 and 4 of the Ode from such a 
passage makes us aware that these exclamations betray an 
unnaturally charged element of will in the poet's attempt to 
re-establish the unity of self and world whose loss the 
opting stanzas of the Ode mourned. The first four stanzas 
of the Immortality Ode undoubtedly tend, as noted, to 
privilege a perspective comparable to that of the 
Simplon-Pass narrative i ■ which objects are "soulless 
images" unless transfigureu by "light divine". The 
precariousness of vision, dramatised by its loss of 
continuity in stanza 1, generates a counter-movement in the 
Ode which gives powerful expression to nostalgia yearnings 
for a state of "natural piety" which the bulk of the poem 
discredits as an intellc Jtual possibility.
The close of stanza 4 confirms intuitions that the previous 
attempts to restore the "natural piety" of the epigraph were 
scarred by an element of strain. In an abrupt - though as 
the foregoing analysis would suggest, by no means entirely 
unprepared - change nf mood, a renewed lament for the lost 
"visionary gleam" re-establishes the second stanza's 
discontinuity between sense perception, however detailed and 
intense, and the "glory" whose absence is so keenly felt:
- But there's a Tree, of many one,
A single Field which I have looked upon,
Both of them speak of something that is gone:
The Pansy at my feet 
Doth the same tale repeat:
Whither is fled the visionary gleam?
Where is it now, the glory and the dream?
(Stanza IV: 51-7)
The tree and the pansy, haunting memories of a sense of 
harmony that is lost, both testify now to the loss of the 
"visionary gleam". ‘Vhe rhyme of "dream" and "gleam", 
strategically placed at the end of the crucial question, 
retrospectively equate the "visionary gleam" with the 
"glory" and the "celestial light", for the conjunction of 
"'celestial light" with both the "glory" and the "dream" 
occurs in stanza 1. At the end of the complex first 
movement of the immortality Ode, the blankness of the 
opening stanzas is once again seen to be a condition brought 
about by the loss of "autonomous" vision, our only means of 
contact with the transcendental source of light imbuing 
natural objects with "glory." The problem then remains of 
trying to formulate an account of how it was once possible 
to perceive the "celestial light", of how it wati once 
possible to securely possess the faculty whose loss is now 
mourned.
Stanza five's assertions that the child's birth is "but a 
sleep and a forgetting”, and that its "naturalised" 
existence is characterised by "Fallings" and "vanishings", 
indicate that the Ode will use the Platonic notion of 
anamnesis in an attempt to do this. At this point 
Wordsworth's own remarkable account of Platonic recollection 
in the 1642 Fenwick note, where he elaborates on the reasor 3 
why the notion suggested itself to him as well as the degree 
of belief he invested in it, becomes relevant. It is well 
worth quoting in full:
To the attentive and competent reader the whole 
sufficiently explains itself, but there may be no harm 
in adverting here to particular feelings or experiences 
of my own mind on which the structure of the poem partly 
rests. Nothing was more difficult in childhood than to 
admit the notion of death as a state applicable to my 
own being ••• But it was not so much from feelings of 
animal vivacity that my difficulty came as from a sense 
of the indomitableness of the spirit within me. I used 
to brood over stories of Enoch and Elijah, and almost to 
persuade myself that, whatever might become of others, I 
should be translated, in something of the same way, to 
heaven. With a feeling congenial to this, I was often 
unable to think of external t i-.irgs as having external 
existence, and I communed wifcV' 11 I saw as something 
no; apart from, but inherent ;.j, my own immaterial 
nature. Many times, whila going to school have I 
grasped a wall or a tree to rr-call myself from this 
abyss of idealism to the reality. In a later period of 
life I have deplored, aa we all '^ ava reason to do, a 
subjugation of an opposite character, and have rejoiced 
over remembrances as is expressed in the lines -
" Obstinate questionings
Of sense and outward things
Fallings from us, vanishings" etc
To that dream-like vividness and splendour which invests 
objects of sight in childhood, every one, I believe, if 
he would but look, could bear testimony, and I need not
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dwell upon it heies but having in the poem regarded it 
as presumptive evidence of a prior state of existence, I 
think it right to protest against a conclusion, which 
has given pain to some good and pious persons, that I 
meant to inculcate such a belief. It is far too shadowy 
a notion to be recommended to faith, as more than an 
element in our instincts of immortality. But let us 
bear in mind that, although the idea is not advanced in 
revelation, there is nothing there to contradict it, and 
the fall of man presents an analogy in its favour. 
Accordingly, a pre-existent state has entered into the 
popular creeds of many nations? and, among all persons 
acquainted with classic literature, is known as an 
ingredient in platonic philosophy. Archimedes said that 
he could move the world if he had a point whereon to 
rest his machine. Who has not felt the same aspirations 
as regards the world of his mind? Having to wield some
of its elements when I was impelled to write this poem
on the ‘ Immortality of the Soul1 I took hold of the
notion of pre-existence as having sufficient foundation
in humanity for authorising me to make for my purposes 
the best of it I could as a poet."35
The links between the first four stanzas of the Ode, its
subsequent development and the considerations touched on in
the Fenwick Note, begin to be elaborated in stanza five:
Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting:
The Soul that rises with us, our life's Star, 
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar*
Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory do we cunts 
From God, who is our home:
Heaven lies about us in our infancy.':
Shades of the prison-house begin to •» .50 
Upon the growing Boy,
i— ft!
But He beholds the light, and whence it flows,
He sees it in his joy?
The Youth who daily farther from the Sawt 
Must travel, still is Nature's Priest,
And by the vision splendid 
Is on his way attended?
At length the Man perceives it die away,
And fade into the light on common day.
(Stanza V: 58-76)
The child's birth, the process of becoming "naturalised" in
the fullest imaginable sense of the term, is a "sleep and
forgetting," for the soul "hath had elsewhere its setting / 
And cometh from afar." The soul comes "trailing clouds of 
glory", the clouds of glory presumably being the light of 
the "visionary gleam" from which the child is moving away. 
This correlates perfectly with the assertion at the close of 
the stanza that the "light of common day," the gradual
interlocking of the child's existence with that which is 
"common" in the sense of mundane and earthly, is the
beginning of vision’s dissipation. The two chains of
imagery are tied even more closely through the beautifully 
precise way in which the child's "trailing clouds of glory" 
suggests the shedding of garments, linking with the opening
stanza's assertion that the world was formerly "Apparelled
in celestial light." The nearly continuously sustained
opposition between two different kinds of light in the
Immortality Ode, the opening stanzas' insistence that the 
"glory"' of sense-percept ion and the "glory" of the
"visionary gleam" to which the child has access are
disjunct, enables Wordsworth to equate the "light of common 
day" with the "Shades of the prison-house."
The stark opposition between man's earthly existence and the 
"glory" that has fled is also used to structure the
following st.-'zas
Barth fills her lap with pleasures of her own?
Yearnings she hath in her own natural kind,
And, even with something of a Mother's mind.
And no unworthy aim,
The homely Nurse doth all she can 
To make her Foster-child her Inmate Man,
Forget the glories he hath known,
And that imperial palace whence he came.
(Stanza VI: 77-84)
In stanza six the "homely Nurse" assumes the paradoxical 
guise of a seductress of sorts, seducing the child with 
"pleasures" fundamentally at odds with the "clouds of glory" 
and the "visionary gleam". Immersion in these "pleasures" 
ha a as its final product the alienation with which the Ode
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opens. Those virtues which can appropriately be called 
"imperial" are not those o£ mundane existence, the word 
"imperial" suggesting, as pointed out by Trilling, the 
difficulty of sustaining the child's vision in the hostile 
and recalcitrant actuality of the world.
The firmness of the opposition between the "earthly 
pleasures" and the "imperial palace" leaves us in no doubt 
that Stanza six's main thrust confirms and complements 
Stanza five's characterization of our "naturalised" life as 
an imprisonment. The train of thought we have been tracing 
in the second movement of the Immortality Ode can perhaps 
be said to reach its climax in stanza eight's celebration of 
the child as "best Philosopher". The logic of the imagery 
would seem to make this self-evident for the child, before 
birth, enjoys immediate participation in the "light divine", 
whereas the man has become involuntarily alienated from the 
transcendental well-springs of our being. The import of 
stanzas 5 - 8 is continuous with the implications of the 
opening stanza's opposition of the natural world, the 
"visionary gleam" and the "glory" that has fled. The logic 
of the whole Ode thus far insists on a tension amounting to 
antagonism between the "homely" pleasures of earthly 
existence and the yearnings of an imagination seeking to 
become autonomous in the manner of the "unfathered vapour", 
to regain immediate participation in the divine.
However, as noted, the failure of vision which is the poem's 
starting point renders completely unequivocal commitment to 
an imagination become "autonomous" in the sense defined in 
Chapter 3 Section B (p.129 foil) impossible. This 
precariousness of vision is perhaps responsible for a 
subsidiary but noticable counter-movement implicit in the 
imagery of stanzas 5 - 8 .  Stanza 5 is a key transitional 
point in the structure of the Immortality Ode. Glossing the 
crucial line "Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting" 
B.D. Hirsch writes that what "Wordsworth means in stanza 5, 
of course, is that the state of pre-existence when we are 
united with God is the highest and most glorious form of 
lice we can know. Compared to that stage of existence, 
everything else is a sleep. On the other hand, life before 
birth lies in the fields of sleep. The effect of the line 
is to imply that our birth is a sleep ana an awakening. 
And, as if to call further attention to this paradox, the 
poet again deliberately (if not completely) contradicts 
himself. Even though birth is a "forgetting" we come "not 
in entire forget fullness.1, ,,87
Although Hirsch uses considerations such as these to support 
a more affirmative reading of the Ode than any I can 
endorse, he is correct to point to the slight measure of 
ambiguity that can be found in almost all the key images and 
pronouncements of the poem. He is also perceptive in
£ „
Yelecting to single out the tension between the two lines 
cited. Latent paradoxes such as these make us 
retrospectively aware that, the flight of the "visionary 
gleam" does not entirely extinguish awareness of the 
"imperial palace", the Heaven which "lies about us in our 
infancy". A1tho_yh the primary thrust of this stanza 
insists on a disjunction between the beauties, however 
intense, accessible to sense perception and the "visionary 
gleam", its images are also related to stanza nine's similar 
but subtly different characterization of our earthly life in 
terms of "fallings and vanishings". The nature of the 
resolution towards which Wordsworth is led by these 
considerations will be examined later in this section. For 
the moment it will suffice to note that the 
counter-assertion that we come "Not in entire 
forgetfullness" connects with the Fenwick Note’s remarks on 
Platonic recollection: "The natural world manifests the
absence of the divine, and yet that absence, felt along the 
senses as the absence of nature's former radiance, is the 
perpetual reminder of the divine ... The natural world 
is the starting-point for the recollection's backward 
glance, which frees the man from the natural perspective and 
places him within the eternal silence, the perfect orbit of 
his immortal liberty".8®
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Although in describing the nature of the forgetfullness into 
which the child falls, Stanza 6 confirms the previous 
assertion that the child's birth is a descent into the 
"Shades of prison-house", it is complicated by slight 
ambiguities similar to those noted in Stanza 5. Although 
the "earth is not an environment in which the celestial or 
imperial qualities can easij.y exist ... it is to be observed 
that the foster-mother is a kindly one, that her aims are at 
least not unworthy ... Wordsworth, in short, is looking at 
man in a double-way, seeing man both in his ideal nature and 
his earthly activity. The two views do not so much 
contradict as supplement each another. If in stanzas V-VIII 
Wordsworth tells us that we live by decrease tanzas
IX-XI he tells us of the everlasting connec c the
diminished person with his own ideal personality". "  It 
is difficult to reconcile Wordsworth's insistence on the 
usurpatory nature of the nurse - hers is a "Foster-child" - 
with the simultaneous assertion that her attempts to 
accomodate the child to its earthly existence embody "no 
unworthy aim". In terms of the argument advanced by the 
Ode, any such immersion in the world of sense can lead only 
to an alienation from the "imperial palace" from which the 
imagination derives its vitality. The way in which the 
child, and later the man, diminished by their descent into 
the "Shades of the prison-house", remain connected with the 
ideal personality of which Trilling speaks is obscure.
Although this point is tenuous in a way that would not make 
me wish to insist on it, the difference between the 
attitudes to the "homely Nurse” may indicate that the 
nostalgic yearnings for an unproblematical participation in 
nature expressed in Stanza 3 are, however attenuated, not 
entirely appeased. Just as the main thrust of the Ode’s 
argument thus far reaches a climax in stanza eight, so does 
the thread of counter-suggestion implicit in the imagery of 
stanzas 5-8. In a manner consistent with an implicit desire 
to soften the disjunction between earthly existence and the 
“visionary gleam" we have been analysing, the "best 
Philosopher" and "Mighty Prophet" is also said to be 
“blindly" at strife with its “blessedness"- As Hirs«h has 
pointed out, the praise of the child's intrinsic but as yet 
unselfconscious and unrealised wisdom indicates that he is 
as yet "only a philospher in potentia Wordsworth
emphasises how implicit that wisdom is and how important, 
therefore, man's whole teleological development is .
Here a complete disjunction of man’s earthly existence and 
the "imperial palace" seems to be qualified by implying that 
supervening adult self-consciousness is necessary in some 
mysterious way for the realisation of the child's implicit 
wisdom. If this is so then one could, as does Hirsch, speak 
of the necessity of a "teleological development" of sorts. 
This line of thought is however opposed to the main 
arguments advanced thus far and seemingly far too tenuous to 
carrry conviction.
It is accordingly hardly surprising that .considerations such 
as these are swept aside by the bitterness of stanza eight’s 
conclusions
Thou little Child, yet glorious in the might 
Of untamed pleasures/ on thy Being's height,
Why with such earnest pains dost thou provoke 
The Years to bring the inevitable yoke,
Thus blindly with thy blessedness at strife?
Pull soon thy Soul shall have her earthly freight,
And custom lie upon thee with a weight,
Heavy as frost, and deep almost as life!
(Lines 124-31)
Unable to believe in anything remotely resembling "natural 
piety", plagued by the precariousness of the faculty of 
vision in which it seeks redemption, and seemingly unable to 
give substance to a notion of teleologlc 1 development 
capable of unifying the various phases of man's life, the 
second movement of the Ode ends in desperation. The 
subordinate counter-current in the imagery of stanzas 5-8, 
the paradox that immersion in the natural world did not 
completely extinguish memory o£ the "imperial palace" as one 
might expect, foreshadows the attempt to use the Platonic 
notions of pre-existence and anamnestic recollection to 
unify the many tensions of the Ode. It is because of its
1
structural importance in the Ode that I spent what may seem 
a disproportionate amount of space examining an admittedly 
subsidiary line of suggestion in stanzas 5-6. It is to 
Wordsworth's, to my mind unsuccessful, attempt to unify the 
poem using the ideas articulated in the 1842 Fenwick Note, 
that we must now turn.
A clue as to how the attempted reconciliation is effected 
may be found through returning once again to the 
characterisation of our earthly existence in terms of 
"fallings" and "vanishings." The use of the present 
participle in "fallings" and "vanishings" leaves open the 
possibility, however tenuous, of some small measure of 
continuity between the child's existence and the "visionary 
gleam". In the Fenwick note, the notion of pre-existence is 
tentatively used as a heuristic device to explain how it is 
that, most frequently in childhood, we experience objects as 
invested with "dream-like vividness and splendour". As in 
the platonic texts cited as precedents for such a notion, 
immersion in earthly existence is indeed a "sleep and a 
forgetting". The frequency and power of the child's 
perception of the "visionary gleam" is entirely due to his 
closeness to its transcendental source. However, anamnestic 
recollection of former closeness to the "celestial light" is 
always possible. The descent into the "Shades of the 
prison-house" never entirely erodes the man's capacity for
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those “obstinate questionings / Of sense and outward things" 
that potentially renew whatever attenuated degree of contact 
with the "visionary gleam" is still possible. Anamnestic 
recollection is invoked to explain both the precariousneas 
of vision, the flight of the "visionary gleam" mourned in 
the Ode's first four stanzas, and the belief that attenuated 
access to vision's transcendental source can be preserved 
through memory.®*
it is this vestigial access to the "celestial light" that is 
referred to in the "embers" of stanza 9t
0 joy! that in our embers 
Is something that doth live,
That nature yet remembers 
What was so fugitive!
The thought of our past years in me doth breed
Perpetual benedictions: not indeed
For that which is most worthy to be blest;
Delight and liberty, the simple creed 
Of Childhood, whether fluttering or at rest,
With new-born hope for ever in his breast:-
Not for these I raise
The eong of thanks and praise;
But for those obstinate questionings 
Of sense and outward things,
The "embera" are, j. course, an image of mortality, of the 
passage of human life towards death. The image is 
brilliantly chosen, for the light thrown off by the dying 
"embers" is a recollection of the "celestial light" itself, 
of that "fugitive" remnant of the "visionary gleam" which 
"nature yet remembers." 'i'he light of the "embers" is or 
course also a celebration of that remnant of access to the 
"visionary gleam" producing the “obstinate questionings", 
the "fallings" and "vanishings" for which thanks is given. 
The qualified hope of these lines is born from an ironical 
demonstration sf the sense in which, th-ough the agency of 
Platonic recollection, the child can yet be said to be the 
father of the man. This conclusion is endorsed by the 
celebratory tone of the lines with which stanza 9 concludes;
Our noicy years seem moments in the being 
Of the sternal Silence i truths that wake.
To perish never?
Whi:h neither listlessness nor mad endeavour, 
Nor Man nor Boy,
Nor all that is at enmity with joy.
Can uttlerly abolish or destroy!
Hence, in a season of calm weather.
Though inland far wo be,
Our Souls have sight of that immortal aea 
Which brought us hither,
i
Can in a moment travel thither.
And see the Children sport upon the shore,
And hear the mighty waters rolling evermore.
" \j (Stanza IX 157-70)
\
The auyyustion, through the image o£ the never completely 
extinguished embers, that our access to the "celestial 
light" is never completely lost, is explored in some detail 
in the closing lines of this stanza. In the last two lines 
the proximity of the children to the shore seems to be 
related to both stanza nine's "fallings" and "vanishings" 
and the earlier assertion that our birth is a "sleep and a
forgetting". Although the children are closer to the source
of the "visionary gleam" than the adult, we are nonetheless 
credited with the ability to “hear the mighty waters rolling 
evermore." A Culler understanding of this last line can be 
gained by linking it to the use of similar imagery in The 
Prelude. In the ascent of Mount Snowdon, the waters roaring 
underneath the poet seem to represent the flux and reflux of 
natural process itself. As E.D. Hirsch has pointed out,
such imagery is also used to evoke the "sentiment of being"
in Book 2 of the 1805 Preludes^
My seventeenth year was come, 
And, whether from this habit rooted now 
So deeply in my mind, or from excess
*  *«*
Of the great social principle of life.
Coercing all things into sympathy,
To unorganic natures I transferred 
My own enjoyments, or, the power of truth 
Coming in revelation, I conversed 
With things that really are, I at this time 
Saw blessings spread around me like a sea.
Thus did my days pass on, and now at length 
From Nature and her overflowing soul 
I had received so much that all my thoughts 
Were ster ->d in feeling. I was only then 
Contented when with bliss ineffable 
I felt the sentiment of Being spread 
O'er all that moves, and ail that seemeth still, 
(H  405 - 21)
The flow of water is often used in Wordsworth to signify 
something akin to the "sentiment of being", to a state of 
deeply felt harmony between man and world, in the Ode the 
continuity celebrated is of course of a different nature. 
Although the mature poet's distance from the source of the 
"celestial light" is seen by the fact that he, unlike the 
children playing on the shore, is "far inland," the land is 
nonetheless essentially continuous with the "waters rolling 
evermore." This continuity gives flesh and body in the 
imagery of the poem to the suggestion that the child can, in
a sense, still be deemed the father of the man. The 
continuity of the "shadowy recollections" with the fled 
"glory" which is yet the "fountain - light of all our day" 
is also underwritten in stanza nine in metaphysical terms, 
in the assertion that the vicissitudes of earthly existence 
are "moments in W e  being / Of the eternal Silence." B,D. 
Hirsch has summarised well the dual terms on which a 
reconciliation of the Ode's tensions is attempted in this 
stanza : "Metaphysically the divinity and continuity of life 
are assured because our noisy years are moments in the 
eternal silence out of which we arose. Psychological’ ’, 
that continuity is assured by ‘he ever-recurrent fusions 
with divinity that we experience :rom birth till death. As 
alwa.s, the essential perfection of this life is assured by 
reference to a beyond, to a prenatal state of perfect fusion 
with God or the eternal Silence."93 It is in the moments 
of "calm weather", moments of anamnestic recollection "which 
are themselves types and symbols of the 'Eternal Silence"', 
that "obstinate questionings" restoring our connection to 
the divine become possible.
Wordsworth's play with imagery at the close of stanza 9 is 
most complex. The promontory on which the poet stand , 
although distant from the shore of the "immortal sea" on 
which the children play, is nonetheless male to seem 
geographically continuous with the "waves rolling
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evermore".^4 This continuity is in fact strongly insisted 
on by the striking assertion that our souls "can in a moment 
travel backward",^  can participate in the divine with 
which the children are associated. The heuristic notion of 
pre-existence seems to be used here to reconcile the natural 
world and the "imperial palace", the temporal and the 
divine, through the idea that man's existence is a mediate 
one. Man, straddled between the "celestial lights" and the 
"Shades of the prison-house" partakes of both worlds, 
forming a precarious but nonetheless enduring interface 
between them. This characterization of man's existence as 
an irreducibly "mediate" one, mediate in the sense of being 
suspended between the natural and the divine is one aspect, 
although a decidedly subordinate aspect, of the Ode's 
reconciliatory concluding movement.
It should be stressed at once that any attempt to reconcile 
the tensions of the poem in this manner is peculiarly at 
odds with the arguments advanced in the Ode's previous eight 
stanzas. The main arguments advanced by the Ode make the 
discontinuity between the transcendental "light divine" and 
the "prison-house" into which our birth is a descent too 
uncompromising for any attempt to be made to fuse them 
metaphysically in the essential being of man. It is also 
inconsistent with the main thrust of the Ode’s attempted 
resolution of its various tensions in stanzas IX-XI. The
Jhr A
concluding movement of the Immortality Ode seems to imply, 
almost exclusively, that "The transcendent link of the 
finite to the infinite is revealed in the visitations of the 
imagination. But upon what basis? The revelation of the 
infinite in the finite ... does not come from without but is
seen as coming from within. The imagination is an
'endowment' of a mind standing in a privileged relation to
its world ... The disclosure of the link between the divine 
and the mortal does not proceed through the agency of some 
external force, but is recognised aa an endowment of the 
poet's mind."9®
In order to understand the primary arguments of the Ode at 
this point it is necessary to realise that the
reconciliatory powers of Platonic recollection in fact 
depend on rather than overcome a qualified disjunction of 
"autonomous" mind and natural objects, the fled "glory" and 
the "world of sense". In the act of "binding" our days 
together through memory, the "visionary gleam" is transmuted 
into the "philosophic mind"t
Though nothing can bring back the hour 
Of splendour in the grass, of glory in the flower? 
We will grieve not, rather find 
Strength in what remains behind,
In the primal sympathy
J l .
Which having been must ever be,
In tht soothing thoughts that spring 
Out of human suffering,
In the faith that looks through death,
In years that bring the philosophic mind.
(Stanza X 1B0-S',
“The hour of splendour in the grass" and the "glory in the 
flower" are indeed irrecoverable, for they are a product of 
the unmediated contact with the "celestial light" whose loss 
was mourned in the Ode's opening stanzas. The "philosophic 
mind”, by contrast, is intimately connected with stanza 
nine's highly self-conscious "questionings / Of sense and 
outward things." It is these questionings that restore our 
contact with the "visionary gleam" by countering the 
"forgetfulness" - see stanza 6 - inherent in our immersion 
in the world of sense. For Wordsworth the consolations of 
merely mediated contact with the "visionary gleam" are not 
spurious for, as seen in stanza 8, the child's unmediated 
contact with the "celestial light" is blind. As Sherry and 
Hirsch point out, in terms of Wordsworth's argument in 
stanzas IX-XI, the immediacy of the child's relation to the 
"celestial light" militates against it understanding the 
nature of its condition: "The glory which the child first
senses is fundamentally the same as the truth which the 
"philosophic mind" perceives. Our early instincts later
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become the poet's awareness of the divine totality to which
we belong: Being closest to the source, the divine sea, the
children spoirt upon the shore, but in their joyful direct
participation they cannot "see", as can the poet, life's :
divine t o t a l i t y " . T h e  transmutation of the "visionary
gleam" into the "philosophic mind" shows a structure of -
experience that we have observed, in admittedly very ,
different contexts, throughout our consideration of i
Romanticism. The "philosophic mind" attempts to recover, i
for consciousness, the full meaning and significance of the 1
child's unmediated participation in the divine. The phrase '
"philosophic mind" indeed suggests a measure of
self-conscious introspection differentiating it from the
terms in which the child's perception of the "visionary !
gleam” is described in the poem: "The significance of the
way in which the child regards the world is only discovered
in recollection, after that vision has largely been lost.
It is for the man looking back at his experience of the 
world as a child that the anamnestic vision of nature takes 
on a meaning it could never have had for the child. For the 
man looking back in rei.ulection, this vision becomes an 
intimation of the divine origin of the soul and a promise 
that the end of .life will be a return to that origin. The 
'Intimations Ode' is founded upon the conscious recollection 
of an unconscious memory. Recollection is the act which 
recovers, by raising it into consciousness, the significance
j S\-
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of the child's unconscious memory of how it once perceived 
the divine."®®
In concluding an examination of this aspect of the
Immortality Ode, it should be noted that Wordsworth's use of 
the notions of pre-existence and Planotic recollection to 
try and overcome the seemingly complete opposition between 
our earthly existence and the "visionary gleam" implies a 
new concept of imagination. Thia new mode of imagination 
would be distinct from both the imagination of "natural 
piety" and, to a lesser extent, from the “unfathered
vapour." Imagination would now be nothing other than the 
moment of recollection in which the "philosophic mind" 
recovered for consciouness the full meaning and significance 
of the child's perceptic' Such retrospective 
realisation of significance both illuminates the child's 
experience of the world and allows us to see in such 
experience our kinship with the divine. This recognition is 
a distinctive achievement of tue "philosophic mind", 
allowing the poet to discover "his freedom from a slavery to
the senses, and the power to subject the external world to
the workings of imagination."3-0® It is on this •• little 
developed in his poetry - conception of imagination as a 
moment in which the "autonomous" mind recovers, for 
consciousness, our kinship with the divine in an act of 
memory, that Wordsworth rests and justifies the hope with 
which the Ode ends.
JMT d.
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I committed myself on p.IBO to an assertion that the
reconciliatory movement of the Immortality Ode was
unsuccessful. My analysis will end with a recapitulation of
the reasons why I believe this is so. In the Ode the 
precariousness of vision, merely latent in the assertion of 
The Prelude that objects were only illuminated by the "light 
divine" intermittently, "In flashes", becomes fully manifest 
in a loss of vision's continuity, in the loss of the 
"celestial light". Like the Simplon-Pass narrative, much of 
the Ode articulatos a conception of imagination which makes 
it hostile to the natural world. Objects are experienced as 
valuable only to the extent that they reflect the "celestial 
light", and man can experience fulfillment only to t'ue 
extent that "autonomous" mind and imagination give access to 
the transcendentally located well-springs of our existence. 
The opposition between the "Heaven" lying about us in 
childhood, the "imperial palace", and the "Shades of the 
prison-house" into which our birth is a descent, all 
emphasise the essential antagonism between the "pleasures" 
of earth in stanza 6 of the Ode and the "visionary gleam" 
that has fled. The lapse of vision with which the poem 
begarv however, inhibits the unequivocal celebration of
autonomous mind and imagination displayed in the 
Simplon-Pass passage. The notion of anamnesis, of Platonic 
recollection is invoked tr account for the weakening, or 
even periodic loss of the adult's capacity to perceive the
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"visionary gleam". Given that birth is a descent into the 
"Shades of the prison-house", a distancing from the divine 
wellsprings of our being, this attenuated contact is
inevitable.
However, this strand of the Ode's argument has a 
counter-movement. The mere capacity to hanker after the
"visionary gleam" is proof that something still glows in the 
"embers" of stanza 9. The fundamentally visionary autonomy 
of mind, manifested in the "obstinate questionings / Of 
sense and outward things", can never be completely eroded. 
The poem holds out as a consolation the simultaneous
transformation and retention of the “visionary gleam" in the 
"philosophic mind". In anamnestic recollection the
"philosophic mind" recovers for consciouness a fully
articulated awareness of the meaning of the child's
unmediated perception of the "visionary gleam". What is
irretrievably lost in immediacy is compensated for by an 
increase in understanding. Despite the fact that awareness 
of vision's potential frailty renders completely unequivocal 
commitment to the "unfathered vapour" impossible, the
primary thrust of the Ode still seems to locate whatever 
measure of salvation may be open to us in the "obstinate 
questionings" of Stanza 9.
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In such moments, moments in which the efforts of the "homely 
Nurse" to seduce us with earth's "pleasures" are 
circumvented, the "light of sense" goes out to reveal, as it 
did in the Simplon-Pass passage, mind and imagination's 
essential kinship with the divine and also, in this context, 
our essential kinship with the child. At such times man 
perceives his connection with the "imperial palace" from 
which he came. It is this transformation of the "visionary 
gleam" into the "philosophic mind" that Wordsworth uses to 
try and ‘bind his days together". Ironically - the irony is 
generated by an implied comparison with the Ode's epigraph - 
the child remains the father of the man in an attenuated 
sense, continuity seemingly being re-established at the 
level of vision rather than "natural piety". None of this 
however justifies, on examination, an assertion of 
continuity between either child and adult, or mind and the 
world of which the man is an embodied part.
The second of these last two points is, I think, almost 
self-evident. As the parallel with the Simplon-Pass
outlined above suggests, the "philosophic mind's" task of 
restoring our contact with the fled "glory" make it
intractably hostile to the world of sense. The first of 
these points can, I think, bo shown to be at least
plausible. Prom the outset the Ode is structured by
oppositions of a particularly stark nature between the
J#..
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natural world and the "visionary gleam". This disjunction - 
see particularly the close of stanza 4 - is confirmed by 
stanza five's characterisation of our birth as a "sleep and 
a forgetting" in a Platonic sense, a descent into the 
"Shades of the prison-house". The child’s perception of the 
"glory" which gives natural o) ,ects a borrowed radiance 
seems to be purely a product of his closeness to the 
transcendental source from which the "celestial light" 
emanates. Seen in these terms our worldly existence can 
only be beset by an ever increasing blindness. If wisdom is 
truly a function of our closeness to the transcendental 
sources of our being then, despite Wordsworth's assertions, 
the consolations of the "philosophic mind" remain at best- 
redundant and at worst spurious, for on these assumptions 
the child must by definition remain the "best 
philosopher".101 The tonal crudity of stanza 7 is also 
noteworthy, betraying a measure of uncertainty about the 
metaphysical load the child is being made to carry.
The extraordinarily precarious nature of any commitment to a 
mind or imagination that has become autonomous in any of the 
senses discussed in this dissertation perhaps accounts for a 
counter-current in the Ode. A lengthy analysis of stanza 3 
revealed the vestigial presence of a nostalgic desire for a 
state of unproblematical "natural piety" at odds with the 
poem’s fundamental premises. Despite repeated assertions of
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the incompatibility of sense-perception and the only "glory" 
that matters, the fled "glory" of the "visionary glnam", the 
poet retains a measure of attraction for the play of the 
lamb, the joyous birdsong and the sympathetic echoes and
re-echoes of the landscape.
Understandably enough, the attempt so restore the 
unproblemat i ca1 interchange of world and self typical of
"natural piety" fails. The poet's relation to the play of 
the creatures around him remained/ as comparisons with
superficially similar verse :n The Prelude showed, 
ultimately vicarious, In urging the child to surround him 
with his joyous shouts, the observer showed a strong desire 
to experience, even if only by prnxy, a oneness wi'h the 
natural world that he could not aclieve in his cu.71 right. A 
measure of ambivalence is aloo ."^ -parent in c:anza six's 
assertion that the "homely Nurse'c'' attempts tc accommodate 
her adopted child to the condi -iosio of his naturalized
existence embody "no unworthy aim”. Finally, though I would 
not insist too heavily on thia point, I tried to suggest 
that a subsidiary aspect of the Ode's final mcvainent 
attempted, in a different way, a rapprochement cz the 
adult's earthly existence and the "visionary gleam" cc odds 
with the primary thrust of the poem. The closing images of 
stanza 9, while re-affirming the child's Car closer 
proximity to the "visionary gleam," nonetheless see the land
on which the man stands as continuous with the sea on whose 
shore the children play. There would seem to be a possible 
suggestion that man's existence is, as stated in the full 
analysis of the Ode given in the third section of Chapter 3, 
a "mediate" one. Suspended between the “Shades of the 
prison-house" and the "imperial palace", man appears to 
unite the divine and the natural by forming an interface 
between them. Any such implications fly in the face of the 
poem's frequent insistence on the fundamental 
incompatibility of the "light of sense" and the autonomous 
mind and imagination capable of apprehending the "visionary
In conclusion, an investigation of the Immortality Ode shows 
it to be incapable of resolving the tensions between the 
divergent conceptions of experience, mind and the world 
implicit in its many different strands. As became apparent 
in an analysis of the Simplon-Pass passage, once the 
"ontological primacy of the sensory object" is questioned by 
a poetry committing itself to a celebration of the 
"unfathered vapour", the continuities of "natural piety" are 
not readily re-established within the same discourse. The 
Ode embodies in itself most of the tensions that scar 
Wordsworth's poetry as a whole, displaying the structure of 
inconclusive repetition, the oscillation between different 
accounts of mind and its relation to the world seen to
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characterize The Prelude. Ironically the immortality Ode /
can be read as a gloss on Wordsworth's career as suggested
by his practice in those editions of his poetry he
supervised personally, though doubtlessly not in the sense
he intended.. Ho longer able to consider the affirmations of
"natural piety" a serious intellectual possibility, and
plagued by uhe precariousness of a vision which in any case
only enableti the poet to ituit the transcendental at the
cost of denying him contact with the world, the Immortality
Ode, despite its assertions, leaves the "sad perplexity"
which was its essential subject - matter unresolved. The
failure to resolve it renders all the postulated
affirmations and syntheses "f Wordsworth's verse
problematical! at best.
EPILOGUE
In the last chapter we saw how the Immorality Ode embodied 
in itself all the tensions that scar Wordsworth's poetry as 
a whole. The Ode remains, to use two of Wordsworth's own 
phrases, suspended between the --impeting claims of the
"light of ---- “ »uu the "visionary gleam". Although the
greater weight of the Ode's allegiance seems to lie with 
views of experience related to those valorized more 
unambiguously in the Simplon-Pass passage, it is unable to 
entirely resist nostalgic yearnings for a state of simple 
"natural pie' 1. Such a state is however discredited as an 
intellectual possibility not merely by the Ode itself, but 
also by the inconclusive oscillations between the various 
divergent conceptions of experience that we have braced in 
Wordsworth's poet-.y as a whole. Although the thrust of much 
of Wordsworth's work is optimistic, the great Romantic hope 
of showing how exquisitely mind and the external world were 
fitted to one another remained unrealised. The attempt to 
attain the secularised state of grace described in the 
preface to The Excursion through "natural piety" failed.
Particular doctrines of Romantic writers and thinkers may 
well be quite dead. An attempt to resolve the dualisms of 
post-Cartesian thought through a Schellingesque 
"Naturphilosophie" in which nature is thought of as embodied
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spirit is an intellectual option for nobody, or almost 
nobody, today. A recent commentator states quite rightly 
that "a case can be made for saying that it is precisely 
this claim of a natural supernaturalism based on the 
imagination which is the most conservative element in a 
literature that stands on the edge of modernism, in a 
universe already recognised as discontinuous rather than 
organic. The Romantic rhetoric of affirmation avoids 
breaking wih the past, and simply restates with reference to 
imagination the optimistic humanism urged by the 
Enlightenment with reference to reason. The compensatory, 
conservative nature of Romantic sacraments such as the 
marriage between mind and nature ... is nowhere more evident 
than in Wordsworth ... Thus the Romantic claim of a 
marriage between mind and nature, often considered 
revolutionary in its implications, can also be seen as a 
conservative and sentimental attempt to revive a Renaissance 
or hermetic system of correspondences in a world which has 
already been revealed as discontinuous".*
It the "natural piety" typical of so many Romantic attempts 
to reconcile the polarities of "Reason" and "Nature", 
"Spirit" and the "World" spoken of in the texts of Schiller 
and Von Kleist no longer inspires conviction, then the claim 
of Chapter 1 that the work of the Romantic movement 
nonetheless remains continuous with contemporary concerns 
needs justification. Providing such a justification is, I
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think, not too difficult. Beyond any reasonable doubt, 
Romantic poetry's concern with the subject/object dialectic 
was to be massively influential. The debate concerning the 
nature and extent of the mind's constitutive powers we noted 
to be implicit in the syntax of the Invocation to Book 1 of 
The Prelude and contrasting characterization of the mind as 
"correspondent breeze" and "Lord and Master of outward 
sense", were to continue in the works of major twentieth 
century poets, both European and English. On reflection, 
this is not too surprising. A rejection of specific 
Romantic doctrines or articles of faith by no means entails 
that the dualisms of post-Cartesian thought no ]vw-T plague 
us, or that the subject/object dialectic with wnich much 
Romantic thought and poetry was obsessively concerned has 
been satisfactorily resolved. The attempt to negotiate the 
subject/object dialectic without, using Wordsworthian images 
for convenience, being "debarred" from "Nature's living 
images" by an imagination that has become solipsistically 
autonomous on the one hand, or becoming "intoxicate with 
present objects" on the other, is a problem that still has 
contemporary relevance. This continuity of concern as well 
as the differences between the literature of Romanticism and 
Modernism can be seen very clearly in the work of Wallace 
Stevens. A brief glance at a few well known poems will have 
to suffice.
The Snow Man is a poem exemplifying the dangers of 
privileging the objective pole of the subject/object 
dialectics
One must have a mind of winter 
To regard the frost and the boughs 
Of the pine-trees crusted with snow;
And have been cold a long time 
To behold the junipers shagged with ice, 
The spruces rough in the distant glitter
Of the January sun; and not to think 
Of any misery in the sound of the wind, 
In the sound of a few leaves.
Which is the sound of the land
Full of the same wind
"That is blowing in the same bare place
For the listener, who listens in the snow,
And, nothing himself, beholds
Nothing that is not there and the nothing that is.
In the earlier stanzas of this poem an act of consciousness 
in a projective sense is noticeable in the perception of 
"misery in the sound of the wind". The perception of
Jt,
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emotion, of sympathetic analogy between man and world in the 
landscape, is even more clear in the correspondences between 
the "mind of winter" and the snow observed on the 
pine-trees. These correspondences imply that an admixture 
of imagination attaches to even the meanest act of seemingly 
neutral perception. The poet wishes to purge all acts of 
perception of any trace of imagination, for such traces 
allow one to slide into the fallacies of anthropomorphic 
self-projection. Such tendencies must be stopped in the 
interest of seeing "Nothing that is not there". The almost 
moral insistence on purging perception of imagination in the 
interests of objectivity, of unmediated contact with the 
world as it "independently is," heightens our shock when 
confronted with the "soulless image" that such a world would
Such a world is describable only in terms of utter vacancy 
as the "nothing that is". This vorld corresponds, through 
most ingenious wordplay, with the "nothing" used to 
designate the observer who is "nothing himself". This 
"nothing" can be glossed as "neutral" or 
"presuppositionless". Any gloss will do provided it is 
recognised that Stevens is concerned with that residue left 
to perception when the natural world is confronted by an 
observing consciousness as close as possible to a 
transparency of one or other kind. In this world any sense 
v self is obliterated by the random driftings of the snow.
the "nothing that is" cleverly being evoked in an image 
which comes as close as possible to being colourless and 
formless.
At the close of the Snow Man the fictive projections of 
consciousness implicit in earlier correspondences between 
perceive: and landscape are demystified only at the cost of 
confrontation with a "truth which is generally represented 
in Stevens as everywhere and always hostile to human 
being".2
The Snow Man is then a poem about the dilemma attendant on 
privileging the objective pole of the subject/object 
dialectic. However this poem contains a counter-movement in 
which the powers Stevens attributes to autonomous 
imagination become clear in an oblique way, ironically 
enough, precisely by means of the concluding description of 
what a world completely bereft of imagination is like. The 
Snow Man is a good example of the complex continuities and 
differences between the poetry of Romanticism and
Modernism. In The Snow Man we may indirectly infer that
even to perceive the "pine-tree crusted with snow",
imagination must be granted an almost absolute autonomy. 
Although the precise relations of mind, nature and 
imagination to one another in the work of the two poets do 
not always coincide, Stevens' work represents a
radicalization of that strain of Romantic poetry glorying in
the mind as "lord and master of outward sense". The powers 
of autonomous imagination, either celebrated or desired in 
those rare passages of The Prelude in which objects are 
"crossed" with the perceiver's "image" on the one hand, or 
the eye is stigmatized as the most "despotic" of our senses 
on the other, now seem to be intrinsic to even the most 
mundane act of sense-perception. In a sense the polarities 
of the subject/object dialectic are sharpened, the potential 
distance between the two terms widened. The claims Stevens 
is prepared to make for the redemptive capacities of 
imagination, its ability to order and confer meaning on 
experience, are stated explicitly in the famous Anecdote of 
the Jar :
I placed a jar in Tennessee,
And round it was, upon a hill.
It made the slovenly wilderness 
Surround that hill.
The wilderness rose up to it.
And sprawled around, no longer wild.
The jar was round upon the ground
It took dominion everywhere.
The jar was gray and bare.
It did not give of bird or bush.
Like nothing else in Tennessee.
Detailed analysis of this poem will not be given as it would 
entail, needless repetition. What is important is the way in 
which the jar, imposing order on an otherwise "slovenly 
wilderness", is an analogue of the sovereignty of
imagination in all perception.^ And yet even in this 
poem's celebration of imagination, an important limitation 
is placed on imagination’s generative capacities. Unlike 
the rest of Tennessee - the last line presumably refers to 
the natural objects and processes which imagination so 
comprehensively orders - the imagination does not ana cannot 
"give of bird or bush".4 Imagination's exclusion from 
generation in this sense hints at the solipsistically 
self-reflexive nature of the imagination seemingly 
unambiguously celebrated. Stevens is fully aware that to 
privilege the subjective pole of the subject/ object
dialectic is to risk an imprisonment in mind, to be left
without a world one can inhabit, without anything external
to self with which relationship is possible. Accordingly, 
much of Wallace Stevens1 poetry is essentially a search for 
an accomodation of imagination and world where imagination's 
autonomy is not incompatible with the world's reality, for a
poetry capable of fashioning "A tune upon the blue guitar / 
Of things exactly as they are".1’
The self-defeating nature of this enterprise is made clear 
in these lines from Add this to Rhetoric:
In the way you speak 
You arrange, the thing is posed,
What in nature merely grows.
Tomorrow when the sun 
For all your images.
Gomes up as the sun, bull fire,
Your images will have left 
No shadow of themselves.
The solipsism attendant on attempting to make the power of 
constitutive imagination engulf all perception and reality 
is shown by the poetic image's inability to cast a 
shadow.6 Once artifice has done all it can, imagination 
can no more constitute the sunrise "in its own image" than 
it can generate bird or bush. The perception of disjunction 
between world and imagination is clinched by the oppoaition 
of "posed" and "grows",^ the artifice, the element of 
conscious manufacturing caught in the word "pose", being 
irreducibly distinct from natural growth.
■>
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In the comic evocation of the sun rising "bull-tire" as "the 
sun" despite all the poet's fictionalizing efforts and the 
ironic recognition of the image's inability to cast a 
shadow, Stevens develops the reservation implicit in the 
restriction placed on imagination's generative capacities in 
Anecdote of the Jar. As Ruggiero points out,8 Stevens 
attempts to neutralize the fact that the act of creative 
writing unavoidably "poses" by affirming the irreducible 
particularity uf the objects entering into the poomt 
"Stevens' poetics is a two term system where fiction and 
reality engage in endless and complex play in which one 
term, while open to qualification by the other, always 
successfully resists subsumption by its opponent".* As 
the humorously rhetorical use of the word "bull-fire" 
indicates, it is "self-consciousness, the governing third 
force in Stevens' system which enables desiring 
consciousness to step away from itself and watch its fictive 
projections fail to enclose the real, in its transformative 
vision".10
Through using consciousness' powers reflexively as a means 
of interrogating consciousness itself, Stevens engages in 
the search for the "metaphor" that will "murder metaphor", a 
mode of writing in which, as indicated before, the world's 
reality and mind's autonomy will be compatible. Ironically 
it appears, in Add this to Rhetoric, that Steven's
paradoxical purposes may bet!, be served by what may, in a 
sense, be described as a poetry of failure, a poetry which 
"turns repeatedly to self-ironic celebration of the illusory 
efficacy of the human i m a g i n a t i o n " I n  Add this to 
Rhetoric the evocation of the sunrise enhances our awareness 
of the poetic image's inability to "name" in a manner that 
could hope to generate "bird or bush". Through a poem 
self-reflexively "naming" its inability to "name" in the 
required sense, the autonomous imagination ostensibly 
guarantees the "openess of its fictions to time" . ^ a As 
Ruggiero indicates, an attempt is made to make autonomous 
imagination an instrument of experience and knowledge by 
merely "envisioning" an object "placed oulside of the realm
The attempt to preserve the "integrity" of the object
through ensuring that perception ceases to be merely an act 
of subjugation and mastery represents, as Lentricchia has
perceptively pointed out, an attempt to turn the
epistemological difficulties of stabilizing the subject/ 
object dialectic into the poetry's major strength.13 The 
attempt made in much (■ Stevens1 poetry "to set up an
apparently rigid dualism of fiction and reality and then 
attempt to break down that dualism in an act of 
self-consciousness"1  ^ testifies to the hopelessly 
vitiating circularity of any attempt to "play a tune upon
wthe blue guitar / Of things exactly as they ace". An 
examination of the vicissitudes of the subject/object 
dialectic in Tne Snow Man, Anecdote of the Jat and Add this 
to Rhetoric only sharpens our awareness of poetic fictions' 
"double a ' generally self-contradictory mission; to
discov"- •th' of the real as well as to 1 escape',• to
'recog pay adequate respect * to ’real' ti "3, the
time of the d, and to inform mere successiveness 
with the Aristotelian literary necessity of temporal 
beginning, middle and end
In the last analysis, to place complete trust in autonomous 
imagination ij to remain trapped in the "image" in a 
limiting sense, to be deprived of a world to which one can 
relate. And yet, as the Caose of The Snow Man shows, for a 
poetry based cn Wallace Stevens1 assumptions, the death of 
incarceration within self cannot be counteracted by a 
single-minded celebration of "what is". To purge perception 
of any Imagir.ative admixture would he to confront the
"nothing that is", to court the opposite death of
self-annihilatfon. The poetry of Wallace Stevens then, like
much modern poetry concerned with the nature of
imagination's functions and their relation to that which is 
exterior to consciousness or self, displays an inability to 
harmonize various ultimately divergent views of experience 
and reality into a coherent whole. In this it displays an
inconclusiveness similar to that found to characterise The 
Prelude.
As noted, however, the polarities of the subject/object 
dialectic have widened and intensified in the intervening 
century because of the greater wsight placed on the
potentially redemptive power of imagination. Although the 
continuity of t-tevens1 concerns with those reflected in 
Wordsworth's verse is fundamental, the difficulties of 
stabilizing the subject/object dialectic have increased in 
such a way as to render the essential condition of the
poetry even mo.e, to use a phrase of Lentricchia's, 
"metaphysically precarious-.16 The metaphysici 1
precariousness of which Lentricchia speaks interestingly 
implies, as I hope to show, that Stevens’ radicalization of 
the claims <-f imagination on one level, imply an attenuated 
scope for imagination on another.
As The Snow Man allowed us to obliquely infer, imagination
is essential if we are to see something as rudimentary as
the snow-covered pine-tree, if we are to be capable of even 
perceiving a natural object as a natural object. However in 
Stevens' work, where sense-perception is at bottom an act of 
imaginative mastery, there is nothing answering to the 
reciprocal thrust of energies between mind and world 
depicted so often in The- Prelude, nothing remotely
resembling the "blessing" in the breeze that complements the 
blessing the poet gives. The activity of mind in perception 
does not produce a sense of the sacramental in nature, of 
anything resembling an epiphanic revelation of the "One 
Lite" within us and abroad. Autonomous imagination's power 
is necessary for any "world" to be given to perception at 
all. But, at i'-ast in The Snow Man, even autonomous 
imagination would not seem able to provide very much 
more.17 Lentricchia is accordingly right in saying, in a 
fine book on Robert Frost, that Frost and Stevens do not 
seem to "have in their cultural contexts a paradigm and a 
promise (however difficult to realise) for the ultimate 
romantic cure of alienation, the metaphysical continuity of 
subject and object which breaks down the prison of 
subjectivity. For Frost the redemption of alienation is 
never an experience of metaphysical transcendence, as it 
sometimes is in Wordsworth. For Frost the frequent failure 
to redeem alienation is never accompanied (as it sometimes 
is in Wordsworth) by the sense that human limitation has 
cruelly denied him the experience of Vat he believes to be 
most profoundly true of human beings and their relationship 
to nature."1®
The polarities of the subject/object dialectic have widened 
tc such a degree chat any conceivable redemption of objects 
exterior and hostile to man through the sympathetic agencies
of imagination falls ?;ir short of the metaphysical "kinship 
of essence" between man and nature, the cosubstantiality of 
all being frequently cc.' obrated by Wordsworth and
Coleridge. The underwriting of any such metaphysical 
kinship by "natural piety" is no longer even a distant
intellectual possibility. fhe result is that any 
"salvation" won through the consolations of autonomous
imagination will have purely individual validity, and
psychological rather than metaphysical significance.1' As 
we infer from The Snow Man, imagination yields to perception 
the possibility of seeing the sensory texture of the winter 
landscape, but not much more. The rodeapivive act o£ mind is 
altogether less grandiose than is often the case in 
Wordsworth and Coleridge, and the "redemption" granted 
correspondingly attenuated in both scope and significance. 
It is for these reasons that I was careful to specify fairly 
closely which of tho various aspects of Wordsworth's verse
examined in Chapter 3 wau vo be influential. By and large
this was, as I hope has become evident, that aspect of
Wordsworth's verse which responded to the precariousness of 
the epiphanic moment by glorying in the constitutive powers 
of mind, rather than attempting to ground our perception of 
the "life of things' transcendentally in a visionary faculty 
capable of par icipating in the "light divine". The
paradoxically simultaneous radicalization and diminishraent 
of imagination's claims and scope outlined here makes the
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reasons for this self-evident. Yet even here it could be
argued that Yeats' search for what he termed "unity of
being" is a secularised echo of the more overtly religious
and metaphysical longings of the Romantics. Unfortunately 
this question cannot be pursued here.^
Me have noted two modificati.is of the Romantic inheritance 
in the work of Wallace Stevens: the radicalization of the
subject/object dialectic through a greater stress on the 
redemptive power of autonomous imagination? and the 
poetry's frequently diminished "metaphysical reveberation,“ 
the increasingly personal and merely psychological 
significance of any harmony established between mind and 
nature, self and world. They are closely related. An 
attempt to stabilize the subject/object dialectic through a 
"natural piety" which would underwrite the metaphysical and 
necessary rather than external and contingent unity of man 
and world is no longer possible. The temptation to seek 
salvation by immersing oneself fully in the world of sense 
or retreating to the sphere of autonomous and pure mind is 
accordingly greatly increased. If ihat in effect amounts to 
a “dissolution" of the subject/object dialectic in a 
perception of common essence is no longer possible, what 
remains but to privilege either the subject or object pole 
of the subject/object dialectic?
W "
Despite causing a large shift or" emphasis, the 
radicalization of the subject/object dialectic discussed in 
this epilogue is, at a deeper level, fundamentally 
continuous with the more problematical aspects of 
Wordsworth's verse examined in Chapter 3. -It is those 
aspects of Wordsworth's verse that are distant from the 
simplistic affirmations of "natural piety", those aspects of 
his poetry manifesting their discontent with such 
characteristically Romantic resolutions of the 
subject/object dialectic that are at the centre of 
Romanticism's by no means exhausted contemporary relevance. 
The problems with which the greatest Romantic writers and 
thinkers wrestled remain "contemporary" in a way that many 
of their attempted solutions of them do not. It is 
Romanticism's "sad perplexities" that were to form its truly 
enduring bequest to modern writers concerned with the nature 
of mind, imagination and the world. Their radicalizations 
of the subject/object dialectic still leave their work prey 
to the dangers of either drowning in the world of sense, or 
remaining incarcerated within the sterile purity of 
solipsistically self-reflexive mind.
The persistence of the subject/object dialectic in the work 
of suc't writtirs testifies to an ultimate uncertainty about 
the relation between mind and world. The dialectic is 
accordingly hostile to the unity of being the poetry holds
# '  ^
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out to itself as prospect and achievement. And yet it is
only out of the frustrations and tensiona of this dialectic
that poetry can be written at all. When in Sailing to
Byzantium, Yeats "imagines his existence in "artifice" or 
the golden bird, it is not of the timeless abstraction that 
he tells us he will sing but of nature and time, or nature 
in t i m e " D e s p i t e  the latent contradiction this is 
inevitable, for nothing else could be the subject-matter of 
the song. The poetry starts out from assumptions concerning 
consciousness, experience, the world, and the relations
between them that render the tensions discussed between self 
consciousness and world insoluble, for the poetry strains
perpetually towards a resolution it can achieve only at the
cost of extinction. The dilemmas of Romantic thought could 
only be evaded through the elaboration of doctrines of 
experience based on radically different philosophical 
assumptions. Fortunately an examination of this question
lies well beyond the scope of this dissertation.
APPENDIX 8
THE DEJECTION OPE
Coleridge's Dejection Ode is one of the most famous poems in 
English Romanticism about the ambiguities of "natural piety" 
and the fragility of any attempt to overcome the divisive
effects of SiSlf-consciousness through the typically Romantic
doctrine of ar -rchange between man and nature.
Acccrdingly a f of the poem itself and my reasons
for not including a u»^3usaion of it in the main body of the 
text will be given he:a .
In a manner that I find at best only partially plausible, 
the Ode still seems ultimately to place its faith in "Joy", 
defined as the product of a redemptive interchange of world 
=md self:
O pure of heart! thou needest not auk of me
What this strong music in the soul may be I
What, and wherein it doth exist,
This light, this glory, this fair-luminous mist,
T-iia beautiful and beauty-making power.
Joy, virtuous Lady I Joy that ne'er we. a given.
Save to the pure, and in their purest hour.
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Life and Life's effluence, cloud at once and shower,
Joy, Ladyl is the spirit and the power.
Which, wedding Nature to as, gives in dower 
A new Earth and new Heaven,
Undreamt of by the sensual and the proud - 
Joy ia the sweet voice, Joy the luminous cloud - 
We in ourselves rejoice I
(Lines 59-72)
The sacramental images of marriage and dowry, and the 
characterization of "Joy" as a power both beautiful and
productive of beauty, recall Wordsworth's metaphors of the 
"correspondent breeze" and "kindred streams". In
Coleridge's work "Joy", by "breaking down ths boundaries of
the isolated consciousness, relates the self both to other 
human selves and to an cucer nature which it has inanimated, 
and so iBsdfs compatible with itself".* In this the
Dejeocion ode is reminiscent of the opening lines of the 
1805 Prelufle, considered in Section A of Chapter 3. Just as 
Wordsworth considered the imagination to be properly 
employ«d when It celebrated the "blessing", the sacranental 
inhering in the natura.. world in "Tho holy life of music and 
of vefse", Coleridge concludes the Dejection Ode with a 
metaphor strongly suggesting bhe metaphysical kinship of 
mind and world:
Jt,
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Joy lift her spirit, joy attune her voice,- 
To her may all things live, from pole to pole,
Their life the eddying of her living soul 1 
O simple spirit, guided from above.
Dear LadyI friend devoutest of my choice,
Thus mayest thou ever, evermore rejoice.
(Lines 134-9)
As Jackson Bate has pointed out, the validity of the act of 
blessing, impossible for Coleridge himself, is affirmed by 
his wish that it may always be possible for Sara.2 The 
affirmations of "natural piety" are not fundamentally 
questioned.
The failure of imagination lamented in the Dejection Ode is 
however related to the arguments advanced in Chapter 2 
Section D (p.68-76) concerning the necessary procariousness 
of the epiphanic moment in which a perception of the "life 
of things" is given immanently within experience itself. It 
was noted that the epiphanic moment, the flash of insight 
claiming to contain the certitudes of knowledge within it, 
had a solipsiatically self-referential quality. This makes 
it at best uncertain whether or not the "life" perceived in 
the natural world, far from being given to perception within 
experience itself, is the product of an act of 
self-projection in a far stronger sense. Subtle doubts
about whether the "Joy" Coleridge had known was the product 
of an equal and reciprocal interchange of self and world are
raised in lines like this: "hope grew round me, like the
twining vine, / And fruits, and foliage, not my own, seemed 
mine". Coleridge's emphasis on the measure of 
"gratuitousness" in this sense of hope, its ability to 
sustain itself in seemingly implausible circumstances, makes 
it legitimate to wonder whether the hope in question is not
self-engendered to a greater degree than the passages
considered so far would allow.^
This argument is supported by the close of Stanza 2 where we 
learn that the dejection with which the poem is concerned is 
not the product of a mere failure of perception:
And still I gaze - and with how blank an eye I 
And those thin clouds above, in flakes and bars,
That give away their motion to the stars;
Those stars, that glide behind them or between.
Now sparkling, now bedimmed, but always seen:
Yon crescent Moon, as fixed as if it grow 
In its own cloudless, starless lake of blue?
I see them all so excellently fair,
I see, not feel, how beautiful they arel
(Lines 30-8)
JUT ^
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The discontinuity between the strength of the poet's 
perception of beauty in the land ape and the dejection in 
which he languishes suggests an alternative characterization 
of mind, one which assigns it a far more constitutive role 
in perception:
0 LadyI we receive but what we give.
And in our life alone does Nature live:
Ours is her wedding garment, ours her shroud I 
And would we aught behold, of higher worth,
Than that inanimate cold world allowed 
To the poor loveless ever-anxious crowd,
Ahl from the soul itself must issue forth 
A light, a glory, a fair luminous cloud 
Enveloping the Earth - 
And from the soul itself there must be sent 
A sweet and potent voice, of its own birth,
Of all sweet sounds the life and element I
(Lines 47-58)
In this alternative view of imagination and its functions 
natural objects, considered merely as natural objects, are 
lifeless. The "inanimate cold world" can only be redeemed 
through a projective act of consciousness in which the world 
is "Enveloped" by a light external to it. Stanzas 3 and 4 
of the Dejection Ode seem to imply that the fears so often
engendered by the possibility of solipsism can perhaps be 
overcome by fully embracing it, renouncing all "hopes from 
outward forms to win / The passions and the life, whose 
fountains are within". This strand of argument in the
Dejection Ode is strongly reminiscent of IV 247-67 of the
1805 Prelude, in which it is suggested that the objects of 
the natural world live to the extent that thev are crossed 
with the "gleam" of the perceiver's “image". As has been 
noted frequently in this dissertation, the metaphysical 
kinship of self and world of "natural piety" implies that 
mind is active in perception. However, as was seen in 
Section u$ of Chapter 3, a simultaneous assertion of the
mind's activity i perception and the independent existence 
of the world pert, ived is difficult to sustain. To pursue 
the line of thought presented in these stanzas of the
Dejection Ode would be to risk being "debarred" from
Nature's "living images", to be left without a world one 
could inhabit. The unsatisfactory nature of this method of 
restoring the poet's "genial spirits" is shown by the
immediately following account of "Joy" in stanza 5 with
which our analysis of the Ode began, and, even more
powerfully, by the recurrence of "viper thoughts" in 
stanza 7. The conclusion of the Ode does not do justice to 
the tensions between the various positions advanced within 
it. Coleridge does not allow himself to register fully the 
implications the divergent accounts of experience given in
A  '
stanzas 3 and 4 on the one hand, and stanzas; 5 and 8 on the 
other, have for the "natural piety" which he still seems to 
affirm as an intellectual possibility.
Much criticism of the Ode has erred by glossing over these 
tensions in a manner similar to Coleridge himself, making 
the secondary literature oddly resemble a displaced version 
of the poem of which it is an account Perhaps focussing 
too exclusively on passages such as the paean to "Joy" in 
stanza 5, or the desire, expressed at the close of stanza 1, 
for the rain and the wind to give their "wonted impulse", 
the poet's dejection has been interpreted to be the result 
of an incapacity to respond to the natural world.^ As the 
close of stanza 2 indicates this is, in an important sense, 
simply not so. If the account of the Dejection Ode offered 
here has any plausibility a critic like Rajan, although 
overstating her case, makes an interesting point when she 
writes that the real paradox of the poem is not to be found 
"in Coleridge's ability to create despite his professed 
inability to do so. The dilemma of the poem is that there 
is no consolation in the power of imagination to constitute 
an ideal that is not fulfilled in the prose of the 
world”.6 Although the Ode is an important document in the 
history of English Romanticism, an account of it adds 
nothing essential to the argument advanced in the main body 
of this dissertation's text. The tensions between divergent
accounts of experience discussed here were dealt with, as 
the cross-referencing indulged in X hope showed, in Sections 
A and B of Chapter 3. The danger of a world-view that 
allowed for no distinctions in kind between terms 
descriptive of the world and terms descriptive of mind 
lapsing into solipsism was seen, locally, in passages such 
as IV 247-67 of the 1805 Prelude, The questions raised by 
the Ode could also be analysed by examining the structure of 
The Prelude as a whole, by juxtaposing the metaphor of the 
"correspondent breeze" with the celebration of the mind as 
"lord and master -£ outward sense".
My second reason for proceding as I did in Chapter 2, giving 
structural prominence to the Eoilan Harp, is more 
important. The close of the Eolian Harp showed how the 
instability of the epiphanic moment potentially had a second 
possible set of consequences, a set of consequences moreover 
that could not be deduced from the Dejection Ode in the same 
way. The precariously self-validating moment of epiphany 
could lead, most notably in the contradictory close of the 
Eolian Harp, to an attempt to "-•-und our perception of the 
"One Life1' more securely . something like a more 
traditional theology. Coleridge's characterization of the 
symbol as the "translucence of the eternal through and in 
the individual" and his grounding of Primary imagination in 
the activity of the "Infinite I AM" shows that his
philosophical work also oscillates uneasily between a 
"natural supernaturalism" and a theology of sorts - see 
Sections B and D of Chapter 2. This aspect of Coleridge's 
work formed a useful background for subsequent discussions 
ot the Simplon-Pass passage and the Immortality Ode. In all 
three eases, objects become contingent bearers of a glory 
"not their own1'. Such a light - see Section B of Chapter 3 
- could only be perceived by an imagination that was, in a 
fiense, autonomous from the natural world, opposed to the 
merely "bodily eye" of Tintern Abbey. And yet, as the goal 
of imagination here is presumably participation in the 
divine, it is not autonomous in the manner of the mind which 
is "lord and master of outward sense", which simply 
constitutes objects of experience as modifications of self. 
Thus, Coleridge's and Wordsworth's divergent conceptions of 
imagination could be shown, no less than their divergent 
characterizations of experience, to be incapable of fin&lly 
cohering with one another in an ordered structure. I hope 
the reader will find that the analyses of Wordsworth's 
poetry in Sections A and B of Chapter 3 illuminate the 
questions raised by the Dejection Ode without significant 
loss of content. I also hope the reader may agree that an 
examination of the Eolian Harp allowed a richer and 
different set of connections be drawn between the work of 
Wordsworth and Coleridge, connections that could not have 
been suggested as readily in other ways.
\
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35. Ibid., p.33
36. Barth, R.S.J. The Symbolic Imagination: Coleridge and 
the Romantic Tradition. Princeton: Princeton University 
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In stressing that Coleridge's writings on the symbol 
stand far closer ultimately to Christian or Neo-Platonic 
mysticism than Kant Barth is, I believe, quite correct. 
This point is supported by the Bionraphia Literaria and 
indirectly, as pointed out, by the fully justified way
which thinkers like Schelling drew attention to the 
gnostic roots of their works.
39. Ed. Owen, W.J.B. s Smyser, J.W. The Prose Hocks of
William Wordsworth, 3 vols. Oxford: 1974, Vol.2-. p.84-5.
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Rupert Hart-Davis, 1953 and Hill, U.S. 
Companion. London: Macmillan, 1983, p.19 and
It should be noted that what House, Hill and others have 
described bears the closest resemblance to the ’ternary 
structure" of experience discussed in p.1-5 of Chapter 1 
and the analysis of Tintern Abbey in Section A of 
Chapter 3.
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For a far fuller discussion of Coleridge's use of 
implied auditors and the implicit casting of the 
Conversation Poems in the form of a dialogue, see Rajan, 
op.cit., p.201-59.
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51. See Rajan, op.cit., p.224 and Hill, op.cit., p.43.
52. Hill, op.cit.,p.43.
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57. Hill, op.cit., p.44.
57a Langbaum, op.cit., p.39.
58. Langbaum, op.cit., p.38-9.
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67. Ibid., p.103.
68. Ibid., p.106.
69. Ibid., p.105.
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72. Langbaum, op.cit.,p.39-40.
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In part because the focus of his study is on the 
dramatic monologue, Langbaum does not explore the full 
consequences of the disequilibrium he identifies. For 
all the enormous usefulness of his discussion Langbaum 
shares, I think, a tendency of very many critics to 
treat the "natural piety" of Wordsworth as 
representative of the oeuvre as a whole. Such 
assumptions may perhaps be a deeper reason for failing 
to elaborate the consequences of the "disequilibrium" he 
speaks of. This "disequilibrium" between idea and 
insight points to a precariousness in the doctrines of 
"natural piety" and the epiphanic moments claiming to 
underwrite them. Langbaum*s formulation correctly links 
this precariousness to the self-contained purportedly 
self-validating nature of the epiphany itself. My 
dissertation is in large measure nothing other than an 
attempt to explore the nature and consequences of the 
"disequilibrium" of which Langbaum speaks. I hope the 
text and footnotes of Chapter 3 will make '-.he reader at 
least consider the propositiion that tuis choice of 
starting point leads to results different from those 
critics attempting to make "natural piety" 
representative of Wordsworth's work as a whole on the 
one hand and, more importantly, from those critics like 
De Man, Hartmann, Terry, Perkins, Armstrong and Ruggiero 
who, in various ways deal with the more problematical 
aspects of Wordsworth's poetic imagination on the other.
74. Cassirer, E. The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Volume 3, 
The Phenomenology of Knowledge. Trans. R. Manheim. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1955, p.2. See also 
Norris, C. Contest of Faculties: Philosophy and Theory 
after Deconstruction. London: Methuen, 1985, p.B0-1.
75. Langbaum, op.cit., p.17.
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77. See footnote 32.
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B.E. Rooks, in The Collected Works, Ed. Coburn, IV. 2 
Vols. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969, I 500.
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Vol.8, Part 1: Bentham & Russel, New York: Image Books, 
1967, "p."Da.
C. The Notebor",a of Samuel Taylor 
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Darbishire, H. and De Selincourt,
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The tendency I spoke of in footnote 63 is shown very 
clearly by the readiness with which readers take 
Coleridge's affective rhetoric entirely on its own 
terms. This is particularly clear in Hill's unqualified 
assertion on p. 20-1 that the use of "auditors" 
conclusively overcomes the solipsism implicit in the 
poem's starting point. The same mistake is made by most 
of my other principal sources in the discussion of Frost 
at Midnight, namely House, Reeve-Parker and even 
Langbaum.
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Hartmann, %!. Beyond Pormalism: Literary Essays 1958-70. 
New Havens Yale University Press, 1970, p.300.
Clarke, C. Romantic Paradox? An Essay on the Poetry of 
Wordsworth■ Londons Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962. See 
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Coleridge, S.T. Biographia Literaria. Ed. G. Watson. 
Londons J.M. Dent & Sons, 1965, repr. 1975, p.145.
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Ibid., p..147-8.
Ibid., p.149.
The importance ol' these oaesage:: for an understanding of 
the poetry of Wordswox U. * t i..so seen by Clarke. (See 
Clarke, op.cit.,p.10-13). It should be added that 
Chapters 12 and 13 of the Biographia Literaria, 
expounding as they do the conceptual underpinnings of 
Coleridge's belief that man's relation to the world was 
a "fellowship of essence", are essential for an 
understanding of his "Naturphilosophie". Chapter 12 
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indication of the affinities Coleridge felt his work to 
have with Neo-Platonism. These last points are however 
dealt with more thoroughly in Chapters 8 and 9 of the 
same work.
Armstrong, I. Language as Living Form in Nineteenth 
Century Poetry. Brighton, Sussex: The Harvester Press,
Ltd., 1962, p.22.
Armstrong's book deals superbly with the tendency 
towards solipsism implicit in the language of 
Wordsworth's poetry. Her analyses show how the 
difficulty of maintaining simultaneous belief in the 
formative powers of perception and the independent
existence of the world is reflected in the language of
The Prelude. She rightly insists that it is necessary
t5 "consider a structure of poetic language and how it 
behaves in relation to an epistemology concerned with
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the sttucture •>" consciousness", (p.20). I think she, 
however overe'-.,..'iisos ‘he tendency towards an absolute 
idealism of t-jfta in Wordsworth's poetry, conflating 
that aspect of Wordsworth's work revealed by the 
celebration of mind as "Lord and master of outward 
sense" with other strands of his verse. I shall touch 
on fcnis point in the notes to those passages in Section 
B of Chapter 3 dealing with the Simplon-Pass passage, 
and deal with it at some length in the note on Helen 
Ruggiero's work - see esp. note 33.
11. Ibid., p.22
12. Ibid., p.22
Armstrong pays attention to line 5, noting an ambiguity 
in the welcoming of the breeze: "if welcome is a verb, 
the onrush of emotion is towards the messenger or 
breeze. If it is an adjective, the welcome faces 
towards Wordsworth, a gift of Vie breeze, welcome, 
joyous, tj me" tp.22). As Armstroi. 's analysis of the 
syntax shows an awareness of latent uncertainty about 
the extent to which the "blessing" is received or 
projected, it is strange that she does not examine the 
apostrophes themselves, for they duplicate the same 
ambiguity. Furthermore at a deeper level the device of 
perscnification itself, the constitution of natural 
objects as "presences", hints at the incipient autonomy 
of mir. 3 in The Prelude. Examination of this device also 
permit.: more explicit correlations to be drawn with the 
"glear.of the perceiver' s "images" in IV247-67, 
Armct.t.vng, to my mind, does not fully explore the 
possibilities suggested by her analysis,,
13. Culler, J. The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics. Literature, 
Deeonntruction. London": Routledge I Regan Paul, 1981, 
p.,42. See Chapter 7 on the apostrophe, p.135-54.
Cu.ler has some interesting remarks to make on the 
apcctrophe, albeit from a theoretical perspective 
different from mine. For another discussion of these 
matters, see Ode to the West Wind in Trilling, L. 
Prefaces to the Experience of Literature, p.238-42. 
Also of relevance here is Bloom's treatment “of Shelley's 
poems# following Martin Buber, as an attempt to 
articulate an "l-thou" rather than an "l-it" relation 
between man and the world. (See Bloom, H. Shelley's 
Mythmaking, 1959).
14. Armstrong, op.cit.,p.22.
15. Armstrong, op.cit.,p.22.
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16. Ed. Harvey, W.J. & Gravil, R. The Preludet A Selection 
of critical Essays. London: Macmillan, 1972, p.217.
17. Quoted in Langbaum, R. The Poetry of Experience: The 
Dramatic Monologue in the Modern Literary Tradition. 
Londonl, ctiatto ^  Windus, 1957, p.33.
18. Abrams, M.H. The Mirror and the Lamp? Romantic Theory 
and The Critical Tradition. Oxford: Oxford University 
Prossl 1953, repr. ITfj, p.62.
19. Clarke, op.cit.,p.6.
20 Clarke, op.cit ,p. 39-53.
21. Easthope, A. Poetry as Discourse. London and New York: 
Methuen, 1983, p.127 (See also Clarke, op.cit.,p.44-5).
22. Ibid., p.127.
23. Empson, W. Seven Types of Ambiguity. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, repr. 1961, pi 153.
Empson, with an element of correctness, considered the 
verbal and syntactic ambiguities of Tintern Abbey 
obfuscating, generating what he termed a sense of vague 
interdenominational uplift.
24. Hartmann, G.H. Wordsworth's Poetry; 1787-1814. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1964. (See the whole 
discussion of Tintern Abbey).
This point is also dealt with by Easthope, op.cit., 
p.128-32 and in a seminal discussion by Langbaum, 
op.cit., p.35-6; 39-40? 41 foil
25. Ibid.,p.27.
26. Ed. Abrams, M.H. Wordsworths A Collection of Critical 
Essays, Twentieth Century View'sl Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc. 1972, p.99.
27. Langbaum, op.cit., p.37.
28. Hirsch, E.D. Jnr. Wordsworth and Schellinq: A
Typological Study of Romanticism. New Haven: Yale
University Press, i960~p-.767
This is one of the most cogent examinations I know of 
Wordsworth's "natural piety" and, to use Hirsch's 
phrase, the "structure of experience" Schelling and 
Wordsworth shure with one another. It sulfers
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unfortunately from a defect that can be observed very 
often in the secondary literature, a tendency to make 
one strand of Wordsworth's poetry emblematic of his work 
as a whole.
29. Ed. Abrams, op.cit., p.100-2. See also Benziger, J. 
Tintern Abbey Revisited. PMLA, 65 (1950) and
Ruggiero, H. The Limits of Imagination: Wordsworth,
Yeats and Stevens. Ithaca & London: Cornell University 
Press, 1976, p.63.
30. Ruggiero, H. Wordsworth, Yeats, Stevens: The Limits of 
Imagination. Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press,' 
1976, p.73 foil.
31. Almost every traditional discussion of Wordsworth, going 
right back to Mathew Arnold, can in a sense be said to 
be an exploration of the implications of this metaphor. 
For an exposition of the correspondence between the 
movements of nature and imagination see Ruggiero, 
op.cit. p.73-4.
32. Ruggiero, op.cit.,p.76.
33. Ruggiero, op.cit.,p.66.
Ruggiero's work tackles these problems from another 
perspective, attempting to articulate a distinction 
between what she calls the "temporal perspective" and 
the "natural perspective". For her "The Wordsworthian 
imagination seeks out the world of nature but validates 
it in the world of time, placing it in a context in 
which it can be "re-membered". It is of couree the 
inescapable function of consciousness to constantly 
transform experience into memory. By trying to place 
the experience of nature within a temporal order in 
which restoration is always possible, Wordsworth casts 
it back into the alienating process of temporality." 
(p.45). Realising the implications of this for what I 
have throughout called "natural piety" and wishing to 
link this remark with subsequent discussions of the 
Immortality Ode and the Simplon-Pass passage, Ruggiero 
writes that Wordsworth will come to "sense the tension 
between imagination and reality and validate his 
withdrawal in terms of poetic survival ... The "bodily 
eye" - "the most despotic of our senses" - is rejected 
for the "inward eye" and the visionary perspective. But 
the withdrawal from nature ... is also a movement 
inward, a recognition of the autonomy of the imagination 
..." (p.45-6). While Ruggiero is perfectly correct to 
say, in her treatment of the Immortality Ode, that 
Wordsworth is concerned with memory1s relation to
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etecnity, she does not realise that the imagination 
seeking participation in the divine is not "autonomous" 
in the same sense as an imagination which constitutes 
objects as modifications of self. In this latter case 
the "autonomy" concerned can be interpreted far more 
simply in a purely secular sense, as a tendency towards 
solipsism.
This confusion results, I would suggest, from too 
simplistic an understanding of the concept "subject - 
object dialectic". This dialectic is usually used in 
the secondary literature to refer to the interchange of 
self and world typical of so much Romantic poetry, in 
which the mind half-creates and half-perceivev - see the 
relevant lines of Tintern Abbey. The notion is thus 
used within a secular framework. The relative priority 
given to the subjective or objective pole of this 
dialectic will depend on one's views concerning the 
extent to which mind plays a constitutive role in 
experience. Therefore one can readily speak of the 
tension implicit in the syntax and diction of he 
Invocation implying a subject - object dialectic. It is 
also possible - see p.98-102 ;£ Chapter 3 Section A - to 
speak of "natural piety" as a doctrine attempting to 
stabilize a subject/object dialectic by avoiding the 
opposite dangers of solipsism and becoming 
'intoxicate/with present objects." This is why I tend 
to use the term subject-object dialectic to refer to the 
interchange of self and world celebrated in "natural 
piety" on the one hand, and the tension between the 
simultaneous belief in the mind-dependence of perception 
and the independent existence of the world on the 
other. The spectre of solipsism haunting "natural 
piety's" attempt to stabilise this dialectic may result, 
as noted, in an attempt to ground experience solely in 
the constitutive powers of mind. It seems difficult to 
apply the same concepts to characterize an imagination 
seeking participation in the divine for such an 
imagination is not in any obvious sense "constitutive", 
does not simply constitute objects as modifications of 
self - see Section B of Chapter 3, p.129 foil. Indeed, 
as Coleridge pointed out - see Section D of Chapter 2 - 
an imagination of the kind Ruggiero deals with on p.45-6 
implies, if not a theology of sorts, a decidedly 
Platonistic conception of reality. Accordingly, I ted 
not to m e  the term subject-object dialectic in my 
discussions of the Simplcn-Pass passage and the 
Immortality Ode. This perhaps also shows the advantages 
of analysing divergent conceptions of mine;, world and 
the relations between them in Wordsworth's work in terms 
of the precariousness of the insights of "natural piety" 
and the epiphanies purporting to underwrite them.
Interestingly, again through failure to differentiate 
the various tendencies of Wordsworth's poetry precisely 
enough from one another, Armstrong’s discussion of the 
Simplon-Pass passage makes the opposite mistake - see 
note 54.
33a Ruggiero, op.cit., p.66.
34. Langbaum, op.cit., p.40.
35. Cassirer, E. The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms Volume 3; 
The Phenomenology of Knowledge. Trans. R. Mannheim: New 
Haven: Vale University Press, 1955, p.3.
36. For a magnificent argument that it cannot, see Ibid.,
37. See relevant notes to Chapter 1 for bibliographical 
details.
38. Langbaum, op.cit., p.17.
Actually, I am using Langbaum1a words for my own 
purposes here. He speaks of a projective act of 
consciousness in suggesting the flavour of that 
conception of experience I have consistently called
"natural piety". The tendency towards solipsism has 
been examined in the work by Armstrong already cited. 
For further treatments see Lentricchia, F. After the New 
Criticism, 1980, p.52-60, De Man, P. Blindness and 
Insight, 1971, repr.1983, p.187-98, Rajan, T. Dark
Interpreter: The Discourse of Romanticism 1980, p.13-26; 
204-66, Bostetter, E. The Romantic Ventriloquists: 
Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley, Keats, Byron 19637 
Belsey, C. Critical Practice, 1980, p.118-24, Culler, J.
The Pursuit o~f Signs, 1980" p.138-48, Nuttall, A.D. A
Common Sky: A study of Solipsism in Literature and
Philosophy, 19741 See especially p.13-44? 129-47 and 
finally, Hazlitt's remarkable review of The Excursion, 
part of which is reprinted in Ed. G. McMaster. 
Wordsworth: Penguin Critical Anthologies Series 1972^
p.ii4-20"as weYl as his treatment of Wordsworth in The 
Spirit of the Age.
39. Nuttall, A.D. A Common Sky: A Study of Solipsism in
Literature and Philosophy. London: Chatto & Windus,
T9731
40. Clarke, op.cit., p.8.
41. Clarke, op.c.t., p.8.
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44. Abrams, M.H. Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and 
Revolution in Romantic Literature"! Londons Oxford 
University Preas, 1971, p.75. See also Clarke, op.cit., 
p.71 and Armstrong, op.cit., p.30-2.
45. De Man, P. Blindness and Insight; Essays in the Rhetoric 
of Contemporary Criticism. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1971. repr. Methuen, 1983, p.196.
Speaking of the tendency, noted by Clarke and others, of 
the Romantics to use words like "affinity" and 
"sympathy" in descriptions of nature, words usually used 
to characterize human emotions, De Man notes that "the 
new terminology indicates a gliding away from the formal 
problem of a congruence between the two poles (he is
speaking o? the subject/object dialectic) to that of the 
ontological priority of the one over the other. For 
terms such as "affinity" or "sympathy" apply to the 
relationships between subjects rather than to
relationships between a subject and an object. The
relationship with nature has been superseded by an 
intersubjective, interpersonal relationship that, in the 
last analysis, is a relationship of the subject toward 
itself." (p.195-6).
46. Nuttall, op.cit., p.141.
47. Ed. Harvey, W.J. & Gravil, R. op.cit.,p.162.
48. Sherry, C. Wordsworth's Poetry of the Imagination.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966, p.41.
49. Taylor, op. cit., p. 45.
50 Kolakowski, L. Bergson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1985, p. 104.
51. Langbaum, op.cit., p.37.
51a Ruggiero, op.cit., p.75-6.
51b Ruggiero, op.cit., p.75-6 (mainly p.75). As Ruggiero 
says, poetic creation is conceived of in this passage as 
an epiphanic manifestation of "being", of "that which
52. Hirsch, op.cit., p.105.
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53. Armstrong, op.cit.,p.65.
54. Armstrong, op.eit., p.65-6.
Strangely, Armstrong's frequently perceptive reading 
seems on the verge of attributing mind and imagination 
“autonomy" in this passage, but finally does not. 
Writing on this passage she concludes that there "is a 
mystery in words, an interpretable 'darkness' which may 
even be the darkness of consciousness, but which 
Wordsworth leaves unpenetrated. To resolve the 
opposition between the two ways of seeing the world 
would be, finally, too dangerous. The dangers of 
deciding for one syntax rather than another, for one
account of the world rather than another, are the 
subject of this chapter". (p.67-8). I have two
objections to this. The first is that natural objects 
considered purely as natural objects, become "soulless 
images" in the last two lines of this extract. They owe 
their radiance to the intermittent flashes of a "light 
divine" that can surely, as Ruggiero suggests - see note 
33 - be seen only by an imagination hostile to the 
merely "bodily eye". Imagination has become 
"autonomous" in the problematical sense considered in 
Chapter 3, Section B p.124 foil.
My second objection can only be understood by 
contextualising Armstrong's reference to a "dual syntax" 
in Wordsworth's work. For Armstrong Wordsworth's 
"double syntax" (p.64) can simultaneously "claim both 
the reflexive, self-creating powers of mind which make 
the world categories of itself, and a reciprocal 
relationship in which the self is an object for the
landscape as much as the world is an object for the
self". (p.64). The "double-syntax", whose workings she
then claims to analyse in the passage under examination 
is "double" because it has inscribed within it the 
tensions uncovered in the syntax of the Invocation - see 
Chapter 3 Section A p.76-8. This tension is a tension 
between "natural piety" and mind conceived of as "Lord 
and master of outward sense". However - see note 3 3 - 1  
have argued throughout that the solipsistic autonomy of 
mind in question here is different from the opposition 
to the natural world of an imagination seeking 
participation in the divine, however construed. Even, 
then, had Armstrong insisted unequivocally on the mind's 
assumption of "autonomy" in this passage, she would not 
have done so in the relevant sense. Through failing to 
differentiate between the conceptions of mind, 
experience and the world implicit in ce.1 ebrations of 
mind and imagination as "Lord and master of outward
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sense" on the one hand, and the "unfathered vapour" on 
the other, Ruggiero and Armstrong make opposite mistakes 
£or the same fundamental reason.
55. See Da Man's seminal essay Intentional Structure of the 
Romantic Image in Ed Abrams, op.cit., p.144.
56. I owe this vital point largely to my supervisor. 
Professor A.G. Woodward.
57. Kolakowski, L. Main Currents of Marxism; Vol 1, The 
Founders. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 19^8, p.17.
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62. Ed. Harvey, W.J. & Gravil, R., p.175-93.
63. See Hartmann's famous A Poet's Progress: Wordsworth and 
the Via Naturaiiter Negative, reprinted in Ed. Harvey, 
w.u. & Gravil, R., op.cit.,p.175.
64. Hartmann in Ed. Harvey, W.J. & Gravil, R., op.cit., 
p.175-93.
65. Hartmann in Ed. Harvey, W.J. & Gravil, R. op.cit., p.
66. Hartmann in Ed. Harvey, W.J. & Gravil, R., op.citp.190.
67. Ruggiero, op.cit.,p-76.
68. It seems to me that this point is too little 
emphasised. Hartmann's article makes some of the 
relevant points, l'ut many critics still take 
Wordsworth's affectiv; rhetoric entirely on its own 
terms and read the p?ssage as emblematic of an achieved 
harmony of opposites. The point is made however in 
Ruggiero, op.cit., p.79 foil.
69. Hartmann in Ed. Harvey, W.J. & Gravil, R., op.cit.,
70. Armstrong, op.cit., p.84.
71. Armstrong, op.cit., p.84. See also De Man, P. in Ed. 
Abrams, op.cit.,p.146-2.
72. This ambiguity is picked up by Armstrong, 
op.cit,,p.84-5. However, she reads the passage as a 
particularly memorable instance of the "two syntaxes" 
(p.83} I spoke of in note 54, "reflexive and reciprocal, 
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also qualified his thought of joy in nature by pointing 
to the difference between the child's instinctive gaiety 
with his own joy which demands the poet's sympathetic 
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unity of perspective in the poem he examines. These 
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for a similar note in Chapter 1 is methodological; it is 
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be'." (p.156) This equation stems from a belief that
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of the Ode "expresses by a theiatical metaphor", (p.152) 
It goes without saying that I do not believe the 
"visionary gleam" can be naturalized in this manner. 
This is yet another instance where I have used a 
quotation in ways its author might not have approved 
of. Again, as with Hirsch, I think Trilling’s comment 
to be true, but not for his reasons.
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that the child’s immediate and therefore uncomprehending 
participation in the divine needs to be retrieved for 
consciousness, I do not believe the consolatory close of 
the Ode is convincing. In terms of the oppositions 
structuring the Immortality Ode, the child must surely 
remain the "best philosopher".
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EPILOGOB : FOOTNOTES
1. Rtijan, T. Dark Intsrpreter; The Discourse of 
Romanticism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980,p.15
Similar claims would be made in a different manner by 
Paul De Man. See The Rh toric of Temporality in 
Blindness and Insight; Es ays in the Rhetoric of 
Contemporary Criticism. Ne York: Oxford University
Press, 1971 repr. 1993, p.28/-228.
2. Lentricchia, F. After the New Criticism. Athlone Press, 
1980, p.32; 53 foil.
3. Ruggiero, H. The Limits of Imagination: Wordsworth, 
Yeats & Stevens. Ithaca & London: Cornell University 
Press, 1976, p.116.
4. Ibid., p.27 & 165.
5. Ibid., p.165.
The significance of this poem has, however, been 
recognized by all Wallace Stevens1 more important 
commentators.
6 . Ibid., p.159.
Ruggiero makes the point in a different way, but is 
correct to stress that the image's mode of being differs 
radically from that of the object. Her analysis of the 
implications of this for the poetry is also both 
thorough and acute.
7. Ibid., p.159.
8 . Ibid., p.148-9.
9. Lentricchia, op.cit., p.34.
10. Lentricchia, op.cit., p.34.
11. Lentricchia, op.cit., p.33.
11a Lentricchia, op.cit,, p.34.
12. Ruggiero, op.cit., p.148-9.
13. Lentricchia, op.cit., p.36; 38 foil.
14. Lentricchia, op.cit., p.38.
15. Lentricchia, op.cit:., p.35-6.
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Lentricchia, F. Robert Frost? Modern Poetics and the 
Landscapes of Self. Durham! Duke University Press, 1975, 
pTTST^ T
See Ibid., 101-119.
Ibid., p.102.
Ibid., p.103.
This diminished "metaphysical reverberation" is, as 
Lentricchia and many others have pointed out, one reason 
for the ironical self-consciously "fictivo" nature of 
the work of a writer like Stevens. This is yet another 
example of the continuities and differences between 
Romanticism and Modernism. It would be no exaggeration 
to say that a small industry has grown around the 
exploration of these questions, including many of the 
more frequently cited bibliographical sources in my 
footnotes, It will be obvious frnm this dissertation 
that I believe the continuities between nineteenth and 
twentieth century literature and philosophy to be deeper 
than the disjunctions. To that er.tent I disagree with 
Lentricchia. A work dealing v;ith these matters 
explicitly in relation to Wordsworth is Rheder, R. 
Wordsworth and the Beginnings of Modern Poetry. London:
1981. Both Abrams' Natural Supernaturalism and 
Langbaum's Poetry of Experience, it c-ies without saying 
give impressive testimony to the depth of the cultural 
upheaval that took place in European intellectua- life 
in the latter part of the eighteenth century. The ocean 
of literature is such that piecemeal naming of litles 
serves even less purpose than normal. I will therefore 
conclude by saying that Taylor's boel: on Hegel is one of 
the most distinguished attempts I know to demcostrate 
these continuities in politics a-J3 philosophy. The 
figure of Hegel is particularly suited to demonstrating 
the point with which this chapter apened, that a 
thinker's concerns can still ? : etasively present
generations after his solutions are deei.
For what it is worth, I think it is. Although there is 
no question of a "fellowship of esoense" between world 
and self being established, Stevens1 cosire to stabilize 
the conflict of the subject/object dialectic through 
finding a tune on the "blue guitar" that would leave 
things as they are is an expression of the same hopu 
animating Schiller's letters.
Trilling, L. Prefaces to the Experience of Literature. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967, reprl Uniform
Edition, 1981, p.273
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Natural Supernaturalis Tradition and
Oxford*. Oxford
Bate, W.J. Coleridge. New York? Macmillan, 1968, p.110.
Again too many readers take Coleridge on hia own terms 
entirely. The degree to which hope and external 
circumstance in she past were not callibrated with one 
another makes "Joy", as in stanza 3, a product of the 
"fountains within"• The debate about how "affirmative"
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by Hill in Hill, J.S. A Coleridge Companion. London: 
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"Joy" and mind. This is certainly true of those
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